SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN).-----The services of Amir Ali, appellant who was employed as Gestetner Operator in the Capital Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the C. D. A.) were terminated by the Additional Establishment Officer by his order dated 15th February, 1978 under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 as adopted by the C. D. A. In appeal the penalty was reduced from termination of service to that of compulsory retirement by the Appellate Authority by order dated 27th or 28th March, 1978. Against this order the appellant has filed this appeal purporting to be under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The employees of the C. D. A. Not being "civil servants" within the definition of the term as given in sec-- tion 2(1)(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. Mr. M. S. Siddiqi, learned counsel for the appellant was asked to explain how the appeal lies to this Tribunal.
2. Mr. Siddiqi has referred to various provisions of Corporation Employees (Special Power)
Ordinance, 1978 (XIII of 1978) (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) and has contended that this Ordinance has given the appellant the status of a civil servant and has made him entitled to approach the Tribunal by way of appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to section 5 of the Ordinance and contended that the service under the C. D. A. Which is a service of Corporation has been declared to be "service of Pakistan" and every person in corporation service is now deemed to be a "civil servant". When his attention was drawn to the specific language of section 5 of the Ordinance and it was explained that the appellant can approach the Tribunal only when he is removed from service or reverted to a lower post or grade under the Ordinance itself, the right of appeal will accrue to him and not otherwise, he contended that by virtue of the provi--sions of section 5 of the Ordinance the appellant belongs to "Service of Pakistan" within the definition of the term given in clause (1) of the Article 260 of the Constitution and consequently he shall be deemed to be serving in connection with the affairs of the Federation by which even he acquired the status of civil servants under section 2(1)(b), Civil Servants Act, 1973, which entitles him to approach the Tribunal by way of appeal under sec--tion 4 of the Service Tribunal Act, 1973.
4. In order to examine the legal position we have first to see as to what is "Civil Service of Pakistan".
Article 260(1) of the Constitution defines the term "Service of Pakistan" as service, post or office in connec--tion with the affairs of the Federation or the Province and also such service as may be declared to be "Service of Pakistan" by or under an Act of Parliament or of a Provincial Assembly.
There is no doubt that the service of Corporation which undisputedly includes the service of the C.
D. A. Has been declared to be a Service of Pakistan under the Ordinance, neverthe--less this provisions does not confer the right on the employee of a Corpora--tion to become ipso facto of a "civil servant" under Civil Servants Act, A 1973. The definition of the term "Service of Pakistan" is embodied in Article 260(1) for interpreting the provisions of the Constitution specially. Article 240 which relate to appointments to Service of Pakistan and condi--tion of service and Article 63 read with Article 127 which provide for disqualification of a person in the service of Pakistan from being a member of Provincial Assembly or of Parliament. Section 5 of the Ordinance itself does not make an employee of a corporation a civil servant within the definition given in Civil Servants Act, 1973.
Saying plainly a person who is in the service of Pakistan is not necessarily a "civil servant" for all purposes.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that since the appellant is in the service of Pakistan, he is automatically a person serving a connection with the affairs of the Federation and therefore falls with the definition of `civil servant" as given in Civil Servants Act, 1973. In this argument we do not find any force. The class of persons who are serving in connection with the affairs of the Federation is quite different and the employees of a corporation are not deemed to be serving in con--nection with the affairs of the Federation. The C. D. A. Which is a corporation itself is a distinct person and the person employed in the C. D. A. Cannot be said to be holding a post in connection with the affairs of the Federation as he holds a post under C. D. A. Which is a corpora--tion having been created by an independent Statute.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant then pointed out that section 5 of Ordinance specifically provides that persons in the service of the corporation (which includes the C. D. A.) shall be deemed to be civil servants for the purpose of Civil Servants Act, 1973, and therefore they have right to approach the Tribunal in respect of the disciplinary action taken against them. This section has no doubt declared the service of the corporation to be a service of Pakistan and further provides that any per--son to Corporation Service who is removed from service or reverted to a post or grade under the Ordinance shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purpose of Service Tribunal Act, 1973, but in this lease the order or termination of the service of the appellant does not show that the appellant's services were terminated or he was compulsorily retired under provisions of the Ordinance. It will not be out of place to reproduce here section 3 of the Ordinance which reads as follows :- "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, or in the terms and conditions of service a person in corpo--ration service appointed or promoted during the period from the first day of January, 1972 to the fifth day of July, 1977 may be removed from service, or reverted to his lower post of grade, as the case may be, without notice, by the President, or a person authorised by him in this behalf, on such date as the President, or as the case may be, the person so authorised may, in the public interest, direct."
This section clearly shows that under the Ordinance only those persons can suffer penalty who were appointed or promoted during the period from first day of January 1972, to the fifth day of July, 1977. It is not the appellant's case that he was either appointed during this period or promot-- ed during this period. His services were not terminated nor he was com--pulsorily retired under the provisions of section 3 of the Ordinance. He was penalised under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 as made applicable by the C. D.A. For its own employees and therefore his only remedy was the channel which he has already exhausted under the relevant Rules. The jurisdiction of this Tribunal would have come into motion only if the appellant had been removed from service or reverted to a lower post or grade under section 3 of the Ordinance. Such removal is to be made by the President or by a person authorised by him to do so. By no standard the case of the appellant falls under section 3 of the consequently the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Ordinance and section 5 thereto does not extend to his case.
7. In view of the above discussion, we hold that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction in the matter. The appeal is dismissed in limine.
Parties to be informed.