Rana Bhagwandas, J.--This appeal with the leave of the Court is directed against judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 29.2.2000 allowing Writ Petition No, 16422 of 1996 filed by Respondent No, 1 calling in question the correctness and validity of demand notice dated 28.7.1996 issued by appellant-Zila Council, Lahore.
2. Respondent No, 1 is carrying on business of manufacturing shoes in its Unit situated at Mauza Bath 34-Kilometers Multan Road, Lahore since 1996. Appellant-Zila Council, constituted under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) issued a notice to the said respondent on 28.7.1996 calling upon it to pay licence fee amounting to Rs, 50,000/- for the year 1996-1997, failing which action under section 162 of the Ordinance would be initiated and the amount of licence fee recovered as arrears of land revenue.
3. The respondent challenged the correctness of the notice of demand through a writ petition before the Lahore High Court on the premises that it was not required to obtain any licence or permission for running its business; that the appellant was not entitled to levy any fee or tax on the industry of the respondent and that the demand itself was unreasonable and highly excessive. The petition was resisted by the appellant-Zila Council, while the Government of Punjab was also represented by Assistant Advocate General, Punjab but it seems that proper assistance was not rendered to the learned Judge in Chambers, who, upon interpretation of the provisions contained in Sections 73 and 137 of the Ordinance, proceeded to hold that licence was required only in respect of trade or business specified in the First Schedule. According to the learned Judge, shoe manufacturing was not one of the trades mentioned in the First Schedule and there was no other provision in the Ordinance authorizing the Local Council to direct a person to obtain a licence for running a business or trade if it did not fall within the ambit of the First Schedule to the Ordinance.
As regards Section 137 of the Ordinance, it was observed that Zila Council was empowered to levy fee on sanctions, licenses and permissions granted by it but this provision would come into operation when it was shown that for running a particular business, a licence was required to be obtained under some provision of law.
4. Leave to appeal was granted to consider the question whether the appellant Council was empowered vide Item No, 12 of the Second Schedule Part-II of the Ordinance to levy tax or fee on professions, trades, callings and employments.
5. We have heard Dr. M. Mohyuddin Qazi, learned ASC on behalf of the appellants and Khawaja Muhammad Akram, learned ASC who has entered appearance on behalf of Respondent No, 1 and gone through the record. Learned counsel for the respondent did not press the argument that the trade or business carried on by Respondent No, 1 was covered by the ' scope of trade and business falling under the provisions of Section 73 of the Ordinance, which essentially deals with dangerous and offensive articles and trades. Learned counsel, however, vehemently contended that notwithstanding the power and jurisdiction of the local council to levy all or any of the taxes enumerated in the Second Schedule, appellant had failed to establish whether any licence fee was levied at any time on the business of shoe manufacturing. In this connection learned counsel appearing for the appellant heavily relied upon section 137 of the Ordinance, which reads as under: "137. Taxes to be levied.--A local Council subject to the provisions of any other law may, and if directed by Government shall levy all &r any of the taxes enumerated in the Second Schedule."
6. Learned counsel then proceeded to invite our attention to Second Schedule, Part-II enumerated the "taxes leviable by Zila Councils. Item 12 of this list deals with taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments.". Having referred to the provision in the Schedule to the Ordinance, learned counsel also invited our attention to Section 138 of the Ordinance, which reads as follows:-- "138. Notification and enforcement of taxes.--(1) All taxes levied by a local Council shall be notified and shall, unless otherwise directed by Government, be subject to previous publication.
(2) Where a tax is levied or modified the local Council shall specify the date for the enforcement thereof and such tax or the modification shall come into force on such date.
7. Learned counsel further referred to Gazette Notification No, 592 dated 26.1.1995 revising the rates of licence fee and professional tax as notified earlier vide Notification No, 9055 dated 15.10.1992. He pointed out that in this notification, licence fee of Rs, 1,00,000/- already imposed on shoe factories was reduced to Rs, 50,000/-. It may be pertinent to note that this Notification is expressly referred in the impugned notice, vices whereof were challenged before the High Court. Earlier public notices published in print media inviting objections from general public with regard to the imposition of tax/fee in terms of Sections 137 and 138 of the Ordinance have also been placed on record, which fully support the stance taken by appellant-Zila Council that in fact this tax/fee was already imposed on a large number of trades, professions and callings as enumerated in the Gazette Notification. Indeed it was in the exercise of the powers vested in the Council under section 138 of the Ordinance that the Council had reviewed and modified various amounts of taxes/fees levied on different trades and industries.
8. Learned counsel for the respondent is unable to controvert the legality or authenticity of these Notifications, which perhaps were not highlighted before the High Court otherwise the result of the writ petition in all probability would have been different. Since appellant-Zila Council is duly empowered to levy fees/taxes on trades, professions, callings and employments and has evidently acted within jurisdiction vested in it by law inasmuch as requisite notifications were not only issued but also published in the official Gazette, no exception as such can be taken to the demand notice issued by the said Council.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that writ petition against the impugned notice was not maintainable before the High Court as alternate and efficacious remedy was available in terms of Sections 156 and 166 of the Ordinance but on scrutiny of both the provisions of law, we are not inclined to agree with the learned counsel as no express provision providing for an appeal against the imposition of a tax or fee on a particular trade or industry by a local Council as a whole had been pointed out taking away the jurisdiction of a Court. Even otherwise, High Court is possessed of extraordinary inherent jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to redress the wrong and rectify injustice, therefore, no exception can be taken to the maintainability of the writ petition itself, which was rightly entertained in the circumstances of the case.
10. For the aforesaid facts, circumstances and reasons, we are of the considered view that the demand raised by appellant Zila Council does not suffer from lack of jurisdiction with the necessary corollary that this appeal must succeed and no acceptance impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. No order as to costs.