' This petition dated 29-12-1977 has apparently been filed before me for interference in exercise of my revisional jurisdiction under section 164(1)(4) of the Land Revenue Act, 1967. It is directed against the order dated 23-10-1977, vide Case No, SROA-4487/73, passed by the Additional Commissioner Sukkur in exercise of his powers of review under section 163(2) ibid. In the order impugned herein, the Additional Commissioner declined, on the short ground of limitation, to review the order dated 11-7-1975 of his predecessor-in-Office, who in exercise of his appellate powers under section 161 (1)(b) ibid had allowed the petition of respondent Sarfraz and granted both the disputed S. Nos. 180 and 61 of Deh Gahno, Taluka Mirpur' Mathelo, to the respondent on the basis of a compromise statement dated 11-7-1975 filed by the parties to the matter before him.
2. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused relevant case papers.
3. I find that both the disputed S. Nos. 180 and 61 were initially granted to the petitioner Ali Muhammad by the Colonization Officer, Guddu Barrage, Sukkur, on harap conditions from Kharif 1973-74, in open Kutchery. Respondent Sarfraz being aggrieved by his order, filed appeal before the Additional Commissioner. During the pendency of the matter, parties patched up and recorded a compromise statement dated 11-7-1975 duly signed by them and verified by the Additional Commissioner, whereby the petitioner Ali Muhammad surrendered his rights in S. No, 180 in favour of the respondent Sarfraz and retained S. No, 61 only. The statement of compromise appears to have been granted by virtue of which his appeal in respect of S. No, 180 stood allowed. But the Additional Commissioner in his short order dated 11-7-1975 directed as follows:- ". . The parties have patched up and given statement. Accordingly the respondent gives up his grant in favour of appellant. It is accepted. The Colonization Officer is required to make necessary changes as per rules."
' Thus there perhaps crept in an error apparent on the face of the record while dictating/drafting the order.
4. The parties who come from rural area, became aware of the mistake in due course and therefore respondent Sarfraz in his application dated 21-1-1976 addressed to the Additional Commissioner hastened to sea due correction. The Additional Commissioner instead of acting judicially, passed the petition on to the Assistant Colonization Officer, Mirpur Mathelo "for necessary action".
5. Handling extra judicially applications relating to judicial proceedings that are either pending or have been disposed of by judicial forums, as miscellaneous applications, does not appear to be in keeping with normal judicial practice. The Additional Commissioner should have dug out the relative case papers looked into them and disposed of the application judicially with due notice to the parties under the relevant provisions of law.
6. The petitioner thus moved a regular review petition dated 11-8-1977 before the successor-in- Office of the Additional Commissioner who had passed the original order. This review petition was not admitted and dismissed in limine on 27-10-1977 as "badly time-barred for more than two years" without going into the substance of the case sought to be reviewed.'
7. No one ought to leave the Court without a remedy. Refusal to interfere in case of an erroneous and therefore manifestly exceptionable order is clearly not sustainable as the order was after all, overtly contrary to record and unfortunated. Construction of law ought to be liberal an compact and its application vigilant and expertly. Only then, chances of miscarriage of justice would be abviated. Perhaps provisions of only subsection (2) of section 163 ibid were referred to while passing to impugned order to the exclusion of subsection (1) of section 163 ibid which lays down that the Commissioner may "at any time, on his own motion, review any order passed by himself or any of his predecessor-in-Office, and on so reviewing modify, reverse or confirm the same."
' Subject however to proviso (a) (i) to subsection (2) of section 163 ibid. These are suo motu powers of review. Intention of law thus is to keep the doors open for any genuine correction of error apparent on the face of record, discernible on plain of inspection without any further inquiry or investigation. Where there is right, there is remedy. No time limit has therefore been set in subsection (1) of section 163 ibid for such matter as are subject to review.
8. The position of case before me is that the first adverse order against the petitioner was passed on 11-7-1975 by the Additional Commissioner. The petitioner had cause of action to come in appeal before the Board of Revenue under section 161 (1)(c) ibid on a point of law only or under section filed a belated review petition under section 163 (2) ibid before the Additional Commissioner who dismissed the same on 23-11-1977 on the point of limitation. In the result the earlier order treated as appeal, it is hit by section 164(4) ibid and is therefore not maintainable; if it is treated as a revision petition, it is liable to be dismissed on two-fold ground:-
(i) It is time-barred as the original order was passed on 11-7-1975 and no application for condonation of delay has been filed.
(ii)Original order dated 11-7-1975 has also not been challenged in this portion.
' Thus the petition per se is apparently not maintainable.
9. Nevertheless, as indicated supra, I find that there has been obvious miscarriage of justice in this case for which the petitioner is not at fault. The situation thus calls for interference to straighten the record. I, therefore, in exercise of my suo motu revisional powers under seam 164 (1)(4) ibid, direct that S. No, 180 should stand granted to respondent Sarfraz and S. No, 61 should remain with petitioner Ali Muhammad. This is in terms of the original compromise statement dated 11-7-1975, further supported by the application dated 21-1-1976 to the Additional Commissioner, Sukkar by the respondent Sarfraz. The order dated 11-7-1975 of the Additional Commissioner, Sukkur should stand modified accordingly. The present petition is upheld to that extent.