' JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.---The appellants/defendants impugn the judgment and decree of , the First Appellate Court, dated 15-2-2000 whereby the decree of the learned trial Court, dated 3-10- 1994 was set aside and a declaratory suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff was decreed.
2. The facts of the case have been set out in the judgment of the Court of first appeal and need not, therefore, be reproduced in extenso.
3. The facts necessary for deciding this second appeal are brief and simple. The respondent/plaintiff was awarded two contracts both, dated 23-6-1975 for installation of imported lifts. It appears from the evidence that after the respondent had completed between 50% to 70% of the work, some of the material supplied to him was stolen.
4. The case of the appellants/ defendants is that they got the contract completed through some other contractor, namely, the Duncon Company, Karachi, and paid a sum of Rs,1,25,000 to the said Company. According to the appellants, the respondent/plaintiff was contractually obliged to pay the said amount to the appellants. The appellants thereafter raised a demand against the respondent through two demand notices (Exh.P.6 and Exh.P.7), dated 5-4-1982. It is these notices which were challenged by the respondent/plaintiff through two suits which were consolidated by the learned trial Court vide order, dated 28-6-1987 and have, been decided by means of common judgment by the learned Courts below.
5. Without going into the question as to the party responsible for the theft of material, I asked the learned counsel for the appellants to show from the available evidence any proof that any amount was paid to the above named Duncon Company for completing the contracted work. He was not in a position to show any such payment. In the circumstances, the contention of the respondent/plaintiff that the demand raised by the appellants was without basis is borne out from the record.
6. In the foregoing circumstances, I find no reasons to interfere in the decree of the learned Court of first appeal, dated 15-2-2000. As a consequence, this appeal is dismissed.