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2006 PLC (C.S.) 1179

MUHAMMAD NAEEM vs SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION through

Citation2006 PLC (C.S.) 1179
CourtFederal Service Tribunal
Judge(s)Moazzam Hayat, Jehan Zaib Burki
ResultAppeal dismissed

' MOAZZAM HAYAT (MEMBER).---Appellant Muhammad Naeem was an Officer Grade-III in the Small Business Finance Corporation respondent No,1. He was removed from service vide order, dated 10- 7-2000. This order was received by him on 2-8-2000. He filed a departmental appeal on 21-9-2000 but it was not responded. He was, therefore, coli strained to file the present appeal under section 4 of Service Tribunals Act, 1973 wherein he has prayed that the impugned order of removal be set aside and he be reinstated into service with back-benefits.

2. The charge-sheet was issued to the appellant on 1-11-1999 for committing misconduct under Regulation 2(4) of the Small Business Finance Corporation Employees (E&D) Regulations 1995. The allegation against him was that he had 'prepared fake verification reports regarding applicants/guarantors, their businesses and investment of equity'. This allegation was in respect of loan cases No,SEP-12/94 and SEP-13/94 of Bahawalpur Branch. Mr. Muhammad Younus, Vice- President, Incharge Audit Office, was appointed as an Inquiry Officer. In the inquiry the charge levelled against the appellant was proved. The defence taken by the appellant was that all the documents were correctly verified by him which were also verified by Manager Sh. Mujeeb-Ullah.

3. The appeal is resisted by the respondents. It is stated that the departmental appeal was not filed in time. It is also stated that the present appeal too is time-barred. On merits it is stated that penalty was imposed upon the appellant after observance of all the relevant rules.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record.

5. The impugned order was passed on 10-7-2000. This order was received by the appellant on 2-8- 2000. The departmental appeal was filed by him on 21-9-2000. According to the learned counsel for the respondents the departmental appeal could be filed within 30 days only and as it was filed on 21-9-2000, therefore, it was time-bared. This argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is not correct. Under Regulation 9-C of Small Business Finance Corporation Employees (E&D) Regulations 1995 the departmental appeal could be filed within three months. Accordingly the objection is overruled.

6. The departmental appeal was filed on 21-9-2000. The appellant was required to wait of the result of his appeal for 90-days and then to file appeal in this Tribunal within the next 120-days. It means that the present appeal could be filed within 120-days starting from 21-9-2000. The appeal was received in the office of this Tribunal through post on 21-1-2001. It was thus the 122nd day on which the appeal was received by the Assistant Registrar of this Tribunal. The learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the appeal is time-barred by 2-days and since no application for condonation of delay has been filed, therefore, it is liable to be dismissed as time-barred. On the other hand the learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the appeal had been dispatched through registered post A.D. On 14-1-2001 and in this manner it was filed well within time. The postal receipt has been produced by him which shows that the appeal had been dispatched by the appellant on 14-1-2001.

7. Order-IV Rule-1 C.P.C. Says that 'every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such Officer as it appoints in this behalf.' In this rule it is not stated that a suit can be sent to the Court through registered post. On the other hand in Rule-5(1) of the Service Tribunals (Procedure)

Rules, 1973 it is clearly stated that 'an appeal to a Tribunal may be sent to the Registrar by registered post (A.D.).' It appears that a facility has been given to the Civil Servants that instead of appearing in person by taking leave from office they are permitted to send their appeals to the Tribunal through registered post. As such the submission of appeal through registered post is not only permissible but is also quite legal. It is the date on which the appeal is dispatched through registered post that shall be deemed to be the date of presentation of the appeal. If a different interpretation is given to this rule that the date of presentation shall be the date on which the appeal is actually received by the Registrar of the Tribunal then the very purpose for which the said rule is framed shall be frustrated. The departmental appeals are also to be filed by the Civil Servants within the statutory period. For such appeals those dates are taken into consideration on which they are sent through registered post. On the same analogy the appeals filed in Tribunal can also be deemed to have been properly presented on the dates they are dispatched by the aggrieved Civil Servants through registered post. The provisions of C.P.C. Are different from the provisions of Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1973. For the purposes of 1974 Rules it shall be the date on which the appeal is dispatched which for all intents and purposes shall be considered to be the date of presentation of the appeal. We accordingly hold that the present appeal having been dispatched on 14-1-2001 was presented well within time. The objection with regard to limitation is, therefore, overruled.

8.On merits we find that a proper inquiry had been held by Mr. Muhammad Younus, Inquiry Officer.

He had taken into consideration the defence taken by the appellant. After scrutinizing the relevant record in C the light of defence taken by the appellant he had come to the conclusion that the charge levelled against the appellant was correct. We see no legal error in the proceedings conducted by the Inquiry Officer.

9.The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the verification reports, alleged to be fake, were also verified by Sh. Mujeeb-Ullah, Manager and this abundantly proved that these verifications were not fake. We find no force in this argument of the learned counsel. Sh. Mujeeb- Ullah was a Manager of the project. The task of verification of the cases in question had been entrusted to the appellant. It was thus his responsibility to ensure that the verifications were not fake. A supervisory officer normally depends on his subordinate staff. The subordinate staff, therefore, cannot shift the charge levelled against it on the supervisory officer. But it is stated by the respondents that even Sh. Mujeeb-Ullah was arrested by the Police and has since been removed from service. The complicity of Sh. Mujeeb-Ullah for the mischief attributed to the appellant cannot be ruled out. In any case the appellant cannot take advantage of the verification made by Sh.

Mujeeb-Ullah. For his misdeeds he himself is responsible.

10. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the appellant had prepared the documents as the Managing Director of the respondent No,1 had issued instructions in that regard on a directive issued by the then Speaker of the National Assembly Mr. Yousaf Raza Gillani. A photocopy of the letter, dated 22nd of March, 1994 sent by the Speaker to Rana Muhammad Jalil Khan, Managing Director has been placed on record. We have seen this letter. Mr. Yousaf Raza Gillani had not issued any instruction that fictitious verification reports be prepared for early sanction of loan.

His only request was that the concerned quarters be directed for early sanction of the loan. No direction was issued to the respondents to sanction loan in violation of the prescribed rules. Thus the appellant cannot take advantage of the said letter. Even otherwise obeying unlawful orders of superiors is not a good defence in departmental proceedings against a delinquent Civil Servant. It was the duty of appellant to follow the rules in letter and in spirit by citing chapter and verse. Any deviation from such rules for any reason was an act of misconduct on his part. The illegal order of a superior authority would not exonerate him of the charge of deviation from rules.

11. For the above reasons we find no merit in the appeal which is hereby dismissed.

12. There shall be no order as to costs. Parties be informed.

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