M. SALEEM CHAUDHRY (CHAIRMAN).-In this case the appellant an ex-Head Constable of Police is aggrieved by the order of Superintendent of Police, Gujrat dated 23rd February, 1976 dis--missing him from service and the order of Deputy Inspector General of Police, Rawalpindi rejecting his appeal against the order of S. P. Gujrat. The Revision Petition filed by the appellant before the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, was also rejected on 23rd December, 1976. The appellant instead of approaching this Tribunal, in the first instance, moved an application before the Martial Law Authorities and eventually filed a Civil Suit on 9th December, 1978 in the Civil Court at Gujrat.
The suit filed by the appellant was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, but the appellant still chose to press his claim before the District Judge, Gujrat, who also dismissed his appeal on the 14th October, 1979. The present appeal has been filed before this Tribunal on 21st December, 1999. It appears to be barred by time.
2. The appellant has moved an application along with this appeal seeking condonation of delay on the ground that he was wrongly pursuing his remedy somewhere else and as such extension in time be granted. In the application the appellant has sought the extension for the time in filing this appeal on the plea that the period spent in pursuing the civil suit had to be excluded inasmuch as he was pursuing his remedy before a wrong forum having no jurisdiction in good faith. The appellant also submitted that after the dismissal of his appeal by the District Judge, Gujrat on 14th October, 1979, he applied for a certified copy of the order which was delivered to him on 14th November, 1979. Before us the appellant has also taken up the plea that he was sick from 7th December, 1979 to 25th December, 1979 and he could produce Medical Certificate in support of his above contention, although none has been placed on the record so far. With these submissions, the appellant submitted that if the time spent before the civil Court and the time consumed in sickness and in obtaining certified copy of order of District Judge, Gujrat, were to be excluded, the appeal filed as such was within 30 days and, therefore, merited to be treated as in time.
3. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant we are afraid we can do not feel persuaded to accept the plea of the appellant for the extension of time. The period of 30 days was available to the appellant against the order of Departmental Authority which had already run out The appellant has failed to satisfy us that he had been pursuing his remedy before the civil Court in good faith. In fact the legal position as contained in article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan was quite clear that the disputes regarding terms and conditions of service of a civil servant were entertainable only before the Service Tribunal established in pursuance of the provisions aforesaid. This Tribunal was established in July 1974. It is too late in 1979 to assert the plea of good faith qua the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. In any case assuming that the appellant was entitled to exclude the period spent in pursuing his remedy before the civil Court still he had failed to file the appeal diligently before this Tribunal which had become barred by time. It is admitted by the appellant that the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, has rejected the departmental appeal of the appellant on 23rd December, 1976 whereas the civil suit by the appellant on 9th December, 1978 i.e., after the lapse of two. The appeal had already become grossly barred by time when the civil suit was instituted. The appeal is also liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation as even after excluding the time for getting certified copy of the order passed by the District Judge, Gujrat, the appellant was required to approach this Tribunal within a reasonable time as the prescribed period for filing the appeal before this Tribunal had already run out. The impression of the appellant that he was entitled to avail 30 days after the order passed by the District Judge; Gujrat, appears to be wholly misconceived and had no basis in law. The learned counsel has not been able to satisfy us in this regard. In fact, the law c is well settled that the appellant is required to explain the delay for each and every day. Since there is no explanation whatsoever available with the appellant for the unreasonable delay after obtaining the certified copy of the order of District Judge, Gujrat, therefore, we are not inclined to condone the delay in this case.
4. In view of the above, the appeal is rejected as barred by time.