1. ' ALI SAIN DINO METLO, J.---Heard Messrs Muhammad Ayaz Soomro, Advocate for the applicant, Ali Nawaz Ghanghro, Advocate for the complainant and Mushtaque Ahmed Abbasi, Assistant Advocate-General for the State.
2. ' The allegation against the applicant is that on 2-9-2005 at about 1500 hours, in front of Otaq of Mithal Khan Khoso at the bank of Supra Minor Canal, near village Sher Muhammad Khoso, Taluka Kamber, he and his brother co-accused Allah Dino, both armed with shotguns, killed complainant Ghulam Mustafa' s son Liaquat Ali by making fires upon him. The incident was witnessed by the complainant and his two nephews Gul Hassan and Ghulam Umar. The motive, as alleged, was that about a week prior to this incident, there was altercation between the deceased and the applicant on the matter of irrigation water. The F.I.R. Was lodged with Police Station Drigh on the same day at 1800 hours.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant has pressed the bail application only on the ground of delay in the conclusion of trial under section 10(7) of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, as according to him, the applicant was a child as defined in section 2(b) of the Ordinance and despite passage of more than a year the trial had not concluded and the applicant was not responsible for the delay.
4. ' According to the School Leaving Certificate produced by the applicant, he was of 11 years at the time of the commission of the offence. The Medial Board, constituted under the orders of the trial Court, examined him on 3-2-2005 and found his age to be between 17 to 18 years. Thus,' it is clear that at the time of the commission of the offence the applicant was a 'child' as defined in section 2(b) ibid. Under section 10(7) ibid, a child becomes entitled to bail if he has remained in custody for a continuous period exceeding one year and his trial has not concluded. The applicant was arrested on 2-9-2004 and he is continuously in custody and his trial has not concluded. There is nothing on record to show that he was a previous convict or that the delay was occasioned by him.
5. There is also nothing on record to show that the offence is 'serious, heinous, gruesome, brutal, sensational in character or shocking to public morality' so as to deny him the right under the proviso to section 10(7) ibid. No doubt , the offence of murder, like all other offences entailing capital punishment, is a serious offence, but bail under section 10(7) ibid cannot be denied merely because he was involved in 'serious' offence. Word 'serious1 will have to be read in conjunction with 'heinous, gruesome, brutal, sensational in character or shocking to public morality' and not in isolation, otherwise the very object of enacting the provision will- be defeated which cannot be the intention of the legislature. Faced with such factual and legal position, Mr. Ali Nawaz Ghanghro, conceded that there remained nothing for him to argue. Mr. Mushtaque Ahmed Abbasi, learned A.A.-G. Frankly conceded to the grant of bail.
6. ' In view of the above, it is 'clear that the applicant is entitled to bail under section 10(7) ibid. Therefore, he is admitted to bail in the sum of Rs.300,000 with one surety and personal recognizance in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court. The application was allowed by a short order on 2-11-2005 and these are the reasons for the same.