M. SALEEM CHAUDHRY (CHAIRMAN).-------The appellant has put in this application to seek the review of our order dated 12-9-1979, dismissing his appeal as barred by time. The plea for condonation was sought to be established by the following averments in the application filed before us, under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 read with section 9 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974:-- "It is prayed that the delay of about one and a half months may kindly be condoned as the said period was spent in obtaining a copy of the judgment of the High Court which decided that the writ petition filed by the appellant stood abated; and it is respectfully prayed that in view of the complicated legal position, as mentioned above, the Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to condone the delay, if the case is held up to be covered by section 8 and not section 4 of the Act."
2. We dismissed the appeal holding that even allowing the time for obtaining the copy of the High Court order (the only authenticated document supplied with appeal), the appeal was still barred by time, Evidently the part of plea based upon the "complicated legal position" was not discussed.
In this regard, the appellant had relied upon the legislative sequence in which Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973), was amended on 8-5-1974, vide Act No. XXXII of 1974 to provide for abatement of proceedings pending before the Courts having Constitutional jurisdictions. The appellant also pointed out that the Punjab Service Tribunals Act was enacted on 4-6-1974 to bring its provisions regarding abatement as contained in section 8, in line with Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The appellant submitted that initially, the abatement of pending proceedings before other forum was envisaged by the very enforcement of Punjab Administrative Tribunal Ordinance, 1974, i.e. 23-4-1974, as against which the Constitution, provided for the abatement after the establishment of the Tribunal. Thus there was confusion as to the date on which the abatement was to take place. Moreover, by section 8 of the Punjab Administrative/Service Tribunal Act, the abatement of the writ petition was not possible, therefore, the same had to be effected under Article 212 of the Constitution which made the provision for the first time on 8-5-1974 though with retrospective effect. In our opinion, even this argument did not make any material difference. The legal complications explained by the appellant in his application terminated with the order of the High Court declaring the abatement of his writ petition on 15-7-1974, or in the alternative w.e.f. 22-7-1974 when the Punjab Administrative Tribunal had been admittedly established. Thereafter, the appellant was entitled to file the appeal only under section 8 which allowed the maximum period of 90 days only. Even after allowing the period spent for obtaining the copy of A the order of the High Court which otherwise was not essential for filing the appeal, this appeal was still barred by a fortnight.
3. He also relied upon the observations of this Tribunal in case reported as 1978 L S L R 157, decided on 20-11-1976 that in case where no final judgment was passed by any civil Court, the appellant may be entitled to a maximum period of six months as prescribed under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, from the date of the establishment of the Tribunal. The appellant also submitted the order of Supreme Court of Pakistan in PLD 1976 SC 195, as passed on 25-11-1975, in point of time was much later than the filing of the appeal, therefore, it could not be used to attribute the knowledge of legal position to the appellant in 1974. This argument of the appellant is also untenable as the limitation of appeal under section 8 had been expressly prescribed as 90 days, On his own premises, the appellant could not rely upon the decision of this Tribunal given on 20-11-1976 reported as 1978 L S L R 157 containing the observation that in cases of abatement if no final order had been passed by the Civil Court a larger period of limitation prescribed under section 4 i.e. Six months from the date of the establishment of Tribunal, was available. The same appears to have been made in ignorance of the Supreme Court Authority vie. PLD 1976 SC 195.
4. During the course of arguments, the appellant relied upon the practice of this Tribunal to allow period of six months in such cases which was claimed to have misled him. We are not aware of any such practice. Factually, the plea remained unsubstantiated. We, therefore, find little merit in the same.
5. For the reasons above, we do not feel inclined to modify our previous order. We hereby affirm the same, and this order may be read as part of our order dated 12-9-1979.