JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.--- This appeal impugns the concurrent findings of the learned Trial Court dated 8.12.1999 and of the learned Appellate Court dated 3.7.2000 whereby a suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff has been dismissed.
2. The facts of the case have been duly noted in the impugned judgments and need not, therefore, be reproduced in ex tenso.
3. The appellant had filed a suit seeking specific performance of agreement to sell dated 2.3.1991 (Ex.P-1). The said agreement related to land-owned by the respondents/defendants who were minors. Ex.P-1 was executed by their father Muhammad Ilyas. It is important to note that in the agreement (Ex.P-1) itself it was noted that the respondents were minors. As per terms of the said agreement, their father was to obtain the permission of the Guardian Court for effecting the sale.
The admitted position is that no permission to this effect was granted by the learned Guardian Judge. Ex.P-2, which is the order passed by the learned Guardian Judge, Sheikhupura, merely records that the father is a natural guardian and by virtue of this status is entitled to exercise the powers of a guardian in respect of the person and property of the minors. This document cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be construed as validating the agreement (Ex.P-1).
4. Learned counsel for the appellant then argued that under the Principles of Islamic Law any guardian could sell the property of a minor. To support his argument, he referred to para. 362 of D.F.
Mulla`s Book "Principles of Mahomedan Law". I have gone through the said text and find that the general principle is that a.Guardian has no power to sell the immovable property of the minor.
Seven exceptions CL. R. to the general rules, however, have been given in para 362. None of these exceptions have been set out in the agreement (Ex.P-1) and nor is there any evidence in proof thereof. In the foregoing circumstances, I find the impugned decrees to be unexceptionable. Furthermore, learned counsel for the appellant was unable to show the existence of any of the ground set out in Section 100 CPC which would justify interference in the impugned decrees. The appeal is therefore, dismissed. .