' MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ J.---This order shall decide W.P.No,3359/05, W.P. No,3358/05 and W.P.
No,3357/05 as common questions are involved.
2. The persons impleaded as respondent No,1 in each of these three writ petitions were, admittedly, the employees of the petitioner. On 18-1-2000 (W.Ps. No,3359/05 and 3358/05) and 15-12-1999 (W.P.
No,3357/05), they filed applications under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936,before the respondent No,3 for recovery of salary, over-time, leave encashment and balance gratuity. The petitioner filed the replies denying their liability and objecting that the applications are not competent. The respondent No,3 framed issues and recorded evidence of the parties. The applications were allowed on 31-12-2001. The petitioner filed appeals before respondent No,2 which were allowed on 22-4-2003 and the cases were remanded. Vide orders dated 5-6-2004 the applications were allowed. However, the amount claimed was reduced in all the cases after making some corrections. The petitioners filed appeals before respondent No,2. All these appeals were heard together and dismissed vide a common judgment dated 30-3-2005 by the learned Punjab Labour Court No,9, Multan.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of National General Insurance Company Ltd. Through F.A. Jaffary, General Manager v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,9, Rawalpindi and others (2004 PLC 207) has not been properly read by the learned Labour Court. According to the learned counsel, neither the private respondents were workers or workmen nor were the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, applicable. He also questions the findings of the learned Labour Court to the effect that the appeals were not competent as the requisite deposits have not been made.
4. Taking the last point first, I find that the deposits had, in fact, been made in terms of section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, as certified by respondent No,2 and as such the appeals were competent.
5. Now so far as the said other contentions of the learned counsel are concerned, I find the same to be without any force. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has laid down in clear terms that the benefits conferred because of amendment of section 1(4) of the said Act by Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001 w,e,f, 1-7-2001 would be available to persons who were already in employment before 1-7-2001. Le irned counsel argues that since the applications were filed before the amendment took effect, the said benefits would not be available. I am afraid nothing turns on this argument. The reason being that under section 15(2) of the said Act an application for relief envisaged by the said law can be filed within three years from the date when the payment of wages was due and the second proviso to section 15(2) of the said Act provides for admission of an application even after the said three years. This being so, an application could have been competently filed even at a point of time on or after the said amendment was made and the private respondents would be entitled to the said benefit as per dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. The provision being beneficial, its applicability is to be liberally construed particularly with reference to the main ratio of the said judgment. Now once it is held that the private respondents were entitled to make a claim under the said Act of 1936, the argument that they were or were not workers or workmen becomes irrelevant as the Act itself does not lay any restriction in this matter. Learned counsel then has tried to argue that, at least, the claim of gratuity was not competent inasmuch as the said amount was payable under the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, and in order to avail the benefit, the private respondents had to be within the definition of a worker or a workman contained in the said Ordinance. The argument appears to be attracting but loses sight of the statement made by the Business Manager of the petitioner before the respondent No,3 wherein he stated that the gratuity has been paid in accordance with the Company Rules. The finding of fact being that the gratuity was not so paid the award on the said count cannot be said to be illegal or without lawful authority.
All the three writ petitions are dismissed in limine.