' MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.---Brief facts of the case are that one Hakeem-udDin was the allottee of the suit-land; after his death, his legal heirs/petitioners had applied for the grant of the proprietary rights, which were conferred upon them and a Mutation No.133 dated 8-7-1991 was accordingly sanctioned in favour of the present petitioners. On the other hand, the respondents applied to the Revenue Authorities for the cancellation of the above by seeking the implementation of a decree dated 26-5-1976, which as per their stance, had been passed by the learned Civil Judge on the basis of an award .Dated 24-4-1976, inter se the petitioner's father Hakeem-udDin and respondents Nos.1 to 8. Upon this, the petitioners moved an application under section 12(2), C.P.C., seeking the setting aside of the judgment and decree dated 26-5-1976 based upon the award dated 24-4- 1976, asserting that it has been procured through fraud and misrepresentation, because Imdad Hussain, who had appeared on behalf of Hakeem-udDin in that case was never appointed as the attorney; besides, he had no authority to refer the matter to any arbitrator, or to get an award made rule of the Court. It is also their case, that the attorney had got transferred the land in favour of his son, brother and uncle and this is the proof of his fraud. The application, after contest, has been rejected by the learned trial Court, and the appeal of the petitioners has also failed.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends, that the power of attorney in favour of Imdad Hussain dated 5-3-1968 is a forged and fake document; Imdad Hussain was never appointed as attorney on behalf of Hakeem-ud-Din and therefore, he had no authority on behalf of Hakeem-ud- Din to enter into any arbitration agreement and appoint any person as the arbitrator and to concede the award for making it rule of the Court. It is also argued that for the sake of arguments and without prejudice to the above, even if it is assumed that the power of attorney is valid, yet Imdad Hussain had no authority on behalf of Hakeem-ud-Din to enter into an arbitration agreement or to refer the matter to the arbitrator and to act subsequently; it is settled law that the power of attorney must be strictly construed and only such powers can be exercised, by an agent, which are expressly conferred therein, resultantly, on this account too, the judgment and decree dated 26-5-1976 cannot be sustained. Lastly, the learned' counsel for the petitioners has argued that the transactions of alienation have been made by Imdad Hussain in favour of his near ones and, therefore, the presumption, that it is meant to defraud the petitioners, in all probabilities, cannot be ruled out.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Even assuming, that the power of attorney dated 5-3-1968 was validly executed by Hakeemud-Din in favour of Imdad Hussain, yet this power of attorney does not contain any specific power, permitting him to enter into any arbitration agreement, refer the matterto the arbitration or confess any decree on the basis of the award. It is settled law that the power of attorney has to be strictly construed and only such powers shall be deemed conferred upon the agent, which are specifically mentioned therein.
As admittedly, the power of entering into the arbitration agreement or reference of the matter to the arbitrator is not specified in the power of attorney, resultantly, on this score alone, the award as also the proceedings for making the award rule of the Court, and the decree based thereupon, cannot sustain. The view of the Courts below, that considering the nature of the dealings between Hakeem-ud-Din and Imdad Hussain regarding the suit-land and because of the power of attorney given on that basis, Imdad Hussain could refer the matter to the arbitrator, is misconceived.
Because, if afterwards any dispute had arisen between him and Hakeem-ud-Din, the proper course should have been to seek the resolution through the process of law including any independent agreement in writing between Imdad Hussain and Hakeem-ud-Din for the arbitration.
But on the basis of the earlier power of attorney, Imdad Hussain himself could not have referred the dispute to the arbitrator as there was no power in this behalf specified in the power of attorney.
4. As regards the question of limitation, suffice it to say that the application under section 12 (2), C.P.C. Is E governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act. Obviously, such period shall commence from the date when the petitioners had come to know about the decree dated 26-5-1976. According to their case, they learnt about the decree on 21-6-1992 and the respondents have not led any evidence to show if this decree was in the knowledge of the petitioners the day it was passed or earlier to the time mentioned in the application. These aspects when have not been considered by the Courts below, the impugned orders cannot sustain, which are hereby be set aside. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.