1. ' Vide order dated 3-3-2004, a Full Bench of this Court was constituted by the Hon'ble Chief Justice (as he then was) to consider the order passed in this case dated 25-8-1993 whereby the conflict in the decisions arrived at by two learned Benches of this Court in the case of Gulistan v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal Karachi (1982 PLC 1007) and Iqbal Muhammad Khan v. Sindh Labour Appe' ate Tribunal (1992 PLC 549) is to be resolved.
2. ' It would be seen that per order passed on 25-8-1993, it was held that the view taken by the learned D.B in the case of Gulistan (supra) was that according to the language implied by the Legislature in section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969 a workman could only bring his grievance to the notice of the employer himself or through his shop steward or CBA and therefore, no person other than those specified in section 25-A could initiate proceedings under the said section on behalf of the aggrieved workmen. However, the view taken in the case of Iqbal Muhammad Khan (supra) was that the absence of the word "himself" from section 37(3) of the I.R.O., has left it open to an aggrieved person to file an appeal otherwise than by himself or through his agent. Consequently, the appeal filed through an Advocate was held to be competent. Hence, although in the former case section 37 (3) was not under consideration but as an appeal was a continuation of the original proceedings the conflict in between the views taken by the two learned Benches had to be resolved by a larger Bench.
3. ' Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that per section 25-A (1) of the I.R.O. Only the persons mentioned therein may bring a grievance notice to the employer as of right viz a workman himself or through a shop steward or Collective Bargaining Agent. Similarly under section 25-A (4) where the worker is not satisfied with the decision of the employer or the employer has failed to communicate the decision within the stipulated time then the worker or shop steward may take the matter to his CBA or the Labour Court. Consequently, even under section 37(3) of the I.R.O. Only such persons as mentioned in section 25-A (4) could file an appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal as this was the legislative intent.
4. ' We had queried learned counsel as to the reasons why the word "himself" as mentioned in section 25-A (1) and section 25-A (4) of the I.R.O. Were missing in section 37(3) to which he could not give a satisfactory reply.
5. ' On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner his submitted that per section 37 (3) of the I.R.O. Any aggrieved person can file an appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal from the decision of the Labour Court under section 25-A or under sections 34 & 35 (c). Consequently an Appeal filed by the Advocate was perfectly valid.
6. ' We have heard the learned counsel and our conclusions are as follows.
7. It would be seen that section 25-A (1) & (4) are quite clear as to who is the category of person who could firstly bring a grievance petition to the notice of the employer and thereafter where the worker is not satisfied with the decision given by the employer etc. He could move the Labour Court. These are the worker himself or through his CBA or shop steward.
8. ' On the other hand per section 37 (3) of the I.R.O. a person who is aggrieved with the order of the learned Labour Court could file an appeal before learned Labour Appellate Tribunal. In our view, there is hardly any conflict in these two provisions of law. The cases of Gulistan and Iqbal Muhammad Khan (supra) are distinguishable since the former dealt with section 25-A (4) of the I.R.O. Whereas the latter with section 37 (3). We are in full agreement with the decision passed by the learned D.B in the case of Iqbal Muhammad Khan (supra) wherein it has been held that in the absence of any particular provision of the I.R.O. As to how an appeal could be filed by the aggrieved persons, the C.P.C. Would be applicable and under Order XLI, Rule 1, C.P.C. It could be filed by an aggrieved person himself or through his Advocate. Consequently we would hold that the appeal filed by the petitioner through his counsel in these proceedings before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal was quite proper particularly as it has been supported by the affidavit of the Appellant. Reference is disposed of accordingly.