' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---The appellant, through the appeal in hand, has called in question order dated 14-4-2006, whereby the learned Judge Banking Court, after dismissing respondent-Bank's application for leave to defend the suit, also dismissed appellant's suit for declaration and permanent injunction.
2. Precisely stated facts of the case, leading to the present appeal, are that the appellant filed the suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunction, along with the applications for the grant of temporary injunction and seeking "Superdari" of vehicle, reportedly repossessed by the respondent-Bank before the Judge Banking Court. The Bank filed the application seeking leave to defend the suit. The learned Judge Banking Court, after hearing the parties, dismissed appellant's applications for temporary injunction and "Superdari" as having become infructuous; Bank's application for leave to defend the suit was also dismissed and resultantly appellant's suit was disposed of being not "proceedable", vide composite impugned order dated 14-4-2006, hence the present appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the learned Banking Court, without adopting the procedure prescribed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 decided the suit, which course of action is not recognized under the law. He has added that dismissal of respondent-Bank's application for leave to defend the suit in fact strengthened the case of the appellant and proved that the respondent-Bank had no plausible defence, therefore, appellant's suit deserved to be decreed. The learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has however, supported the impugned order.
4. We have heard the learned counsel and examined the available record. The respondent-Bank, in response to the summons issued by the Banking Court filed the application, under section 10 of the aforenoted Ordinance, seeking leave to defend the suit, however, the learned Judge Banking Court not only dismissed respondent's application for leave to defend the suit, but also disposed of appellant's suit on the ground that the same is not "proceedable". We are of the view that the approach of the learned Judge Banking Court in simultaneously dismissing application for leave to defend the suit and appellant's suit, that too without assigning any reason, is not recognized under the law and is a complete departure from the procedure prescribed under the law. The learned Banking Court was obliged to give reasons as to how respondent's application for leave to defend the suit does not disclose substantial questions of law and facts in respect of which evidence needs to be recorded. Be that as it may, if the learned Court decided to reject respondent-Bank's application, then the appellant should have been granted opportunity to prove his case either through documentary or oral evidence or both. If a financial institution files a suit against a customer and latter's application for leave to defend the suit is dismissed, then a Banking Court, in exercise of powers under section 10(11) of the Ordinance No,XLVI of 2001, may pass a decree in favour of the bank, as the suit is based on negotiable instruments. However, in this case as appellant's suit was not based on negotiable instruments, therefore, after the dismissal of Bank's leave application, the suit could not have straightaway been decreed or dismissed without affording an opportunity to the appellant to produce evidence in support of his claim. To our mind, even after rejecting respondent's leave application in the suit for declaration and permanent injunction, decree could not have been passed straightaway as the claim of the declaration cannot be equated with the suit founded on negotiable instruments. When the respondent-Bank failed to obtain leave to defend the suit, the learned Judge Banking Court was legally obliged to decide appellant's suit after calling upon him to produce evidence in respect of his claim. In such- like cases, even if a defendant does not appear before the learned Judge Banking Court or he is not granted leave, the Banking Court is not absolved of its duties to apply its judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of each case. If any case-law is needed, judgment reported as Messrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries Khushab and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi through President and 3 others 1999 SCM R 2353 can be referred.
5. There is another aspect of the case. The impugned order is devoid of reasons and lacks all the characteristics of a "judicial order". The learned Judge Banking Court without advancing any reasons, straightaway dismissed respondent's application for leave to defend the suit. Similarly no reasons are forthcoming from the impugned order itself, as to how and on what grounds after the dismissal of respondent's application for leave to defend the suit, appellant's suit is not "proceedable". The impugned order is silent on all these crucial aspects of the case. More importantly, neither the suit of the appellant was dismissed nor plaint was rejected and strangely enough the suit was disposed of without any consequences. The impugned order, undeniably is sketchy, slipshod, devoid of reasons and not at all a speaking order. The tenor of the impugned order shows that the learned Judge Banking Court has not seriously taken up the matter and it apparently shows lack of application of judicial mind. Even it has been enjoined upon an executive authority, as per section 24-A of General Clauses Act, 1897, (inserted by General Clauses (Amendment Act, 1997, Act No,XI of 1997) to give reasons for making the order. Furthermore, such type of perfunctory orders passed by the Courts are not approved by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. Reliance can be made to Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158 and Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173. The impugned order deserves to be set aside on this ground.
6. The respondent-Bank has neither filed the appeal nor cross-objections against the impugned order and the Bank seems to be satisfied, therefore, the order rejecting respondent's bank leave application has attained finality. In view whereof, we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned order to the extent of dismissal of bank's application.
7. In the above perspective, we have examined the impugned order and find that the same is not sustainable in law, inasmuch as the same is contrary to the principles of law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, thus we are persuaded to set aside the same.
8. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 14-4-2006, only to the extent of dismissal of appellant's suit, is set aside. Resultantly, appellant's suit for declaration etc. Shall be deemed to be pending before the learned Judge Banking Court, who shall decide it after recording evidence and of course in accordance with law.
' No order as to costs.