' SYED SAJJAD HUSSAIN SHAH, J.---This is a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal against the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore on 1-12-2005 whereby he acquitted respondents Nos.1 to 3 by accepting their petition under section 265-K, Cr.P.C.
2. It is contended that the learned trial Court summoned the respondents vide order, dated 21-9- 2005 by observing that prima facie case is made out against the respondents. Thereafter the acquittal of the respondents without recording the evidence amounts to review of earlier order which was not permissible. Further contended that the learned lower Court acquitted the respondents on the main ground that the respondents did not come without mischief of land grabbers, however, section of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 covers any kind of dispossession or occupy is without lawful authority. It is further contended that the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is a Special Law and there is no bar to proceed under this Act in spite of the fact that the civil suit is pending between the parties and prays for setting aside the order of acquittal, dated 1-12-2005.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that in fact NGO, Millat-e- Islamia Welfare Society represented by Rana Nadeem Ahmad being Chairman of the Society was only allowed to access the government school for a few years under contract and said contract was cancelled by the competent authority on 19-3-2005 as well as CPP project and since 19-3- 2005, the appellant had not been allowed to run the community school. The school council was constituted by the District Government headed by Illaqa Nazim who was directed to take over the charge of school. Further contended that on the instructions ofDistrict Education Officer, the school council take over the charge of the school on 19-3-2005 and the charge of the above community school was handed over to the Senior Head Mistress, Lady Mclagon Girls High School, Laaj Road, Lahore under the instructions of the Government. The Chairman of the said NGO had tried to illegally trespassed into government building for which F.I.R. Has been lodged against the said Chairman and the school council had filed suit for permanent injunction against the said NGO and an interim injunctive order was granted by the competent Court of law. It is further submitted that the appellant concealed this fact from this Hon'ble Court as well as from the trial Court that she filed an application under sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C. Titled Mst. Naheed Rana v. DPO, Lahore in which she admitted that she and her staff have been stopped from entering into the institution since 15-4-2005 i.e, before promulgation of this Act. It is further contended that respondents are government servants and have to act and obey the lawful orders of the authority and school council had discontinued the classes taken by the said NGO since 19-3-2005 before the promulgation of the said Act. In support of this contention, the respondents referred the order, dated 11-5-2006 of the Court of Mian Tariq Mehmood, learned Civil Judge, Lahore in case titled Mst.
Naheed Rana v. Naheeda Shamim for permanent injunction with consequential relief which is placed on the record.
4. Arguments heard. Record perused.
5. It is evident from the record that agreement with the appellant was cancelled on 19-3-2005 and school council had discontinued the classes undertaken by the petitioner and thereafter not allowed her to enter into the school. Thereafter the appellant moved certain applications in which it was clearly mentioned that the said NGO i.e, petition was dispossessed by the appellant on 21-3- 2005. She and her husband both moved different complaints in this respect. It is also evident from the record that on 24-3-2005, the husband of the appellant filed a petition before the Justice of Peace and during its pendency the appellant and her husband tried to enter into school premises forcibly on 28-3-2005 and F.I.R. Was got registered. Thereafter the appellant filed an application under sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. On 29-7-2005 in which she admitted that she was restrained to enter in the school, therefore, it is evident that before promulgation of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 she was not allowed to enter into the premises of the school and, therefore, the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 was not in field and the respondents cannot be tried under the provisions of said Act. Even otherwise, the respondents are government servants and they have not acted in their private capacity and they acted bonafidely on the directions andinstructions of the government and they cannot, be penalized. The contention that the learned trial Court could not pass order under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. Has not force. Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. Is reproduced hereunder:-- "Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Court from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case; if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, it considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence".
6. It is crystal clear that during the trial at any time, the trial Court can pass such order. In this regard reference may placed on State through Secretary, Ministry of Interior v. Ashiq Ali Bhutto (1993 SCM R 523) wherein it was held that expression "at any stage" in both the provisions recording of the prosecution evidence was not a condition precedent for acquitting an accused under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Or under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. It is further held that the legislature in its wisdom did not leave the question of the recording of the evidence as a condition before taking action under either of the provisions. The use of the expression at any stage of the case is indicative enough of the intention that any such stage could be the very initial stage after taking cognizance or it could be a middle stage after recording some proceedings and/or even it could be later stage as well. Reliance may also be placed upon Muhammad Khalid Mukhtar v. The State through Deputy Director, F.I.A. (C.B.A.), Lahore (PLD 1997 Supreme Court 275).
7. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is without any force, hence, the same is dismissed.