Muhammad Muzammal Khan, J.--The appellants have called in question in this Intra Court Appeal order dated 2.2.2005, passed by a learned Single Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No, 190/05.
2. The learned counsel for the appellants has prayed that the order of the learned Single Judge be set aside in FIR No, 24/05 dated 14.12.2004, under Sections 409, 420 PPC read with Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 registered at P.S. Anti Corruption Establishment, T.T. Singh be quashed, etc.
3. The background of filing Writ Petition No, 190/05 is given in the writ petition is that, "all the petitioners/appellants are Patwaris. On 3.2.1991, the Members, Municipal Committee, Gojra moved an application for extension of municipal limits of Municipal Committee, Gojra. Apparently a Notification was issued by the Commissioner, Faisalabad Division on 17.7.1991, whereby the municipal limits of M.C. Gojra were extended, but the said Notification was not published in the Gazette of the Government of the Punjab. An anonymous application was sent by a citizen to Senior Member, Board of Revenue and Directorate of Anti Corruption Establishment, Faisalabad, alleging that in certain mutations, of Chak No, 296/JB, Tehsil Gojra, District T.T. Singh, grave irregularities had been committed causing colossal loss to the Government. According to the application, the sale of certain land had to be transferred only through registered deeds, whereas, the lands were transferred through oral mutations, thereby a lot of money on stamp fee account and development fee account was embezzled by the appellants, and approximately a loss of Rs, 40 lacs was caused to the Government. The DDO(R) suspended all the appellants on 31.5.2004. The DDO (R) also made a reference to the Additional Director, Anti Corruption Establishment, Faisalabad on 9.6.2004 attributing illegalities, irregularities to the appellants. The appellants challenged registration of case against them on the grounds that there was no one as complainant against the petitioners in the instant case. The inquiry and subsequent FIR was registered on an anonymous application, on which, no signature or name was mentioned. Neither any extention of urban limits of Gojra was registered in the `roznamcha waqiati' nor was it published in the Gazette of Government of the Punjab and without Gazette Notification there could not be imposition of stamp duty on registration of sale-deed under the Registration Act, even the value table drawn by the Collector was never notified in the official Gazette, under Section 27-A. No such demand could be made even by the Sub-Registrar; that the appellants' duty was only to enter the mutations in the `roznamcha waqiati' which was to be further attested by the attesting Revenue Officer. Therefore, the basic responsibility was of the Revenue Officer and not of the appellants. The appellants were not aware of any official Notification through which the urban limits were extended. For the above reasons, the learned counsel for the appellants contends that registration of FIR No, 24/04 is without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
4. The learned Single Bench dismissed the writ petition while observing that the Notification was issued by the Commissioner, Faisalabad Division regarding extension of the municipal limits of M.C.
Gojra and it was also notified by the Commissioner on 17.7.1991, therefore, appellant cannot say that they were not in the knowledge that limits of Municipal Committee had not been extended. On this question, according to the learned Single Bench, trial Court could go into further details after recording the evidence of the parties. The learned Single Bench further observed that a thorough inquiry was held in this matter by Section Officer, Anti Corruption Establishment, according to which, appellants as well as concerned Tehsildar who attested the mutations were found guilty.
5. The first hurdle which the learned counsel for the appellants has been asked to over come is, whether an ICA is competent against an order of a Single Bench of this Court whereby quashment of FIR has been refused? According to the learned counsel, the ICA is competent in this case.
6. Similar question came under consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nawazul Haq Chowhan vs. The State and others, 2003 SCM R 1597. Briefly, facts of the above cited case are that a Writ Petition No, 178/93 was filed before the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi to seek quashment of an FIR No, 553/94. The prayer was allowed against which ICA No, 7/93 was filed which was also accepted and the order passed by the learned Single Bench for the quashment was set aside. The order of the Lahore High Court Lahore in the ICA was challenged in Civil Petition No, 29/94 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in which leave to appeal was granted, inter alia, on the ground as to whether or not ICA lie against the order passed in Writ Petition by the learned Single Bench and as to whether or not the word "proceedings" mentioned in the proviso (1) of Section 3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, includes the FIR. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the above controversy had been resolved by this Court in the case of Mst. Karim Bibi and others vs. Hussain Bakhsh and another (PLD 1984 SC 344) and Settlement Commissioner(L) and others us. Mauj Din and others (1989 SCM R 1351). The Hon'ble Supreme Court held while holding that in view of Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 ICA is not maintainable, accordingly, Civil Appeal No, 553/94 was allowed and order dated 14.3.1993, passed in ICA No, 7/93 by the learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench was set aside.
7. The important question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above case was whether the word "proceedings" mentioned in the proviso (1) of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, includes the FIR? The Hon'ble Court accepted the argument that it does while referring and relying Mst. Karim Bibi and others vs. Settlement Commissioner (L) and others, two earlier cases decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as referred to above. It is important to point out that above cases were decided in settlement matters. The definition of word "proceedings" was discussed with the help of previous case law, similarly, the expression "original order" was also discussed as these words are essential, to determine in the above context whether ICA is competent or not? For convenience, paras-8 & 9 of the said judgment cited above are reproduced as under:-- "8. After giving our anxious consideration to the arguments urged in support of this appeal we are, however, not impressed by any of the contentions raised. The test laid down by the Legislature in the proviso is that if the law applicable to the proceedings from which the Constitutional Petition arises provides for at least one appeal against the original order, then no appeal would be competent from the order of a Single Judge in the Constitutional jurisdiction to a Bench of two or more Judges of the High Court. The crucial words are the "original Order". It is clear from the wording of the proviso that the requirement of the availability of an appeal in the law applicable is not in relation to the impugned order in the Constitutional Petition, which may be the order passed by the lowest officer or authority in the hierarchy or an order passed by higher authorities in appeal, revision or review, if any, provided in the relevant statute. Therefore, the relevant order may not necessarily be the one which is under challenge but the test is whether then original order passed in the proceedings subject to an appeal under the relevant law, irrespective of the fact whether the remedy of appeal so provided was availed of or not. Apparently the meaning of the expression "original order" is the order with which the proceedings under the relevant statute commenced. The word "proceedings" has been used in different enactments and has been subject to judicial interpretation in a number of cases wherein it has received either restricted or wide meaning according to the text and subject-matter of the particular statute. I do not consider it necessary to notice the various judgments in which this word was so construed. Suffice it to refer to the case of Nawab Din v. Member Board of Revenue (1) in which this Court had occasion to examine the scope and meaning of the word as it occurs in Section 2(2) of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. A useful discussion will be found in this case with reference to precedents as the meaning of the term "proceedings". An earlier case of Jan Muhammad and another V. Home Secretary, West Pakistan others (2) was referred to in this connection and the view taken therein was declared by this Court as the correct enunciation of the law on the subject. In the latter case reference was made to the definition of the term "proceedings" in the book "Words and Phrases" which may usefully be reproduced as under: "The term 'proceedings' is a very comprehensive term, and, generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right, and hence it necessarily embraces the requisite steps by which judicial action is invoked. A `proceedings' would include every step taken towards the further progress of a cause in Court or before a Tribunal, where it may be pending. It is the step towards the objective to be achieved, say for instance the judgment in a pending suit. The proceeding commences with the first step by which the machinery of the law is put into motion in order to take cognizance of the case. It is indeed a comprehensive expression and includes all possible steps in the action under the law, from its commencement to the execution of the judgment".
9. In the light of the aforesaid definition the proceedings under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act would seem to commence with the application of a person entitled to the transfer of a property in the compensation pool under the Schedule and the Schemes framed thereunder. Normally the application will be disposed of by an order passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner which will apparently be the original in the proceedings. Any party aggrieved by such an order may then invoke appellate or revisional jurisdiction conferred under the statute before the higher authorities or officers. In such a case the proceedings remain the same until their conclusion by the order of the final authority as all the intermediary stages are steps taken towards the further progress of a cause of towards the objective to be achieved, the transfer of a particular property to the person entitled thereto under the relevant provisions of law.
Before the amendment of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act in 1973 there was a right of appeal provided by Section 19, therefore, no letters Patent Appeal was then competent against the order of a Single Judge of the High Court to a larger Bench of the same High Court. Similarly there can no dispute that in cases in which the original order was passed after the aforesaid amendment of law such appeal was competent as the right of appeal under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act was taken away by the amendment."
8. From the above judgment, it is clear that proceedings are taken before a judicial forum and proceedings include any stage before the matter is finally concluded. Similarly, the expression "original order' means an order passed under a law which provides an appeal or revision to challenge the said order. The subject-matter of the present I.C.A. or subject of Civil Appeal No, 553/94 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was for registration of a FIR. Taking an application before SHO for registration of a FIR, according to the appellants, cannot be called "proceedings". It is also contended that Criminal Procedure Code does not provide any right of appeal or revision if registration of a FIR is refused or if a request for registration of a FIR is accepted and the same requires to be challenged. A similar controversy is reported to have been decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Iftikhar Hussain etc. vs. Government of Pakistan etc. (PLD 1996 Lah. 82, D.B).
The learned Division Bench held that the relevant law does not provide appeal or revision against an act of the registration of a FIR. The learned Division Bench also discussed PLD 1984 SC 344. For guidance para-6 of the report is reproduced as under: "6. According to the view taken by the learned Judges of the Division Bench the impugned order dated 24.11.1973 by the Additional Settlement Commissioner was passed in proceedings arising out of the original order dated 25.7.1960 by which property was initially transferred in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants and in that view of the matter, as the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 contained provisions for appeal etc. the bar contained in the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance as amended was plainly applicable and no Letters Patent Appeal was, therefore, competent."
9. Coming back to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the learned counsel for the appellants submits that facts in Nawazul Haq Chowhan's case (2003 SCM R 1597) are different from the present appeal pending before us. In support of his contention, the learned counsel submits that in the cited case, the learned Single Bench had allowed Writ Petition No, 178/93, against which, ICA No, 7/93 was accepted and the order of Single Bench of quashment and the FIR was set aside.
According to the learned counsel, in the present case, the learned Single Bench, has disallowed his writ petition wherein he sought quashment of FIR; against that order, he has filed the present ICA.
The above contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is not accurate. The exact point in view of decision of Supreme Court i,e, Nawazul Haq Chowhan's case (2003 SCM R 1597) is whether word "proceedings" mentioned in proviso (1) of Section 3 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 includes the FIR? According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it does. Therefore, it is not relevant whether the learned Single Bench has allowed registration of a case or refused registration of a case, the relevant point is that controversy relates to FIR. Under Article 189 of the Constitution, any decision of the Supreme Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or annunciate a principle of law, be binding upon all other Courts in Pakistan. In view of the above provisions of Article 189 of the constitution and irrespective of a decision of a learned Division Bench, above referred (PLJ 1996 Lahore 82, (D.B), we accordingly dismiss this I.C.A. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.