' RAHMAT HUSSAIN JAFFERI, J.---On 12-12-1990, the plaintiffs. National Insurance Corporation, a statutory body established under the National Insurance Corporation Act, 1977 filed the suit for recovery of Rs,3,205,955 against the defendants Pakistan National Shipping Corporation. It is alleged that the plaintiffs ensured a case/consignment containing defence store of commanding officer, Air Stores Depot Karachi. The consignment was booked at port London for Karachi on vessel M.V. Gilarous by the defendants under bill of lading dated 24-6-1988. The consignment did not reach Karachi, as there was short lending, therefore, the consignee lodged claim with the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs satisfied the claim of the consignee by paying the suit amount. The consignee executed a letter of subrogation in favour of the plaintiffs for the suit amount. It is further alleged that the defendants being owner of the vessel are liable to pay the said amount. Hence the suit.
2. The defendants filed the written statement in which they denied the ownership of the vessel but took the plea that the ship was chartered by them. They admitted the booking of suit consignment by the Commanding Officer Air Stores Depot, from London to Karachi. They also admitted the short landing but claimed that as the value of consignment was not mentioned in the bill of lading therefore, the claim of the consignee was satisfied as per one packet, which the consignee had received. Therefore, there is no claim against them. They have denied the execution of the letter of subrogation in favour of the plaintiffs by the consignee. They also took some legal pleas in the written statement.
3. Out of the pleadings of the parties, seven issue s were framed. One of them was about maintainability of the suit. As the suit can be finally decided and disposed of on the said issue therefore, I intend to decide the same first.
4. I have heard the parties' Advocates on the said issue. The learned Advocate for the defendants has argued that the suit has been filed by an unauthorized person therefore, it is not maintainable.
Conversely the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs has argued that the suit has been properly instituted as the plaint is signed by the Assistant Manager of the plaintiff.
5. Admittedly the plaintiffs are the corporate body created under the statute C.P.C. Provides a special provision to deal with the cases of the statutory Corp. As well as company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. Under the law, the plaintiffs are to be sued in the name of their corporate name which has been done in this case. Under Order XXIX. Rule 1 , C.P.C. Which deals with such cases provides that "in suits by or against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of a corporation by the Secretary or by any Director or other principal officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case".
6. It will be noticed that the said provision only deals with the signing of and verification of pleadings in the suit filed by such Corp. And Companies. It neither deals with the frame of the suit nor authorizes the institution of suits. It only permits the persons mentioned in it to sign and verify the pleadings.
7. It is not out of place to mention here that the plaint is signed by Muhammad Yusef Zaman Khan, Assistant Manager (Legal Department) of the plaintiffs. Under Order XXIX, rule 1, C.P.C. The plaint is required to be signed by the Secretary, Director or any principal officer who can depose to the facts of the case. Admittedly, Muhammad Yusef Zaman Khan is neither the Secretary nor the Director of the plaintiffs. Now it is to be seen whether Muhammad Yusef Zaman Khan being the Assistant Manager (Legal Department) comes within the definition of "principal officer" as mentioned in the Order XXIX, rule 1, C.P.C.
8. The word "principal officer" appearing in Order XXIX, rule 1, C.P.C. Has to be read with the other words used earlier i,e, "Secretary" or "Director" on the doctrine of "ejusdem generis". The doctrine means where special words immediately followed or closely associated with general words their meaning is limited to proceeding words. The said doctrine has been applied by Privy Council in the case of Sir Stuart Samuel 19 I.C.
765.768 (PC). Reference is also invited to a case of Anderson v. Anderson (1895) 1 Q.B.
749. If the said doctrine is applied then "principal officer" should be the chief or the highest or foremost in importance or rank or one who holds position of presiding rank or having a leading or starring role. The word "principal" has been defined in the American Heritage Talking Dictionary;:- "1. First, highest, or foremost in importance, rank, worth, or degree, chief, one holds a position of presiding rank,
3. A person having a leading or starring role.
5. Law. A person who empowers another to act at his or her representative. The person having prime responsibility for an obligation as distinguished from one who acts as surety or as an endorser."
9. In the present case Muhammad Yusef Zaman is simply an Assistant Manager and that too of legal department of the plaintiffs. He is not holding the post of highest or foremost in importance.
He is not the chief i,e, highest in rank or authority or the leader. He is not holding the position of presiding rank. As such he is neither chief nor principal nor main, leading, foremost, prime or prime officer of the plaintiffs. He is simply assisting other higher officers of the plaintiffs. Hence he is not coming within the definition of. "principal officer" as mentioned in Order XXIX, rule 1, C.P.C.
10. Furthermore, the business of a corporation or company is required to be carried out under its Articles of Association.
Plaintiffs' witnesses stated that the plaintiffs have Arlieles of Association and affairs of the plaintiffs are being run under the Articles of Association. He further deposed that he did not know whether Muhammad Yusef Zaman Khan was authorized to file the plaint or he filed any power of attorney on behalf of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' witness neither filed Articles of Association nor resolution passed by the Board of Directors authorizing Muhammad Yusef Zaman Khan to institute the suit.
11. Under the law, a suit on behalf of a corporation or company is to be filed by an officer authorized under the Articles of Association or through a resolution passed by the Board of Directors. The plaintiffs in order to prove that the authorized officer has instituted the suit have not filed such documents. As such it has been established beyond any shadow of doubt that an unauthorized person has filed the suit on behalf of the plaintiffs who also cannot sign or verify the plaint as required under Order XXIX, rule 1, C.P.C. As such the plaint is nullity and non-existent in the eye of law for all intents and purposes.
12. It has been held in the case of Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot v. Ghulam Nabi Corporation Limited PLD 1971 SC 550 that the suit should be filed by an authorized person and in order to determine whether a suit has been instituted by a person competent to do so the reference will have to be made to the Articles of company or resolution passed by the Board of Directors. It has further been held in the case of Siddique Muhammad Umar v. Australasia Bank Limited PLD 1966 SC 684 that the plaint or appeal on behalf of corporation can only be instituted by a person duly constituted in accordance with the Articles of Association. It has been observed as under:-- "It was apparent from the pleadings that the suit was being instituted by a constituted attorney of a public limited company. He could only do so if he was duly authorized in that behalf and occupied one or other of the offices mentioned in rule 1 of Order XXIX of the Civil Procedure Code. A copy of power of attorney had been produced which showed that Muhammad You saf Zaman Khan had been empowered in that behalf but the question still remained to be ascertained as to whether those who gave him that power were competent to do so, as the authority was on behalf of a public limited company. For this purpose a reference to the Articles of Association of the Company was certainly necessary to see whether the Directors were competent to delegate such power."
13. In the light of what has been discussed above, the suit of the plaintiffs is not maintainable in the present form as it has been filed by an unauthorized person of the plaintiffs.
14. Above are the reasons of my short order dated 31-8-2005, by which I had dismissed the suit with costs.