' MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBAS.., J.--- These two connected appeals involving common question of law and facts are proposed to be disposed of through this single judgment. Leave was granted in these appeals vide order, dated 22-9-2005 in the following terms:- "Both the petitions arise out of common judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 2-7-2003, substituting penalty of dismissal from service to withholding of two increments and directing reinstatement of Syed Nasir Abbas Naqvi in the employment of Allied Bank of Pakistan.
' Precise facts appear to be that petitioner Syed Nasir Abbas Naqvi was serving as Officer Grade-III in the Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited. He was proceeded against on the charge of misconduct for getting certain questions answered in "Accountancy paper" of Banker's Diploma Examination held in Summer 1999 by the Institute of Bankers for acquiring higher professional qualifications. He defended disciplinary proceedings but was found to be guilty of misconduct and dismissed from service vide order, dated 19-10-1999.
' In the first instance petitioner filed a service appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal which was rejected with the observations that Federal Government did not own or possess controlling shares in the Allied Bank of Pakistan, therefore, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the penalty. Petitioner, therefore, invoke jurisdiction of Punjab Labour Court, Lahore.
His grievance petition was hotly contested but ultimately allowed and reinstatement ordered. The employer-Bank challenged the reinstatement order before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal who reversed the findings of the Labour Court and dismissed the grievance petition on a variety of grounds. The petitioner-employer, ultimately, filed a writ petition before the Lahore High Court which was resisted by the employer-Bank on a number of grounds. The High Court, inter alia, held that Branch of the Bank in which the petitioner was serving could not be treated as an "establishment" in isolation from the Bank establishment as a whole. Principle of double jeopardy for double punishment for same act was decided against the petitioner employee. It was held that he was a workman within the scope of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, and that petition before the Labour Court even if barred by time delay was rightly condoned by the Appellate Court and not disturbed by the Appellate Tribunal. Finding the petitioner guilty of misconduct, however, the High Court took a lenient view in the matter of penalty by substituting the same as aforesaid. Both parties feeling aggrieved by the finding and judgment of the High Court now seek leave to appeal.
' We have heard Syed Nasir Abbas Naqvi in Civil Petition No,2617 of 2003 and Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, Advocate Supreme Court, in Civil Petition No,1859 of 2003, who has, A inter alia, contended that apart from other findings which may not be sustained at law, at any rate, High Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction could not alter or modify the penalty imposed upon an employee through such power vested in an appellate forum. Reliance is placed on Pakistan Tobacco Company v. Channa Khan 1980 PLC 981 (Supreme Court) and Brig. (Retd.) F.B. Ali v. The State PLD 1975 SC 506.
' The questions raised appear to be question of law of public importance, therefore, we are inclined to grant leave to appeal to examine, inter alia, the question of jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of alteration of penalty in its writ jurisdiction. Order accordingly.
Since a short question is involved in these petitions, office is directed to list them out for final hearing before the year 2005 is out."
2. The pivotal question involved in the present appeals relates to the scope of the power of judicial review of the High Court in the matters falling within the discretionary jurisdiction of public functionaries.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant-Bank has challenged the judgment of the High Court on the grounds firstly, that the learned Judge in the High Court after having observed that the respondent has admitted the charge of misconduct, was not supposed to interfere in the matter and secondly, the quantum of punishment being exclusively in the domain of departmental authority, the Labour Court or the High Court could not justifiably reduced the penalty.
' The learned counsel for Syed .Nasir Abbas Naqvi, respondent, on the other hand has argued that the penalty of dismissal from service was not in consonance with the nature of charge and since the respondent was debarred from appearing in ten subsequent examinations of the Banking Institution, therefore, the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon him by the Bank on the same charge was without lawful authority.
4. The charge against the respondent, an employee of Allied Bank of Pakistan on the basis of which he was debarred from appearing in examination by the controlling authority of Institute of Banking, may under the Bank Service Rules constitute an act of misconduct and consequently, the action taken by the Bank administration against the respondent on the charge of misconduct, may not be without lawful authority.
' The Labour Court having set aside the order by virtue of which the respondent was dismissed from service, allowed the grievance petition filed by him under section 25-A, of the I.R.O., 1969 vide order, dated 11-12-2000 whereas the Labour Appellate Tribunal while reversing the order of Labour Court in appeal filed by the Bank, dismissed the grievance petition and the High Court in writ petition filed by the respondent, directed reinstatement of respondent in service with modification of the penalty of dismissal from service into stoppage of increments vide judgment, dated 2-7-2003, therefore, the essential question requiring determination in the present appeal in the given situation would be the scope of interference of the High Court in the writ jurisdiction. We may agree with the learned counsel that ordinarily the High Court is not supposed to interfere in the administrative functions and disciplinary matter of public organizations in its constitutional jurisdiction unless it is found that an order passed by an authority in its discretion was capricious, arbitrary or was passed in utter disregard of law. This is also not disputed that in disciplinary matter, the departmental authorities have exclusive domain to determine the quantum of punishment in the light of nature of charge and Court may not substitute its decision in such matters but this is settled law that the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction may look into the question of legality of an order passed by an authority and consequently, we deem it proper to examine the proposition in the light of the provisions of section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969.
' The expression "just and proper" used in clause (b) to the proviso to subsection (4) of above section in the legislative wisdom reflects the meaning that there must be some control on the exercise of power of the employer in the matter of determining the degree of punishment and Labour Court in a proper case, may wholly or partially allow a grievance petition and modify the penalty awarded to an employee by the employer with any other sort of penalty prescribed under the law. In the present case, the Labour Court having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, reinstated the respondent without grant of back-benefits whereas the Appellate Tribunal taking a contrary view of the matter, dismissed the grievance petition and the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review, having formed opinion that in view of the admission of respondent regarding charge of misconduct, the penalty of stoppage of increments would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice and consequently, setting aside the order of Labour Appellate Tribunal, restored that of the order of Labour Court. The statutory remedy of appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal against the order passed by the Labour Court is certainly in continuation of the proceedings before the Labour Court whereas extraordinary remedy of writ petition before the High Court is invokeable in exceptional cases, therefore, the High Court may not necessarily interfere in the every order passed by the authorities in their discretion. However, the scope of judicial review of the High Court is not confined to particular kind of orders rather the High Court in its jurisdiction, may in the suitable cases, look into the question of legality or otherwise of an order passed by the public functionaries effecting the right of a person.
' The High Court has not unfettered power of judicial review in its constitutional jurisdiction and may not substitute the administrative decision of the public authorities in its jurisdiction but these limitations on the power of judicial review of the High Court, cannot deter it from looking the question of arbitrary exercise of power or validity of the orders passed by the public authorities and consequently, High Court must not hesitate from examining the legality of a matter in its entirety to correct the transgression or abuse of power or unlawful exercise of authority. In view thereof, we find no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the administrative orders passed by the public authorities in their discretion are immune from the judicial scrutiny of the Court. The quantum of punishment may not as such a question of law in every case but the Court on coming to the conclusion that the punishment has been awarded in an arbitrary manner which did not commensurate with the gravity of charge, must look into the legality of order and may also interfere to correct the illegality in the interest of justice. This Court is always reluctant to interfere in the order of the High Court passed in its discretionary jurisdiction under the Constitution unless there is serious question of law of public importance and learned I counsel in the present case has not been able to show us any such illegality in the order of High Court calling for interference of this Court. Be that as it may, keeping in view the admission of the charge by the respondent, we are of the opinion that the penalty of stoppage of increments is also inadequate and consequently, in view of the concept of substantial justice, we without disturbing the reinstatement of the respondent in service, modify the penalty of stoppage of two increments into withholding his promotion for a period of seven years with effect from the date of order of dismissal passed by the competent authority under section 15(4) of West Pakistan (Standing. Orders)
Ordinance, 1968.
9. With the above modification in the judgment of the High Court, Civil Appeal No,1096 of 2005 filed by the Bank is partly allowed and connected Civil Appeal No,1097 of 2005 filed by the respondent is dismissed. The parties shall bean their own costs.