' FAKHRUDDIN G. EBRAHIM, J.-This petition is directed against the proceedings initiated against the detent under the Sind Crimes Control Act, 1975 by the S. D. M., Shikarpur, which is a Tribunal constituted under the said Act upon a report dated 23rd July, 1977 made by the S. H.
0., Lakhi Gate, Shikarpur against the detent. In that report the allegations made against the detent are as follows :-- "(1)
There is general complaint against him that he stands on the public road and makes indecent jokes and uses objectionable words.
(2) Besides that he stands on the road leading towards girls High School and behaves indecently with the girls going to the school, and if any respectable person restrains him from doing so, he becomes inclined to quarrel with him, hence no respectable person for sake of protecting his respect, dares to ask him.
(3) This bad character is very dangerous, quarrelsome fellow, and he is habitual gambler and he does not care for law and order and he is very desperate and very influential. He goes around with deadly weapons and spreads terror in the minds of the public.
(4) Therefore no respectable person dares to go to Police to complain against him. Therefore, the remaining at large of this bad character from jail would be nuisance to the general public. It is, therefore, prayed to the Humble Court that personal spot enquiry be made at Lakhigate Shikarpur against this respondent.
' The said accused is a habitual gambler, gets gambling committed, harbored of thieves, goes armed with deadly weapons, he is very dangerous and desperate person.- ' Mt. Naloch, the learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the proceedings on the ground that the aforesaid report by the S. H.
0. Did not comply with the mandatory requirements of section 6 of the said Act which reads as follows :- "6. Delivery of copy of report.-Every summons or warrant issued under section 5 shall be accompanied by a copy of the report and such copy Shall be - delivered by the officer serving or executing such summons or warrant to the person served with, or arrested under the same : ' Provided that the report, shall briefly state-
(1) the acts with which the person complained against is charged ;
(ii) the details of time and place of such acts ;
(iii) general repute of person complained or such other allegation made against him."
2. It does not require much of an argument that the aforesaid allegations are wholly devoid of any particulars and, therefore, do not14 conform to the aforesaid section 6.
3. Mr. Sattar Sheikh, the learned Assistant Advocate-General contended firstly that the report also refers to as many as 13 cases in which the detenu had been challaned. Assuming that these cases can be considered as instances which is doubtful inasmuch as Tufail Ali, the then C. J., in relation to the then West Pakistin Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959 wherein there was also similar requirement of instances being quoted observed that- "I am quite unable to read the list of cases in which the applicant was challaned as being a statement of particulars within the meaning of the section and clearly, therefore, cognizance was wrongly taken and indeed the information did not comply with the requirements of the law at all."- [1976 P Cr. L J 650] In the present case a further difficulty is that there is prima facie no nexus, between the allegations and the cases referred to. There is also nothing on record to show that the learned Tribunal had before it the FirstB Information Reports of the cases cited in the report to enable him to determine the nexus between the allegations and the cases. In a Division Bench case decided by this Court reported in Ar.Sala Khan v. District Magistrate (South) and Tribunal, Karachi (2) it was observed that in the absence of the First Information Report it was not possible to state that there was any nexus whatsoever between the cases and in all the clauses of section 14 of the said Act.
4. Mr. Sattar Shaikh next appeared to contend that instances are not required where the proceedings are taken on the basis of "reputation". It is obvious to us that reputation does not mean "suspicion" or rumors and there must be necessity evidence which discloses the collective information of those persons in whose midst a person resides before it can be said that there is evidence in proof of general reputation. It was, therefore, necessary even in relation to reputation, assuming.
(1) 1977 P Cr. L J 746 ' without holding that mere general reputation can also become a ground for initiating proceedings under the said Act ; that the report disclosed general reputation which would have justified initiation of proceedings against the detenu.
5. Lastly, we have also noted that the detent had been earlier proceeded against under the said Act in which identical allegations were made and the same cases referred to as in the report of the S. H.
0. Herein, except for addition of three more cases, and the detenu was discharged by the Tribunal by order dated 12th April, 1977, while the present proceedings were instituted only a few months thereafter. In the three additional cases is also included the aforesaid case in which he was discharged by the Tribunal, but the S. H. O. Significally, omitted to mention that it had resulted in an order in favor of the detent.
6. The result, therefore, is that the proceedings initiated by the Tribunal against the detent are without lawful authority and we accordingly quash the same and allow this petition.