' MUHAMMAD JEHANGIR ARSHAD, J.---The appellant beingthe tenant of the respondent in ejectment proceedings, is aggrieved of the concurrent findings recorded by learned Rent Controller, Jhang on 8-10-2002 directing his ejectment from the premises (Shop No,248-F Block-9, Shaheed Road, Jhang Cantt.) and also the order, dated 22-9-2004 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Jhang dismissing his appeal against the abovementioned ejectment order of the learned Rent Controller.
2. The facts significant for the disposal of this appeal are that respondent Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din claiming himself as landlord of the said premises filed ejectment petition against the appellant on the ground of his personal bona fide requirement. The appellant contested the said application admitting the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant but controverted the plea of the respondent that shop in dispute was required by him for bona fide personal need and took the plea that ejectment petition was in fact aimed at increasing the rent. The learned Rent Controller on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues and invited the parties to produce their respective evidence:--- ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petition has been filed just to harass the respondent which is vexatious and frivolous, hence liable to be dismissed? OPD
(2) Whether the petitioner has no cause of action to bring this petition? OPD
(3) Whether the petitioner is in bona fide need to vacate the suit shop for his personal need? OPP
(4) Relief.
' The respondent in his evidence produced Muhammad Iqbal (Petition Writer) AW-1, appeared himself as AW-2, produced Abdul Aleem AW-3 and Zishan A.W.4. Thereafter, by tendering documents Exh.A-1 and Exh.A-2 closed his evidence. In rebuttal the appellant produced Zawar Hussain R.W.1, Aamir Latif R.W.2 and closed his evidence by appearing himself as R.W.3. On the conclusion of the trial, the learned Rent Controller vide order, dated 8-10-2002 answered issue No,3 in favour of the respondent and against the appellant, resultantly the ejectment petition of the respondent was allowed and appellant was directed to vacate the suit property within a period of one month. Against the abovementioned judgment of the learned Rent Controller the appellant brought an appeal but the same was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jhang on 22-9-2004, hence this S.A.O.
3. The only point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant (Mian Israr ul Haq, Advocate) in support of this appeal is that after purchasing the property in dispute from the previous owner namely Anjum Saleem, etc. The respondent issued first notice on 29-9-2001 to the appellant under section 13-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance informing the appellant about change of ownership and demanding rent from the appellant and through a subsequent notice (Exh.R-1), dated 6-10- 2001 not only the respondent claimed increased rent i.e,Rs,2925 to Rs:4200 but also for the first time informed the appellant to vacate the shop as the same was required by the respondent for his personal bona fide need. From this the learned counsel for the appellant has inferred that had the property in question been required to the respondent for his personal bona fide need, he could very well mention the same in his first notice, dated 29-9-2001 and by omitting to mention his personal bona fide need in the first notice, it could be inferred that premises was not required by the respondent for that purpose, rather he was out to eject the appellant without any specific reason.
Hence, the findings of two Courts below on issue No,3 that premises was required for bona fide personal use, were neither correct nor sustainable in law. In support of his abovementioned contention the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the case Ikram Ullah Khan v. Muhammad Umar 1984 CLC 645.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/landlord has vehemently opposed this appeal by arguing that there are concurrent findings of facts recorded by two Courts below about personal bona fide need of the respondent and that the abovementioned arguments of learned counsel for the appellant are not legally sustainable, hence, this S.A.O. Is liable to be dismissed.
5. I have given my anxious consideration to the abovementioned arguments of learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record with their assistance.
6. After proper appraisal of the evidence on record andconsideration of the abovementioned arguments of learned counsel for the parties, I am afraid that argument of learned counsel for the appellant is legally maintainable. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case Sabu Mal v. Kika Ram alias Hemandas 1973 SCM R 185, service of notice under section 13-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 has the only effect of saving a tenant from ejectment on the ground of default in case the said notice is not served upon him by the new landlord after his purchase from the previous landlord but the same has nothing to do or has no effect on the maintainability of ejectment application on the grounds other than ofdefault in the payment of rent. In a subsequent judgment titled Muhammad Hussain v. Haji Chaudhry Umar Bakhsh and another PLD 1982 SC 212 the Hon'ble Supreme Court followed the earlier judgment reported as Sabu Mal v. Kika Ram alias Hemandas 1973 SCM R 185 and till date the same holds the field. Rather, in another subsequent judgment on almost similar facts as are in the case in hand, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case Mst. Umme Khatoon v. Mst. Umme Salam PLD 1990 SC 755 held that even non-mentioning of demand for vacation of the premises on the ground of personal need of the landlord in notice under section 13-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance would not in any manner reflect on the bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord. In the presence of abovementioned dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, no further argument against the impugned judgments of two Courts below is required and thus the case-law cited by learned counsel for the appellant loses its value. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any other illegality or irregularity in the findings of two Courts below which are not only concurrent but also finally determine the question of fact viz. Bona fide personal requirement of the premises by the respondent.
7. The upshot of above discussion is that this S.A.O. Has no force and is accordingly dismissed.
However, the appellant is allowed to vacate the shop in dispute and hand over its vacant possession to the respondent/landlord till 31-8-2006, failing which the respondent shall be at liberty to obtain possession by initiation of execution proceedings.