SABIHUDDIN AHMAD, J. --- The petitioner No.1 claims to be owner of land survey No.70 comprising 5 acres and ghuntas, situate in Deh Khuto, Tapo Landhi Taluka and Distt. Karachi East, now District Malir, claiming to have purchased same from petitioner No.2 through a registered sale-deed dated 24.11.1998. It is contended that the petitioner No.2 purchased the said land on 17.4.1993 from the petitioner who was the attorney of three Pakistani Hindu owners. Apparent ownership of the predecessor-in-ihterest C.L.R. of the three owners Koovarji, Norainji and God lanwala, was established through which was decreed in his favour in 1932. Subsequently the land was also being treated as evacuee property by the Settlement Department, but the Honourable Supreme Court vide its judgment dated 13.8.1987 in Civil Appeal No.39-K of 1981, held such treatment to be illegal. However, the petitioner appears to be aggrieved by an order of the then Settlement Commissioner Revenue (Malir), Karachi, who declined to grant NOC for the sale and mortgage of the property and advised them to seek their remedy from a competent Court of law. Through this petition the petitioners have sought a declaration as to the title of the, petitioner No.1 to said land and the consequential relief by declaring withholding of NOC to be illegal and without jurisdiction. He has further sought a restraining order to the effect that any inquiry or purported inquiries in respect of petitioners' title at the best of respondent No.4 or otherwise be declared void ab initio.
2. It appears that the respondent No.4 has been making seven complaints against the petitioners in respect of their interest in the said property before various authorities and has also filed detailed written statement in this case. Nevertheless we are of the view that the said respondent has no legal interest in the property as such and cannot be allowed to raise controversy in the present proceedings.
3. It may, nevertheless, be noticed that on account of such complaints the respondents No.1 to 3 did take notice of the fact that the said property falls within an urban area but was transferred as if it was a rural property and appropriate stamp duty was allegedly evaded. An inquiry is stated to have been initiated by the Inspector-General of Stamps and apparently the impugned order was passed on this account.
4. Be that as it may Mr. Rafiq Rajori, learned Additional Advocate General files para wise comments in Court, wherein it has been acknowledged on behalf of the respondent No 1 that mutation in the Revenue records has already been made in favour of petitioner No.1.
5. Indeed there does not appear to be much of a controversy between the parties on the factual plain. The only questions to be considered are whether the reliefs sought by the petitioners can be granted in these proceedings. In the first place the petitioner No.1 has sought declaration of title as to the property in question. Obviously such relief cannot be granted in these proceedings and in the case the petitioner wishes to assert his title he can only do so by filing a suit before a competent Civil Court. Indeed Mr. Zaki Muhammad laid great emphasis on the fact that the name of respondent No. 1 had already been entered in the record of right (D.F.VIl). However, it is well settled that entries in the record-of-rights do not create title but are only evidence of title.
Therefore, the petitioner No. 1 cannot be declared as owner of the said land though evidence of relevant entries may always be produced before a Civil Court in support of he claim.
6 As regards the second question we are of the view that the Court cannot restrain the respondents from holding any inquiry into bona fide of the transaction. Learned counsel laid great emphasis on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court mentioned above and the decree in favour of the predecessor of the petitioner. In this respect however, all that needs to be said is that their Lordships only decided that the property could not be treated as evacuee property but does not follow that any declaration as to petitioner's ownership was ever granted or any inquiry into this respect must be stalled.
7. As regards the decree of the Court made in 1932 it may be indeed true that Godanwala was declared to be the owner by a Court, but it does not necessarily follow that all transactions made by him were absolutely unblemished and no inquiry in respect of their validity could be held.
8. While we had almost dictated the order Mr. Zaki Muhammad stated that he does not wish to press this petition; subject to his right to seek appropriate remedies through a Civil Court. Indeed he is always free to do so and with these observations we dismiss this petition. In view of the above, we are not inclined to take an action on the application for contempt and dismiss the same.