1. This is an application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2, C.P.C. (C.M.A. 6166/04) in which plaintiff has prayed that the defendants be restrained from entering into any agreement or transaction with respect to the plot of land Bearing No. 25.SB-6. Zaibunnisa Street, Saddar. Karachi measuring 867.75 square yards alongwith construction thereon (hereinafter called the said property). Counter affidavit has been filed by Defendant No. 1 to which rejoinder affidavit is filed by the plaintiff.
2. Facts necessary for the disposal of this application are that one Muhammad Akhtar Khan the father of plaintiff is the tenant of one shop in the said property where he is running a jewellery outlet by the name of Tessori, The said property is stated to be owned by the Defendant No. 1 which is the Trust and Defendants 1(a), 1(b) and 3 are the Trustees. It is stated that the Defendant No. 1 desired to sell the said property and the plaintiff showed interest of purchasing the same on which negotiation took place between both the parties. As there was problem of Sanad and registration the matter was referred by both the parties to a mutually trusted friend namely Mr. Naim-ur- Rehman, Barrister who agreed to examine it and prepare an Aide Memoire. It is alleged that subsequently the parties entered into an agreement to sell dated 26-8-2003 whereby defendants trust/trustees agreed to sell while plaintiff agreed to purchase the said property for a total consideration of US $ 1 million and towards advance an amount of US $ 1,50,000 was paid by the plaintiff to the Defendant No. 1(a) which is also acknowledged in the agreement. It is alleged that due to the problem of Sanad, the defendant trust trustees asked the plaintiff not to publish notice in newspaper as it desired to resolve this problem first. A public notice appeared in newspaper on 28-8-2004 published by an Advocate for an undisclosed purchaser inviting objections in respect of purchase of the said property on as is where is basis. This led to giving of legal notice by the plaintiff which was replied by the defendants trust trustees Advocate. The plaintiff thereupon filed this suit for specific performance of agreement to sell in which following prayer is made:-- (a)Declare that the Agreement to sell dated 26-8-2003 between the plaintiff and the Defendant No. 1 is liable to' be specifically performed by the Defendant No. 1, through its trustee.
3. (b)Grant mandatory injunction directing the Defendant No. 1, to specifically perform the Agreement to sell dated 26-8-03 and execute and register the sale-deed/sanad/power in favour of the plaintiff and do all acts necessary to put the Plaintiff in full, exclusive and quiet possession and ownership of Plot of land bearing No. 25, SB-6, Zaibunnissa Street, Saddar, Karachi.
4. Admeasuring 867.75 square yards, alongwith construction thereon including shop presently lying vacant.
5. (c)In the event of failure of the trustee (s) of the Defendant No. 1 to fulfil their obligations to execute and register the sale-deed Sanad power in favour of the Plaintiff with respect to plot of land Bearing No. 25, SB-6, Zaibunnissa Street, Saddar, Karachi, admeasuring 867.75 square yards, alongwith construction thereon, direct the Nazir to perform the aforesaid acts.
6. (d)Direct the concerned authorities to register the sale-deed/sanad/power in favour of the plaintiff and do all acts necessary to put the plaintiff in full, exclusive and quiet possession and ownership of plot of land Bearing No. 25, SB-6, Zaibunnissa Street, Saddar Karachi, admeasuring 867.75 square yards, alongwith construction thereon.
(e) Declare that agreement, deed or transaction, if any, between the Defendant No. 1, and the undisclosed buyer/Defendant No. 2, with respect to the suit property is illegal, void and of no legal effect whatsoever.
(f) In addition, grant compensation to the plaintiff caused due to failure of the Defendant N. 1 to specifically perform the agreement in time and also grant mesne profits.
7. (g)Grant any other relief, which is deemed just and proper in the circumstances of the case.
8. (h)Grant costs of the suit.
9. The Defendants Nos. 1, 1(a) and 1(b) have filed a joint written statement in which preliminary objections to the maintainability of the suit are taken. Besides it, the tenancy and preparing of Aide Memoire is admitted but the entering into agreement dated 26-8-2003 is altogether denied and it is labelled as fictitious document fabricated by the plaintiff in order to serve his mala fide and fraudulent intentions: The receipt of advance amount of US, $ 1,50,000 is also denied.
10. Mr. Rasheed A. Razvi learned counsel for the plaintiff has contended that the agreement to sell dated 26-8-2003 is duly executed and the trust trustees are obliged to perform the same. He has contended that Defendant No. 1(a) as trustee has dealt with all the affairs of the said property and relying upon doctrine of indoor management has stated that the agreement is binding on the trust/trustees. He has stated that the copy of the trust deed was not supplied to the plaintiff. He has relied upon the case of Sripada Satyanarayana Sarma v. Ravikanti Venkataramamurithy and others, (AIR 1935 Mad. 454), Messrs Canal Breeze Cooperative Housing Society Limited v.
11. Agricultural and Transport Development Corporation (Pvt.) Limited, (2000 SCM R 506), Muhammad Matin v. Mrs. Dino Manekji Chinoy and others, (PLD 1983 K 387), Mrs. Dino Manekji Chinoy and 8 others v. Muhammad Matin PLD 1983 SC 693. He has also contended that for any reason, the agreement to sell is found to be not reliable, his alternate plea is that there is a oral agreement to sell between the plaintiff and the trust/trustees which can be specifically enforced. He has further stated that plaintiff has prima facie case and granting of injunction in suit for specific performance is a rule and relied upon Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Yousuf, (1983 SCM R 183), Manzoor Ahmed v.
12. Hamid Shah Gilani, (1997 SCM R 1443), and Ferozuddin v. Tien Ying lee, (1987 MLD 2035). In the end, he has contended that the application is liable to be granted against Defendant No. 2 also as protection of Section 27 Specific Relief Act is not available to him.
13. Mr. Khalid Anwar, learned counsel for the defendants trust/trustees has on the other hand argued that trust is not a legal person and suit against it is not maintainable, that the trust deed governs how trust is to be operated and that plaintiff was aware of all the trustees. He has further contended, that the agreement is not signed as per the trust deed, the resolution mentioned in the agreement does not exist, no public notice published in terms of clause 2 of the agreement, the problem of Sanad was already there since two years and plaintiff was in knowledge that there is no new sanad as is mentioned in Aide Memoire. He contended that no sale of the said property can be made in the manner as suggested in the Aide Memoire. That there is no plea of oral agreement in the plaint. That there can be no decree for specific performance in the absence of sanad. That plaintiff has not stated as what steps he has taken for performance of the agreement for the last two years. That Mr. Naim-ur-Rehman is not a witness to the agreement, the origin card of Mr. Jamshed Marker and NIC of the Ardeshir Cowasjee are not available with plaintiff and even Mr. Jamshed Marker who is named as one of the trustees and party to the agreement was not present at Karachi. He has stated that the agreement comprises of four pages but except for last page, there is no signature or initials of the parties on the first three pages. He has stated that though Mr. Jamshed Marker is named in the agreement but it does not bear his signature. No receipt of advance payment of US $ 1.50.000 is filed with the plaint or rejoinder but a photo-copy of receipt is filed with C.M.A. 7012/05 after about one year of filing of counter affidavit. He stated that plaintiff never asked for the copy of trust deed. He contended that the defects, flaws, shortcomings and lacunas make the agreement improbable and not safe to rely upon and no injunction can justifiably be granted. He has distinguished the case-law relied upon by the plaintiff counsel and also the provisions of Sections 36, 37 & 39 of the Trust Act and relied upon Section 21(e) of the Specific Relief Act and the case of Jamil Ahmad v. Provincial Government of West Pakistan, (PLD 1982 L-49) and Obaidullah v. Habiabullah, (PLD 1997 SC 835).
14. On the point of doctrine of indoor management he has relied upon the case of Gajendra Naith Dey v. Moulvi Ashraf Hussain, (AIR 1923 Cal. 130). Messrs Canal Breeze Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. Agricultural and Transport Development Corporation (Pvt.) Limited (2000 SCM R 506). He has stated that there can be no specific performance of oral agreement and relied upon Muhammad Aslam v. Muhammad Khan, (1999 SCM R 2267). That there is no waiver by Mr. Jamshed Marker and relied on Jam Pari v. Muhammad Abdullah, (1992 SCM R 786) and Gohar Rehman v.
15. Liaqat Ali, (1991 SCM R 305). That prayer in suit is only against one trustee and that there being no Sanad no specific performance of registered sale-deed power can be granted.
16. Mr. Mustufa Lakhani, learned counsel for the Defendant No. 2 contended that the Defendant No. 2 was not aware of prior agreement.
17. Mr. Rasheed A. Rizvi in rebuttal has argued that definition of word `trust' in Trust Act and Specific Relief Act are different and that of Trust Act has application to this case. He has stated that Section 21(e) of Specific Relief Act is not applicable to the case. In respect of doctrine of indoor management, he has relied upon the case of Mrs. M.N. Arshad v. Miss Naeema Khan (PLD 1990 SC 612), Gajendra Nath Dey v. Moulvi Ashraf Hussain, (AIR 1923 Cal 130), Hussain A Haroon v. Mrs. Laila Sarfaraz, (SBLR 2003 Sindh 57), Nalmani Poricha v. Appanna Poricha (AIR 1936 Mad. 14). He stated that Mr. Ardeshir Cawasjee is also attorney of Ms. Ava Ardeshir Cawasjee the Defendant No. 3 and that in this way the agreement is signed by two trustees out of three which is majority. He stated that the defendants trust/trustees have taken two pleas that agreement is a forgery and at the same time has raised grounds to show that it is not validly executed. He has stated that these are mutually destructive pleas which cannot be advanced. On the point that specific performance of oral agreement is provided in law, he has cited Mobinul Haq Siddiqi v. Mrs. Hajra Farooqi, (PLD 1986 K 358). In the last he has contended that he plaintiff can be granted transfer of interest by extending the scope of relief in terms of Order 7, Rule 7, C.P.C. and relied upon Bai Dosabai v.
18. Mathurdas Govinddas (AIR 1980 SC 1334).
19. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel and have gone through the case-law relied upon by them and also perused the record of the case.
20. The admitted fact is that the said property is in the name of Trust the Defendant No. 1 and Defendants Nos. 1(a), (b) and 3 are its trustees. The trust deed dated 29-1-1936 in its clause 4 empowers the trustees to sell, exchange and dispose of the trust properties, give effectual receipts and assurances etc. In the present case, the agreement, as per trust is concerned apparently shows signature of only one trustee that of Defendant No. 1(a) only and the same is the case with receipt of US $ 1,50,000 stated to be advance of the sale consideration.
21. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has referred to Sections 36, 37 and 39 of the Trust Act 1882 to demonstrate that the law gives power to one trustee to act for the trust property and even to convey the trust property and in this respect has relied the cases of Sripada Satyanarayana Sarwa and Nilamani Povicha (Supra). On the other hand learned counsel for the defendant Trust/trustees has contended that Sections 36 and 39 of the Trust Act have no application to the case in hand and that all the trustees could only contract for the sale of trust property and receive consideration for it. Sections 36, 37 and 39 of the Trust Act are as follows:- `36 General authority of trustee.--In addition to the powers expressly conferred by this Act and by the instrument of trust, and subject to the restrictions, if any, contained in such instrument, and to the provisions of Section 17, a trustee may do all acts which are reasonable and proper for the realization, protection or benefit of the trust property, and for the protection or support of a beneficiary who is not competent to contract.' `37 Power to sell in lots, and either by public auction or private contract Where the trustee is empowered to sell any trust property, he may sell the same subject to prior charges or not, and either together or in lots, by public auction or private contract, and either at one time or at several times, unless the instrument of trust otherwise directs.' `39. Power to convey:--For the purpose of completing any such sale, the trustee shall have power to convey or otherwise dispose of the property sold in such manner as may be necessary.'
22. Perusal of Section 36 shows that it confers additional powers on a trustee apart from that what is expressly conferred by Act and by the instrument of trust and subject to the restrictions, if any, contained in such instrument and to the provision of Section 17, a trustee may do all acts which are reasonable and proper for the realization, protection or benefit of the trust property and for the protection or support of a beneficiary who is not competent to contact. Section 37 provides that where the trustee is empowered to sell the trust property he may sell it in the manner laid down in this Section. Section 39 provides that for the purpose of completing such sale, the trustee shall have power to convey or dispose of the property sold in the manner as may be necessary. Section 36 does not in any way help the cause of the plaintiff as it nowhere gives authority to a trustee to sell the trust property. Section 37 starts with the words where the trustee is empowered to sell any trust property' so to be able to sell a trust property, trustee has to be empowered to do so. Section 39 refers to 'such sale' i.e. sale which is provided in Section 37. Therefore in order to convey or dispose of the property the trustee has, to be empowered to sell the trust property. From where such empowerment has to be derived, obviously it has to be by the Act and the instrument of trust i.e. trust deed. No provision in the Act is shown which itself empowers a trustee to sell trust property.
23. The Act itself provides that it is the instrument of trust that will govern the affairs of the trust and its properties. In the instrument of trust which is trust deed dated 29-1-1936 in the present case, specifically provides that it will be lawful for the trustees to sell or dispose of the trust properties or any of them and to give effectual receipt for purchase money. Thus the instrument of trust in the present case empowers all the trustees jointly to sell or dispose of the trust property and to give effectual receipt for purchase money. In this case Section 48 of the Trust Act will have application which provides that when there are more trustees than one, all must join in the execution of the trust, except where the instrument of trust otherwise provides. In the case of I.L. Janakirama lyer and others u. P.M. Nilakanta lyer and others AIR 1962 SC 633 the Indian Supreme Court has laid down at page 642 as follows:
(21) Clause 23 has been thus translated by the High Court `In all the proceedings to be taken in connection with this estate, you three either unanimously or according to the decision of the majority, shall act.'
24. In the earlier litigation started by Defendants 1 to 6 this clause was thus translated: `All the steps to be taken in connection with this estate should be according to the unanimous opinion of all the three of you or as decided by the majority.'
25. The learned trial Judge has made this translation of the clause in the present proceedings: In all the proceedings to be taken in connection with the estate all the three should act either unanimously, or according to the decision of the majority. The learned Attorney-General has supplied us with this estate, in all proceedings to be taken decision of the majority shall act. We have carefully compared all the translations, and we feel no difficulty in holding that the translation supplied in the earlier litigation is somewhat inaccurate, whereas all the three translations made in the present proceedings substantially agree. Taking the translation supplied by the learned Attorney-General it is clear that what this clause requires is that the three trustees shall act, and it provides that they shall act according to the decision which may be reached either unanimously or by majority. 'You three' that is to say the three trustees, is the subject of the predicate 'shall act'. And the words between the subject and the predicate indicate how the decision has been reached.
26. Reading the clause as a whole it is difficult to accept the argument that this clause allows two of the three trustees to act without joining the third trustee in the actual action to be taken in the execution of the trust. It is not necessary under the clause that in the matter of executing the trust every decision must be unanimous. The clause recognizes that in some matters decision may be by majority, but nevertheless it requires that once a decision is reached either unanimously or by majority in giving effect to the decision and in taking any given action in the execution of the trust all the three must act. Thus read this clause confirms to the statutory provisions contained in S. 48 of the Indian Trusts Act and is not intended to provide for an exception to the said provisions at all.
27. It is urged that if no departure was intended to be made from the principles laid down in S. 48 the clause need not have been added at all. This argument is wholly inconclusive. There are several other clauses in the trust deed which all bring out provisions corresponding to the relevant provision of the Trusts Act and this argument may apply to the said clause as well. The authors of the trust-while creating the trust, have made elaborate provisions in respect of the several matters concerning the execution of the trust, and the whole scheme of the trust deed is consistent with the operative C1.23 in that it seems to require all the trustees to act together even though the decisions which they seek to give effect to may have been majority decisions and not unanimous decisions.
28. Therefore in our opinion, the Courts below were right in holding that C1.23 like the main provision of S. 48 requires that all the trustees should have joined in the execution of the-sale-deeds in question. That being so. Exhs.B-94 and B-37 which are respectively executed in favour of defendant 14 and defendant 13 are invalid and can pass no title to the alienees on the ground that only two out of the three trustees have executed them (Vide: Man Mohan Das v. Janki Prasad 72 Ind app. 39 (AIR 1945 PC 23).
29. In the first cited Judgment of the Madras High Court, the rule laid down was that of acceptance of rent after default by a trustee who had been held out by co-trustees as having authority to receive payments of amount to an acceptance binding on the trustees. In the second case also of Madras High Court the rule laid down was that arrangements between parties to carry out the duties of a trust if conducive to the interest of smooth administration of the affairs of the trust are really in the nature of scheme framed for the management of the trust and will be binding on the parties. Both the cases are distinguishable as in the first place the matter was mainly of receipt of rent by a trustee and there was authority held out by co-trustees of receiving the rent by. him. In the second case there was arrangement scheme of management of Trust. Both the elements are lacking in this case as no authority to sell trust property is held out by co-trustees nor there is any arrangement scheme of management of trust shown. The receipt of rent otherwise is merely a ministerial act as it can also be done by a Rent Collector. Even if the Defendant No. 1(a) is assumed to have signed the agreement also as an attorney of Defendant No. 3 (which assumption in the present case is not available for that the name of Defendant No. 3 as one of the co-trustees is not mentioned in the agreement) still there is no signature of Defendant No. 1(b) in the agreement whose name is otherwise specifically mentioned in the agreement. The agreement mentions about resolution but neither the date of resolution is given nor copy of resolution filed.
30. The plaintiff had full knowledge that they are dealing in respect of trust property. Prudency required so also the plaintiff ought to have asked for providing him copy of trust deed so as not only to make agreement in accordance with it but also had the hall mark of it being genuine and bona fide. This admittedly was not done and the plaintiff alone is to be blamed for this as regards the question of doctrine of indoor management. Even if such doctrine is accepted to be applicable-to a private trust. It may be noted that this argument would have been available to the plaintiff had the agreement been challenged only on the ground of competency of its execution by the trust/trustees. Though, in the earlier part of this judgment it has been clearly held that by force of Section 48 of the Trust Act, all the trustees are required to execute the agreement and a judgment of the Indian Supreme Court is referred; yet in this case the defendant trust/trustee have altogether denied execution of the agreement. Therefore, in my respectful view, the plaintiff's task is more onerous than just of relying upon the doctrine of indoor management. Even if this doctrine is applied to this case, the plaintiff has to show prima facie that the agreement was executed by the trust/trustees and it could have been made in the circumstances of the case.
31. Indeed there is an admitted document on the record i.e. an Aide Memoire which is attached with a letter dated 20-7-2002 of Mr. M. Naim-urRehman, Barrister. It will be advantageous to reproduce the said letter and Aide Memoire attached to it: Kamran Khan Esq., Chairman, M/s. Tessori Trading Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. Zaibunuissa Street, Karachi.
32. Dear Mr. Kamran Khan. 20.7.2002 RE: AIDE MEMOIRE I am enclosing herewith a copy of my Aide Memorie, which I had prepared in the middle of February, 2001 and the same may be forwarded to Mr. Jamshed Marker.
33. The relevant portions are 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10 and 11 mentioned therein.
34. This is as already advised to Mr. Ardeshir Cowasjee and Mr. Jamshed Marker in February, 2001.
35. Yours sincerely, (Sd.)
36. (M. Naim-ur-Rehman)
37. AIDE MEMOIRE RE: SALE OF PLOT NO. SB-6 SURVEY NO. 25, SADAR, BAZAR, KARACHI
(1) The property belonging to trust in which Mr. Ardeshir Cowasjee and Mr. Jamshed Marker are inter alia, Trustees.
(2) The initial lease expired in 1963 but was renewed and PT-1 Form in this regard was issued.
(3) The property desired to be sold by Mr. Ardeshir Cowasjee and Mr. Jamshed Marker to Mr. Akhtar Khan of Tessori.
(4) No new Sanad was issued after 1963 and after recent contacts with the Commissioner, Karachi none are likely to be issued for the foreseeable future.
(5) According to Mr. Jamshed Marker the Deputy Commissioner South states that he will mutate PT-1 Form to record the change of ownership pursuant to an agreement.
(6) I am informed by Mr. Yakub Kapadia, Advocate that the Deputy Commissioner has issued instructions to the Registrar of Rights and assurances not to register any transactions which would include registration of a Power of Attorney with power to sell from the present owners to the purchaser Mr. Akhtar Khan.
(7) If the PT-1 Form can be mutated in favour of the purchaser Mr. Akhtar Khan of Tessori, then this is the evidence of transfer of ownership of the new purchaser under the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984.
(8) Present course in the circumstances is for an agreement of Sale.
(9) Hand over possession.
(10) Agreement of sale on the basis of 10-15% part payment and at the time of mutation 98-99 % of the sale price be given.
(11) An unregistered Power of Attorney may also be issued in favour of the third party to have the property registered in the name of the purchaser as and when sanads are again issued by the land Revenue Department, Government of Sindh.
REQUIREMENTS
(1) Up-to-date property tax receipt.
(2) Approved plan of the construction on the plot.
(3) Proceedings against tenant M/s. Sanaullah.
38. Learned counsel for the plaintiff frankly conceded that that problem of Sanad is still intact and in terms of Aide Memoire it is not likely to be issued in foreseeable future and that there is embargo imposed by the Deputy Commissioner on registration of transactions including registration of power of attorney with power to sell from present owner to the purchaser Mr. Akhtar Khan. In the face of above state of things prevailing with the property, learned counsel for the plaintiff had no limbs to support the stipulation contained in clause 5 of the agreement which is as follows: "5. That vendor shall complete the sale by:
(a) Making out a valid marketable subsisting and unencumbered title to the said property to the satisfaction of the Vendee, (b) removing satisfying any objection or claim if received pursuant to Public Notice to be published by the vendee or if otherwise coming to the knowledge of the vendee,
(c) by execution and registration of proper conveyance deed and causing the same to be registered in favour of the Vendee or his nominee. The balance sale consideration shall be paid by the Vendee at the time of execution and registration of Conveyance deed."
39. Learned counsel for the plaintiff found it hard even to support the prayer made in the suit that of directing defendants trust/trustees or on their failure Nazir of the Court to execute and register sale-deed/sanad/ power in favour of the plaintiff.
40. Faced with, above difficulties, learned counsel for the plaintiff raised the plea that in the face of admitted document of Aide Memoire which speaks of negotiation of transaction of sale of said property between the parties, at least there is a case of oral agreement between the parties which can be specifically enforced. As regards this submission, it may first be noted that there is no plea of oral agreement in the plaint. Secondly, the Aide Memoire contains state of deficiencies which are incapable of annulment in the foreseeable future besides some personal view/opinion of Mr. Naim- ur-Rehman to how to over come it. None of the parties as it appear has agreed to what is stated inside Memoire and yet more the plaint does not speak nor it is argued before me as to how the contents of Aide Memoire can be specifically enforced. The relief claimed in the suit is altogether contrary to what is mentioned in the Aide Memoire.
41. Learned counsel for the plaintiff then came up with the plea that the plaintiff can be granted relief in terms of Order VII, Rule 7, C.P.C. that of acquiring of some interest in the said property and relied upon the case of Bai Dosabai (supra). There is no cavil with the proposition that Order VII, Rule 7, C.P.C. does give power to the Court to mould the relief or extend it if the facts and circumstances of the case so require to meet the ends of justice. It is admitted position on the record that the plaintiff or his father is a tenant of one shop in the said property. Plaintiff has not been able to establish prima facie that there is an agreement to sell the said property in his favour. Then on what basis the acquiring of unspecified nature of interest in the 1 property can be granted is not clear. In order to claim some interest in the said property, plaintiff in the first place has to show that there is some material on the record which gives him right to acquire some interest in the said property. No such material is on the record nor any has been pointed out to me. To me, this argument seems to be nothing but abstract. As regards the authority of the Indian Supreme Court, it may be noted that there was an admitted agreement between the parties and one of the parties was claiming of having interest in the property on the basis of the said agreement, as the case unfolded and on the facts the Court observed that there was an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property not amounting to an interest in the property that is an obligation in the nature of trust and therefore an obligation which may be specifically enforced. I am unable to find nexus of this authority with this case for that the plaintiff is not saying that through material on record, it has made a case of creation of an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property.
42. There is no material nor any has been spelt out before me whereby the plaintiff may have created an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property.
43. After giving all due consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the case-law relied upon by the parties. I find that plaintiff has failed to establish prima facie case and that the balance of inconvenience and irreparable loss is in his favour.
44. After hearing the learned counsel, by short order dated 19-10-2005 the application was dismissed.
45. Above are the reasons for it.