1. ' The only question worth consideration raised in this appeal appears to be that suit for recovery filed by the respondent was barred by limitation. It is evident from the admitted facts that the appellant had incurred certain liabilities on account of Credit Card issued to her by the respondent.
2. The last transaction on the Credit Card was made on 22-2-1998' and owing to her being a persistent defaulter the appellant's Credit Card was suspended in June, 1998. On 19-2-1999 the appellant addressed a letter to the respondent proposing that instalments of reasonable amount could be arranged provided a' new Gold Card with enhanced limit was issued. However, no further correspondence between the parties was made nor did any transaction take place after expiry of three years when the respondent addressed a notice to the appellant through their counsel on March 2, 2002 claiming Rs,4,36,589.34 by way of principal amount, Rs,57,061.58 as service charges and. Rs,29,800.50 as associated costs. It was followed by some correspondence between the Advocates for the parties which turned out to be futile and eventually suit for recovery of Rs,6,28,130.90 was filed as a further amount of Rs,1,04,688.48 was included by way of liquidated damages was claimed by the respondent.
3. ' The appellant moved an application for leave to defend before the Banking Court which was dismissed and the suit was decreed for the principal amount of Rs,4,36,580.34 with costs and the remaining claim was disallowed.
4. ' Mr. Asim Mansoor Khan, learned counsel for the appellant, inter alia, argued that the suit was barred by limitation. In this context, he pointed out that admittedly no transaction on Credit Card or otherwise took place between the parties after 22-2-1998 and, therefore, the suit filed in 2004 was hopelessly barred by limitation. Learned counsel pointed that Limitation Act applies to the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 as is evident from the provisions i,e, sections 8, 24 etc. He further stated that limitation for recovery suit for money/loan was three years from the date when the loan has been made and could at the most be extended to three years from the last transaction between the parties in terms of Article 5 to the First Schedule.
5. ' Mr. Mehmood Ahmad Khan, learned counsel for the respondent in the first place urged that the appellant's letter dated 19-2-1999 amounted to acknowledgement of liability under section 19 of the Limitation Act.
6. While we do not find any unequivocal acknowledgement from the tenor of the aforesaid letter, it may be observed that even if it did amount to acknowledgement but it would at the most extend the period of limitation by another three years. However, it is evident from the. Record that it was not responded to till 2nd March, 2002 when three years from the date of the letter had already expired. The learned counsel attempted to construe same letter from the tenor for the appellant after receipt of respondent's letter of 2nd March, 2002 as acknowledgement but we do not think that all of them are consequential inasmuch as any acknowledgment of liability after limitation could be of any consequence.
7. ' Mr. Mehmood Ahmad Khan then attempted to reply upon section 8 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 which reads as under:-- "8. Suit for recovery of written off finances, etc.: -
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908) or any other law, a financial institution may, within three years from the date of coming into force of this Ordinance, file a suit for the recovery of any amount written off, released or adjusted under any agreement, contract, or consent, including a compromise or withdrawal of any suit or legal proceedings or adjustment, of a decree between a financial institution and a customer on any day on or after the first day of January, 1990 and before the coming into force of this Ordinance, if it can establish that the amount was written off, released or adjusted for political reasons or considerations other than bona fide business considerations ' We are afraid that admittedly there is nothing to suggest that the amount claimed was ever written off a compromised in respect thereof had been entered into by the parties and thus, section 8 is normally not attracted. This provision is made only to enable the Banks to effect recovery of finance from the borrowers, which have been written off or adjusted for political reason other than bona fide business consideration.
8. ' Finally Mr. Mehmood Ahmed Khan placed relic ne upon section 24(2) of the Ordinance, which reads as under:-- "(2) A suit under section 9 may be entertained by Banking Court after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, if the plaintiff satisfies the, Banking Court that he had sufficient cause for not filing the suit within such period."
9. Indeed we have noticed that the language of the above provisions is very similar to Article 5 of the -Limitation Act, which enables a Court to entertain time-barred application or appeal upon being shown sufficient cause for not moving the Court within the prescribed period, it is well-settled that a time-barred appeal cannot be entertained in the absence of application for condonation of delay under Article 5 of the Limitation Act and for the same reason, we are of the view that once the respondent did not even choose to make an application for condonation of delay they cannot be allowed to enjoy the premium over their negligence.
10. ' For the foregoing reasons, we are constrained to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order.