M. SALEEM CHAUDHRY (CHAIRMAN).-------This is an appeal under section 8 of the Punjab Service 'Tribunal Act, 1974, filed on 24-10-1974 by Dr. Bashir Ahmad, Professor of Neuro Surgery, King Edward Medical College, Lahore against the order of the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal, Lahore, dated 25-1-1973. By this appeal the appellant seeks to impugn the seniority of Dr. Shaukat Raza Khan, Dr. Muhammad Hayat Zafar and Dr. Syed Ghulam Shabbir, over him.
2. The facts of the case are that Dr. Bashir Ahmad was appointed as Assistant Professor, Nishtar Medical College, Multan, on ad hoe basis on 4-1-1964. On 4-1-1965 he was approved by the Public Service Commission for the post of Assistant Professor. He was transferred and appointed as Assistant Professor in the King Edward Medical College on 19-9-1966. He was interviewed on 28-3- 1967 by the Public Service Commission and the appointment as Professor was notified on 14-4- 1967: Dr. Shaukat Raza Khan, who was appointed as Assistant Professor in the King Edward Medical College on 23-10-1959 and was interviewed on 28-1-1967 by the Public Service Commission, his name was recommended by the Public Service Commission, and he was appointed as Professor on 29-3-1967 and confirmed as such from 10-12-1971. The Government issued a provisional seniority list and Dr. Bashir Ahmad was shown junior to all the respondents. Dr. Bashir Ahmad represented against this seniority list and the representa--tion was accepted. Respondents 1 to 3 filed an appeal in the Punjab Service (Appellate) Tribunal which was accepted against Dr. Bashir Ahmad.
3. The present appellant filed a Writ Petition No. 965-S/1973 before the Lahore High Court to assail the order passed by the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal, Lahore, dated 25-1-1973.
However, on the; promulgation of the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal's Ordinance 1974, the Lahore High Court, on 17-7-1974, declared the writ petition preferred by the appellant, to have abated. The appellant under section 8 of the Punjab Services (Appellate) Tribunal Act, 1974, was required to approach this Tribunal within 90 days of the establishment of this Tribunal, which actually started functioning w. e. f. 22-7-1974.
4. The respondents have raised a preliminary objection that the appeal is barred by time inasmuch as the appellant was required to file the appeal within 90 days of. The establishment of this Tribunal, which in any case expired on the 19th of October 1974. The appeal is accompanied by an application for the condonation of delay dated 24-10-1974 which was grounded on the plea that the appellant had no, notice of the abatement of the writ petition, as his counsel Raja Muhammad Akhtar, had at the relevant time, been appointed as Deputy Attorney-General by the Government of Pakistan, and for that reason, he did not appear in the Writ Petition before the Lahore High Court.
The appellant also supplemented his application by written submission dated 8-8-1979, submitting therein that he too was on vacations from 16-6-1974 to 7-8-1974. He also submitted that there was no negligence on his part and the limitation should have started against him from the date of normal period. The respondents have also filed the written arguments in which it has been contended that the abate--ment took place by operation of law as held by Supreme Court in Mr. Masood Ahmad's case (PLD 1976 SC 195). According to the Respondents, no formal order was necessary. Thus the plea with regard to the lack of knowledge, in substance, is a plea of ignorance of law which is no excuse. The objecting Respondents have placed reliance on 1976 PLC 46 to contend that ignorance of law was no excuse. The respondents also contended that the appellant had the notice and he has not been able to establish any good cause for the delay. The respondent cited 1977 PLC 209, 1978 SCMR 457, 1978 SCMR 482, 1974 SCMR 393 and PLD 1970 SC 287 to show that in case of negligence the delay of a week or so was not condoned by the superior Courts.
5. After hearing both the parties and taking into consideration the respective contentions advanced by them, we find that the abatement took place by operation of law, as held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Mr. Masood Ahmad's case. Thus the appellant irrespective of any formal order was required to prefer appeal before us within 90 days of the establish--ment of the Tribunal. We also observe that even the formal order of abatement was passed with notice to the counsel for the appellant. In the High Court, it is a normal practice that the parties are put to notice as to the hearing of Causes by issuing a Cause List (a copy of which has been placed on the record). The appellant had nothing to controvert the same. He has, however, argued that Raja Muhammad Anwar, his counsel in writ petition had been appointed as Deputy Attorney-General by the Government of Pakistan and for that reason, he did not appear in the case on 17-7-1974.
However, there is nothing before us to show that by the terms of his appointment, he was precluded to continue to conduct the cases already held by him. In fact, the application filed by the appellant for the condonation of delay is conspicuously silent on this aspect. In the Writ, the Central Government was neither the party nor any relief was claimed against the Central Government.
Evidently, we find no difficulty on the part of the learned counsel to appear in Writ Petition. Unless it was proved to our satisfaction that the learned counsel for the appellant was debarred to appear in the case, it is difficult to accept the explanation offered by the appellant. In fact, the learned counsel for the appellant continued on the Rolls of Advocates and was obviously eligible to appear before the High Court.. In any case, he could very well appear before the High Court to make a request for an adjournment, or could have informed the present appellant and if need be the appellant could have engaged another counsel. We are thus of the view that the appellant's counsel had notice and the appellant cannot avail of the plea of want of notice.
6. In the circumstances, we uphold the objection as the appellant has failed to make out any justification for condoning the delay. Consequently the appeal fails and is dismissed as barred by time.