' MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.---This judgment shall dispose of Regulator First Appeals Nos. 255 and 155 of 2001 as common question of law and fact is involved in these appeals.
2. The suit for declaration, filed by the present appellants against the respondents, was dismissed by the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree, dated 10-1-2001, holding that even though the matter A has been compromised between the parties, yet the suit is bad formultifariousness of the causes of action, and that the compromise in A essence is beyond the claim of the plaintiff in the suit. Hence this appeal by the plaintiff/appellant, whereas, the other appeal (R.F.A. No,255-01) has been filed by Umar Altaf, defendant No,1, of the suit, who was a party to the said compromise and is a beneficiary of the compromise and has paid some consideration to the other defendants on the basis of the same.
3. Briefly, stated the facts of the case are that National PipeIndustries through its Directors/share- holders (Anwar Sultana and Waqar Ahmad), appointed Umar Altaf as the attorney through registered general power of attorney on 15-2-1999 with the power to sell the suit property. Umar Altaf further appointed Muhammad Anwar, defendant No, 2, as an attorney, who on the basis of said special power of attorney made five sales of the disputed properties in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 8 (respondents Nos.3 to 8 in this appeal). The plaintiff challenged the power of attorney and the sale-deed as being ineffective against their rights and also fraudulent through a suit.
Anyhow, during the course of proceedings of the suit, the plaintiffs entered into a compromise with the vendees, as also Umar Altaf and Muhammad Anwar, whereby, the vendees conceded for the annulment of their sale and in consideration thereof, received a sum of Rs,60,00,000 from Umar Altaf. The general power of attorney in favour of Umar Altaf was agreed to be kept intact, while the special power of attorney in favour of Muhammad Anwar was cancelled. This compromise was duly filed before the Court and has been marked `C-1'. But learned Court below did not dispose of the suit for two reasons, mentioned earlier.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the agreement was lawful in nature and, therefore, the Court below should have been acted upon the same; that in term of Order 23, Rule 3 of C.P.C. Even if the compromise between the parties arrived to resolve some other matter along with the subject-matter of the suit, the matter resolved has been decided in the light of the compromise. In this behalf he has relied upon Messrs Country Products Export Ltd. v. Messrs Bawany Sugar Mills Ltd. (PLD 1968 Karachi 115) and Daud Arshad Wattoo v. Abdul Hafeez and others (1998 CLC 952).
5. When confronted, learned counsel for respondents Nos.3 to 8 states that the allegations contained in the plaint that the sale made in favour of respondents were procured fraudulently. But in the compromise, the said respondents never conceded those to be act of fraud, rather, in order to avoid litigation and on receipt of the consideration, they gave up their right of sale which, in fact, is resale ofthe property on the receipt of consideration of the amount thus as the plaintiff was left with no cause of action, resultantly, the suit was rightly dismissed by the Court below. Moreover, as in a single suit five sales transactions and two power of attorneys were challenged, subsequently, the suit was hit by multifariousness and, lastly, it is stated that the compromise is contrary to the plaint.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and find that the agreement between the parties (Exh.C1) was a lawful agreement, which substantially covered the dispute between the parties, subject-matter of the litigation. Respondents Nos. 3 to 8 are also the signatories and the beneficiaries of the compromise and have received consideration from Umar Altaf. It seems quite unreasonable on the one hand, on the basis of the said agreement they had achieved the advantage and on the other are resisting the disposal of the suit on the basis thereof. To our mind, it is a simple matter in which the respondents Nos. 3 to 8, undoubtedly, in clear terms have conceded for the annulment of their sales on the receipt of a consideration of Rs,60,00,000, thus, for all intends and purposes, the suit of the appellant especially to the extent of the sale-deed should have been decreed by the learned Civil Judge not necessarily declaring the transaction to be fraudulent or imputing any fraud to the said respondents but on the basis of the compromise simplicitor. Having failed to do so, the Court has acted with material irregularity and has refused to exercise its proper jurisdiction, therefore, the judgment and decree of learned trial Court is set aside with the direction that the suit of the appellants shall stand decreed in terms of the agreement (Mark C1) on the record. But as Waqar Ahmad and Mst. Anwar Sultana are not party to the compromise, resultantly, such compromise or the decree shall not be binding upon them.
No order as to costs.