MUHAMMAD MUZAMMAL KHAN, J.---This judgment proposes to decide three civil revisions, one in hand and the others i.e. Civil Revision 390 and Civil Revision 391 of 2000, as all these petitions involve similar questions of law/facts, require determination of alike dispute inter parties and directed against the same set of the respondents. All the three revision petitions assailed the distinct judgments/orders, dated 16-5-1997 and 29-11-1999, passed by the learned Civil Judge and the learned Additional District Judge, whereby all the three plaints filed by the petitioner were rejected under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C. And their appeals were dismissed respectively.
2. Succinctly, relevant facts are that respondents being landowners of Chak No.126-GB, Tehsil Jaranwala, District Faisplabad leased out suit-land to one Raja Khursheed Khan, predecessor-in- interest of the petitioner from "Kharif" 1983 to "Rabi" 1993 vide three lease deeds dated 30-8-1982 registered on 8-9-1982 with an option to further extend the lease after expiry of initial period of 10 years. After expiry of lease period, respondents declined to extend the same, as per option stipulated in the lease deeds whereupon predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner filed three suits for declaration with consequential relief to the effect that he is entitled to remain in possession of the leased land even after Rabi, 2003 and the respondents had no right, title or interest to interfere in his possession. It was further averred that respondents were bound to extend the period of lease for further 10 years but they illegally refused to discharge their contractual obligations.
3. Respondents being defendants in the suit contested the same by filing their written statements wherein certain preliminary objections were raised. Respondents admitted the acceptance of lease deed but denied the right of the- lessee to claim extension, as of right. It was further pleaded that the petitioners were in unauthorized possession alter the expiry of lease period and the suit had been filed with mala fide intention to prolong their unauthorized possession. Pending suit Raja Khurshid Khan, the original lessee, died and his heirs/legal representatives were brought on record.
All the heirs/legal representatives of the original lessee, except the petitioner withdrew the suit to their extent and the learned Civil Judge, who was seized of it, vide order, dated 16-5-1997 rejected all the three plaints of the petitioner. Petitioner, thereafter, filed three revision petitions and respondents in response to notice by this Court appeared and were represented through their counsel.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record, appended herewith. Undisputedly initial lease period of 10 years settled inter parties, has already lapsed with harvest of crop of Rabi, 1993. Question which hinges for determinations is as to whether respondents were bound under the lease agreement to further extend the lease period or the same was to be extended with the concurrence of the parties. Lease deeds dated 30-8-1982 contained conditions of extension of lease after lapse of each 10 years for all times to come, with a restriction on the rights of the respondents to alienate their own property, to anyone through any means whatsoever. This document further specified that in case of violation of any of the terms of the lease by the lessor, they were to be burdened with a penalty of Rs.2,50,000. Such stipulations are not only a clog on ownership rights of the respondents but would also lead them to hardship which could not be foreseen by them at the time of execution of the lease deed. Section 22(ii) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 specified that in such cases, specific performance of the such contract might be refused. Similarly, under section 21 of the Act (ibid), the contracts, non-performance of which, compensation is in money is an adequate relief, cannot be specifically enforced. Since, respondents were made liable to pay the compensation of Rs.2,50,000 to the lessee in ease of violation of any term thereof, under any clause of it, the same could not be specifically enforced.
Above all, the respondents are admittedly the owners of the suit property and their right to deal with it, cannot be restricted and the petitioner if really felt that they had violated the terms of any binding contract they could sue for compensation, for loss or damages caused by breach of the contract under section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872 but they could not go for a prayer to amend their suit for declaration, to the one for specific performance. Petitioner besides his mala fide intention to prolong the litigation, as noted by the Appellate Court while dismissing his application under Order VI, rule 17. C.P.C. Vide order, dated 29-11-1999, had not specified the proposed amendment in his application in this behalf which was apparently ill-motivated as the same was never moved before the trial Court and was an attempt to re-open the case just to perpetuate his possession, to the prejudice of the respondents. For all these reasons I have no ambiguity that the Appellate Court correctly refused to grant the A petitioner permission to amend his plaint and rightly dismissed his application which accepts no lawful exception in revisional jurisdiction of his Court.
5. Option to extend lease period after expiry of time fixed in the original lease deed, dated 30-8- 1982, vested with the owners and the Civil Court could not substitute any such right through suit by the petitioner for the reasons already noted in the foregoing paragraphs. All the three suits tiled by the petitioners did not disclose any cause of action to maintain a suit for declaration as filed by him or the one for specific performance. It goes without saying that lease deed dated 30-8-1982 was executed by respondent No.1, language of which shows that she signed it in absence of any independent expert advice. This document also depicted that the same was not witnessed by any of the male members of the family of respondent No.1. Unilateral and one- sided conditions, without any consideration were also not binding conferring no right to maintain any such suit, without any just cause or reason. The petitioner if really feels that respondents violated the contract, he may file suit under section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872, as remarked above, but so far as his suits for declaration or their conversion into suits for specific performance by amendment of those, are concerned those did not disclose a cause of action, hence, were correctly rejected.
6. For the reasons noted above, both the Courts below correctly concluded the lis concurrently and committed no illegality/irregularity amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this Court, hence all the three revision petitions being devoid of any merit, are dismissed with costs throughout.