' FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.--- The respondent/ plaintiff Mst. Naseeb Khatoon, instituted a suit against the petitioners, for possession of the suit-land through pre-emption on the ground of her own land in Khata No,226 being adjacent to the land sought to be preempted, The Senior Civil Judge, Mianwali, vide judgment dated 1-6-2005 decreed her suit for a consideration of Rs,6,00,000 as sale price of the suit-land and Rs,60,000 as incidental charges. The respondent, who had already deposited Zar-e-Soim, Rs,2,00,000, in the trial Court, was directed to deposit the balance amount of Rs,4,60,000. Both the parties felt dissatisfied and preferred separate appeals. The appeal of the petitioners was dismissed whereas the one filed by the respondent was partly allowed by the Additional District Judge, Mianwali, vide judgment dated 18-4-2006, whereby the incidental charges were reduced to Rs,45,000. Therefore, they filed Civil Revision No,1018 which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge in Chambers of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, vide impugned judgment, dated 17-5-2006. Hence this petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, for grant of leave to appeal.
2. The learned counsel argued that the petitioners had purchased the suit-land measuring 20 Kanals and 2 Marlas from Killas Nos.41 and 45, Square No,128 and Killas Nos.6 and 7 of Square 129 of Khata No,70. The respondent claimed the right of pre-emption on the basis of contiguity being the co-sharer of 10 Kanals out of 36 Kanals in Khata No,226, of Square No,129 and Killa No,4 and only one Khasra No,129/4 measuring 8 Kanals was adjacent to only one Khasra No,129/7 of the suit-land as per Exhs.P.11, 12 and Exh.D.4 being copies of record of right and Aks Shajra. Therefore, she could not assert her right of pre-emption over the entire suit-land in view of the law laid down by this Court in the cases of Murtaza Khan and 2 others v. Mst. Dil Ara Nasrin and 2 others PLD 1991 SC 224 and Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Secretary, Law Department v. Malik Said Kamal Shah PLD 1986 SC 360 at p.385.
3. The learned counsel next contended that the respondent had failed to prove the performance of Talbs as required by the provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 and the High Court had fallen in error in ignoring the material evidence on record.
4. We have heard the learned counsel at length and have also perused the available record with his assistance. It appears to us that the petitioners did not agitate the point of non-performance of Talbs before the High Court during the course of arguments. Therefore, the same would be deemed to have been abandoned. A somewhat similar view was taken by this Court in the case Ghulam Muhammad and others v. Malik Abdul Qadir Khan and others PLD 1983 SC 68 = PLJ 1983 SC 93.
5. The provisions of section 6 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (Act No,IX of 1991) enumerate the persons including "Shall Jar" in whom the right of pre-emption vests. By Explanation-III of the said B section, it is provided that "Shafi Jar" means a person who has a right of pre-emption because of owning immovable property adjacent to the immovable property sold.
6. In its historical background, the first codified law of preemption i,e, Punjab Pre-emption Act II of 1905 was enacted to give statutory recognition to the existing Customary and Muhammadan Law of Pre-emption in the Province of Punjab. By section 13(1)(7) of the said Act, the right of pre-emption in urban immovable property was given to the owners of property adjacent to the sold one. Act No,II of 1905 was, however, repealed by the Punjab Pre-emption Act No,I of 1913. By virtue of section 16 of the said Act, the right of pre-emption in respect of urban immovable property was vested in the persons who owned immovable property contiguous to the property sold. Thus, a significant departure was made by the Legislature. Under the Punjab Act No,1 of 1913, a right to pre-empt an urban immovable property became available on basis of contiguity and not adjacency as was earlier provided by Act of 1905. The Punjab Act No,I of 1913 was adopted by the N.-W.F.P. Vide Notification No,9121-G, dated 20-10-1924, with necessary adaptations and modifications and was titled as the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1924. The Act of 1924 was repealed and reenacted by the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act. No,XIV of 1950, whereunder the right of pre-emption was vested, inter ilia, in owners of contiguous property in respect of agricultural land, as also the village and urban immovable property. The validity of the Punjab Act No,I of 1913 as, well as the N.- W.F.P. Act No,XIV of 1950 was examined by the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court in the case of Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Secretary, Law Department v. Malik Said Kamal Shah PLD 1986 SC 360 and the same were declared to be repugnant to Injunctions of Qur'an and Sunnah. As a consequence, both the statutes were repealed and re-enacted by the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (Act No,IX of 1991) and N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 (Act No,X of 1987). By virtue of section 6 of both the statutes. Shafi Jar i,e, a person owning an immovable property adjacent to the immovable property sold was given a right of pre-emption.
7. The words such as "adjacent", "contiguous", "adjoining", usually carry similar but not necessarily the same connotation in all cases or situations. They are not the terms of art and are, therefore, used in the ordinary sense in order to carry out the purpose of the statute. These words have received judicial interpretation by various Courts. In the case of Mayor, Councillors and Burgesses of the Borough of New Playmouth v. Taranaki Electric Power Board AIR 1933 PC 216 = (1933 AC 680); the Privy Council considered the meaning assigned to the word "adjoining" in section 282 of the New Zealand Municipal Corporation Act, 1920. Their Lordships were of the view that the primary exact meaning of "adjoining": was "conterminous". At the same time it could not be disputed that the words were also used in a lesser sense as meaning "near" or "neighbouring". In Spillers Ltd. v.
Cardiff (Borough) Assessm ent Committee (1931) (2 KB 21) Lord Hewart, C.J. Construed the words "contiguous" as under:-- "It ought to be the rule and we are glad to think that it is the rule that words are used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly. Upon those who assert that rule has been broken, the burden of establishing their proposition lies heavily. And they can discharge it only by pointing to something in the context which goes to show that the loose and inexact meaning must be preferred."
' In the case of Mayor of Wellington v. Mayor of Lower Hutt 1904 AC 773 the meaning of the word "adjacent" used in section 219 of the Municipal Corporation's Act of 1900 was explained. The city of Wellington and Borough of Lower Hutt situated with a distance of over six miles from each other were still treated to be adjacent. Sir Arthur Willson, J., stated at page 775 that "Adjacent is not a word to which a precise and uniform meaning is attached by ordinary usage. It was not confined to places adjoining and it included places close to or near".
8. In Muhammad Nawaz Khan and another v. Musammat Bobo Sahib 44 PR 1903 the Punjab Chief Court, held, in the context of Preemption Law, that the word "contiguous" would mean actually adjoining or touching and did not mean adjacent or proximate. No special form or meaning of "contiguity" was prescribed. A person whose property was touching the property pre-empted was as good as that of a person whose property adjoined the property sold on almost three sides. In Sanwaldas v. Gur Parshad 90 PR 1909 = (4IA179) a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court, examined the provision of section 13(1)(7) of the Punjab Preemption Act of 1905. It was held that although the word "adjacent" under section 13(1)(7) of the Act meant adjoining, it did not mean adjoining on all sides. "Contiguity' would mean contiguity in space.
9. In Hukma v. The State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 476 gold consisting of six blocks allegedly smuggled from Pakistan was seized by a Sub-Inspector of District Barmer in the State of, Rajasthan.
There was a notification issued by the Central Government under section 3 of the Land Customs Act, 1924, whereby the Customs Officers were empowered to seize goods from the areas adjoining Land Customs Frontiers. The question was whether the District Barmer could be treated to be an area adjoining Land Customs Frontiers. It was held as follows:-- "It is clear from definition of 'Foreign Frontier' in clause (e) of section 2 of the said Act that area adjoining the frontiers separating any foreign territory' from any part of India was within those words. There was no justification in restricting the meaning of the word 'adjoining' to a few miles near the frontier. It was true that the village next to the frontier adjoined the frontier. It was equally correct, however, to describe the entire District near the frontier as adjoining the frontier and there was nothing wrong in the entire State of Rajasthan adjoining the West Pakistan Frontier."
10. In the cases of Abdul Qayyum v. Muhammad Aslam PLD 1979 SC 867; Said Karim Shah v. Taj Muhammad PLD 1974 SC 383 and Haji Inayat Khan v. Murtaza Khan and others 1988 SCM R 1172 it was held that different Khasra numbers comprised in one holding or property did not become different properties in themselves. Sale of a parcel of land comprised in more than one Khasra numbers was not a sale of as many properties as there were field numbers but it would be only of one property represented by that parcel of land. It was further held that a plaintiff/pre-emptor having his property contiguous to any part of block or parcel of land, notwithstanding its comprising in a number of Khasras was entitled to pre-empt entire land. Earlier, a Full Bench of the erstwhile West Pakistan High Court had .Taken the same view in the case of Muhammad Yousaf v.
Sikandar PLD 1970 Pesh.
160.
11. For the purpose of pre-emption of agricultural land, it would be sufficient if a part of the Khata or holding of a pre-emptor is adjacent to any Khasra or portion of the Khata or holding sought to be pre-empted. In other words, it is not necessary that whole of the pre-empted land comprising in a number of Khasras in a Khata or Khewat should be adjacent to the holding of the pre-emptor. In the case of Murtaza Khan and 2 others (supra) referred to by the learned counsel, the judgments in the cases of Said Karim Shah (supra), Abdul Qayyum (supra) and Muhammad Yousuf v. Sikandar were not brought to their Lordships' notice. Moreover, the case of Murtaza Khan and 2 others (supra) is distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case. In our view, the impugned judgment of the High Court is plainly correct to which no exception can be taken.
12. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this petition which is dismissed and leave to appeal is refused accordingly.