Brief facts out of which the present appeal arises are that respondent. No. 2 secured a loan from respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 sanctioned the loan in favour of 'respondent No, 2 in accordance with Banking Rules. Property in question was allegedly mortgaged with respondent- bank on 30.12.1985. Appellant purchased the same from respondent No. 4 on 26.4.1987. Respondent No. 1 filed a suit for recovery against respondent No. 2 and others, which was decreed vide judgment dated 14.3.1992.
During the execution proceedings, the appellant filed objection petition before the Banking Court on the ground that the appellant 'has purchased the property in question from respondent No. 4 for consideration and that the property in question was not mortgaged with respondent No. 1-bank. He further submitted that the appellant secured the decree against respondent No. 4 from the Civil Court on 26.7.1988. The Banking Court dismissed the objection petition vide the impugned order dated 16.9.2004. Appellant being aggrieved filed this appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Executing Court erred in law to dismiss the objection of the appellant without application of mind. The appellant is a bona fide purchaser of the property in question, but this fact was not considered by the Banking Court in its true perspective. He further submits that according to the order passed in favour of respondent No. 1 by the Banking Court on 14.3.1992, it has specifically been mentioned that the decretal amount in the first instance may be recovered by sale/disposal of the mortgaged property. The property in question is not mortgaged with the bank. This fact was also not considered by the learned Banking Court in its true perspective.
3. Learned counsel has attached all the necessary documents, which were before the Banking Court, therefore, we intend to decide the same on merits. .
4. 'It is better and appropriate to reproduce the basic facts in chronological order:--
(1) The property in question allegedly was mortgaged by respondent No. 4 in favour of respondent No. 1-bank on 30.12.1985.
(2) Appellant purchased the same from respondent No. 4 on 26.4.1987.
(3) Appellant also secured ex-parte decree against respondent No. 4 without impleading the bank as defendant in the suit on 26.1.1988 from the Civil Court.
(4) The bank filed a suit for recovery against respondents allegedly in the year 1989.
(5) Order was passed in favour of the bank by the Banking Court on 14.3.1992.
(6) Original title deed/document of the property in question was not secured by the appellant from respondent No. 4.
(7) The original document qua the property in question is still with the respondent bank.
5. In case the aforesaid facts are put in juxta position , then it is crystal clear that the appellant has purchased the property without any investigation and without securing the original document qua the property in question from respondent No. 4. The property in question was mortgaged with the respondent bank on 30.12.1985, whereas the appellant has purchased the same on 26.4.1987, therefore, the appellant's case does not fall under the phrase of "bona fide purchaser". It is better and appropriate to reproduce section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:--
41. Transfer by ostensible owner:--Where, with the consent , express or implied, of the persons interested in immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be avoidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorized to make it: provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith.
Mere reading of the aforesaid provision of law shows that the case of the appellant does not fall under the aforesaid provision of law. The appellant purchased the property in question without obtaining original title documents from respondent No. 4, meaning thereby that appellant failed to prove that the appellant purchased the property in question with consideration, in good faith and without making reasonable enquiries in order to get valid title qua the property in question. It is pertinent to mention here that it is the duty of appellant to prove that transfer was for consideration, and transferee had acted bona fide and in good faith. All such ingredients must concomitantly exits together otherwise principle enunciated in section 41 of the aforesaid Act would not apply. It is also settled law that protection of section 41 cast by negligence meaning thereby protection of said provision is available to transferee of property who purchased the same after reasonable care. Even otherwise the impugned order is in accordance with law laid down by the superior Courts in the following judgments:--
(1) Tarachand Mondal and others v. Hazari Shaikh and another (P.L.D. 1967 Dacca 203).
(2) Syed Sajid Ali Asif through Legal Heirs v. Mumtaz Ahmad and 3 others (P.L.D. 1993 Karachi 520).
(3) Sattar Muhammad and 2 others v. Hussain and 3 others (P.L.D. 1988 Peshawar 48).
(4) Ilahi Bakhsh and others v. Hassan Khan and others (P.L.D. 1966 (W.P.) Lahore 654).
(5) Riasul Hassan v. Muhammad Ayub Khan and another (S.C.M.R. 2513).
(6) Ilam Din and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 4 others (P L.J.
1984 Lahore 96).
(7) Mst. Noor-un-Nisa and another v. Ghulam Sarwar and 6 others (N.L.R. 1995 S.C.J. 117): In view of what has been discussed above we do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned order therefore, the appeal has no merits and the same is dismissed in limihe.
RFA Dismissed. .