Javed Iqbal, J.--This appeal with leave of the Court is directed against the judgment dated 12.2.2000 whereby the appeal preferred on behalf of appellant has been dismissed by the learned Federal Service Tribunal and the order dated 7.9.1999 whereby the appellant was retired compulsorily under Section 17(1-A)(a) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 has been kept intact.
2. Heard Harm Traiq Naseem, learned ASC on behalf of appellant and Mr. Faiz-ur-Rehman, learned AOR for WAPDA. The judgment impugned has been perused carefully, relevant portion whereof is reproduced herein below for ready reference:-- "2. We have held in the case of Muhammad Ibrahim Mangrio (Appeal No, 23 (L) CS/2000, decided on 9.2.2000) and in Appeal No, 17(L)/2000-CS, decided on 10.2.2000, filed by Zahid Parvaiz Mughal, that an order of retirement made under the provisions of Section 17(1-A)(a) of the WAPDA Act 1958, is in accordance with the terms and conditions of service of the appellant. There is no mala fide or reason other than the order of retirement passed under the provisions of Section 17(1-A)(a) of the WAPDA Act, 1958. The appeal as such is dismissed and status quo order passed by a Bench of this Tribunal on 24.12.1999 is vacated. In the circumstances of the case, parties are to bear their own costs. The appellant shall return the monetary benefits if received in between 24.12.1999 till 12.2.2000."
3. A bare perusal of above would reveal that the appeal has been decided in a perfunctory and slipshod manner by means of a non-speaking order without assigning any reason whatsoever for conclusion drawn by the learned Federal Service Tribunal. The judgment impugned is not in consonance with the dictum as laid down in WAPDA v. Zulfiqar (PLD 1988 SC 693), Ejaz Nabi Abbasi v. WAPDA (1992 SCM R 774), and is in oblivion of the dictum laid down by this Court in Pakistan and others v. Public-at-large and others (PLD 1987 SC 304) wherein it was held that WAPDA employees must be apprised of and intimated regarding the reasons of their pre-mature retirement. It is worth-mentioning that pursuant to the said judgment, amendment was made in the relevant section of the WAPDA Act, 1958 by means of Act No, XIII of 1994 and an opportunity of show-cause notice was provided. In this regard reference can also be made to the case of Ejaz Nabi Abbasi (supra) wherein it was observed as follows: "11. Though Section 17(1-A) of the Act seemingly confers on the Authority plenary power to remove or to retire an employee of WAPDA at any time without assigning any reason after giving him not less than thirty days' notice or pay for the period by which such notice falls short of thirty days, however, it does not mean that the Authority enjoys above power unfettered or unbridled or arbitrary. The object of conferring such power seems to be to make easier for the Authority to remove from Service surplus and/or inefficient under/or corrupt employees without holding long drawn departmental enquiry in order to make the establishment more viable and efficient and, therefore, exercise of the above power should be directed to achieve the above objective. It is to be exercised in good faith by the repository of the power, untainted with bias or mala fide or consideration other than the above objective and, therefore, any action in violation of the above basic norms will warrants interference by the Tribunal and this Court."
4. The scope of Section 17(1-A)(a) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 has been examined time and again by this Court and finally settled in case titled ,WAPDA v. Sikandar Ali Abro (1998 SCM R 137), relevant portion whereof is reproduced herein below:-- "9. We now proceed to consider whether on account of change in the language of Section 17(1-A) of the Act introduced by Act XIII of 1994, the scope and scheme of Section 17(1-A) (ibid), has been changed so that the above interpretation of the provisions of Section 17(1-A) has become inapplicable. We have already reproduced earlier in this judgment the original text of Section 17(1- A) as well as its provisions as they now stand after the amendment of 1994. This insertion of the words "after informing him in writing of the grounds on which such action is proposed to be taken and giving him an opportunity of showing cause in writing against the action, within a period of fourteen days" in place of "without assigning any reason, after giving him not less than thirty days' notice or pay for the period by which such notice falls short of thirty days". In our view though it did not take away the discretion of Authority- completely to remove its employee, but it did have the effect of curtailing such discretion. Under Section 17(1-A) of the Act as it originally stood, the Authority could remove and employee without disclosing the reasons for such removal by just giving the concerned employee either 30 days' notice or pay in lieu thereof. However, under the amended section 17(1-A), the Authority now cannot remove and employee without first informing him the grounds on which action for this removal from service is being taken and allowing him an opportunity of showing cause in writing against the proposed action. This change in the procedure for removal of an employee under Section 17(1-A) of the Act, in our view, is intended to remove the taint of arbitrariness, if any, in such action. This however, does not mean that the discretion available to Authority under Section 17(1-A) to dispense with the services of an employee has been taken away by the amendment of 1994. The amendment introduced in Section 17(1-A) by Act XIII of 1994 has the effect of only circumscribing the discretion of the Authority by providing a different procedure for removal of employee from service. The contention of the respondents that after amendment in the language of section 17(1-A), a detailed enquiry is must in every case of removal of an employee from service under Section 17(1-A) (ibid) does not appear to be correct. Similarly, the contention of respondents that where in the first instance the Authority elected to proceed under the Rules, it could not take action under Section 17(1-A) of the Act, is devoid of force. The, language of Section 17(1-A), even after amendment, does not admit of any such construction. The underlying object of Section 17(1-A) of the Act, even after its amendment by the Act XIII of 1994, remained unchanged and the Authority still has the discretion to dispense with the service of an employee through recourse to Section 17(1-A) provided the removal did not carry with it any stigma and the procedure laid down in the section is strictly followed by the Authority. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on Ghulam Hadi Baloch v. Collector of. Customs (1987 SCM R 602) and Zarar Khan v. Govt. of Sindh and others (PLD 1980 SC 310), in support of their contention that where the Authority first chooses to proceed against its employee under the detailed procedure is could not subsequently change its mind and follow another procedure prescribed under the Rules. These cases are quite distinguishable. In both the above cited cases the proceedings were initiated under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. In the case before us, there was no legal bar for the Authority to have recourse to the provisions of Section 17(1-A) of the Act, even where proceedings under the Rules were initiated in the first instance against an employee as held by this Court in WAPDA v. Muhammad Ali (supra)."
10. From the proceeding discussion, it follows that even after amendment in Section 17(1-A) of the Act, the Authority is competent to remove an employee from Service through recourse to the provisions of Section 17(1-A) of the Act provided the removal does not carry with it any stigma on the concerned employee and the grounds of removal are such that they could be determined with the ambit of procedure prescribed under section 17(1-A) of the Act. As a corollary, it follows that where the Authority intends to remove an employee on serious charges which required detailed enquiry to establish the same and it also carried stigma on the concerned employee the 'Authority' could not have recourse to the provisions of Section 17(1-A) of the Act for removing such employee from service."
5. Mr. Faizur Rehman, learned AOR on behalf of WAPDA has conceded frankly that no show-cause notice could be issued which should have been issued pursuant to the dictum as laid down by this Court in various authorities as mentioned above. Mr. Faiz-ur-Rehman, learned AOR has assured that the disciplinary proceedings would be initiated afresh strictly in accordance with law and the guidelines as provided by this Court specially in line with the provisions as enumerated in Section 17 (1-A)(a) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 subject to permission of this Court.
6. In view of what has been stand herein above, the judgment impugned being laconic is set aside.
The appellant shall be reinstated in service w,e,f, 7.9.1999. The WAPDA would be at liberty to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law which shall be finalized within a period of four months. The question of back benefits may be raised by the appellant after finalization of disciplinary proceedings and its result which shall be decided by the department on merits.