In a suit filed by the petitioners against the respondents on 12.10.2004, they prayed for grant of temporary injunction. The suit and the application was contested by the respondents. The application was dismissed by the learned Trial Court on 01.12.2004. The first appeal was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Shaiwal on 24.12.2004. However, C.R.No. 53/2005 was allowed by this Court on 24.01.2005 and a restraint order was issued.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the respondents have commenced raising construction at the site in question, in violation of the said restrain order. He argues that vide judgment dated 24.01.2005 in C.R. No. 53/2005, the application was allowed and interim relief was granted as prayed for and since the petitioners have prayed for restraint qua the construction, the respondents are liable to be proceeded against for disobedience of injunction. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand, argues that restraint order was issued in specific terms and there is not even an allegation that they have violated the injunctive order.
3. I have gone through the file of this case. Now in the application for temporary injunction relief was prayed for in the following terms:- "It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that pending final determination and decision of the titled suit, this Honourable Court may graciously be pleased to issue temporary injunction restraining the respondents 1, 2 from undertaking the construction and installation of the petrol pump on the proposed site (located in the bungalow of respondent No. 2.) situated on Nishter Road, near Jinnah Hall, Civil Lines, Sahiwal."
4. As stated by me above, the application was dismissed and the appeal was also dismissed. I deem it appropriate to reproduce here the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners and noted in para. 4 of the judgment in C.R. No. 53/2005:- "Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the concerned Local Government, in the present case, was the Tehsil Council, Sahiwal. This is not disputed by the other side. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the said Local Government has not issued any licence to the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and, therefore, these respondents could not indulge in any trade relating to petrol, oil and lubricants or the business of storing and selling the said items on the property owned by respondent No. 2. This contention is fully supported by the provisions of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance referred above."
5. The contentions found favour with the Court and relief was granted in the following terms in para. 7 of the judgment:--- "In the circumstances, this petition is allowed. The orders passed by the. Learned Trial Court dated 01.12.2004 and by the learned Appellate Court dated 17.01.2005 are set aside. As a result, the application filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs under Ordinance XXXIX, rules 1 & 2 C.P.C. Is allowed and the respondents No. 1 and 2 are restrained from storing and selling petrol, oil and lubricants on the property owned by respondent No. 2"
6. To my mind there is no ambiguity at all as to nature and extent of the restraint order issued by this Court i.e. It restrained respondents No. 1 and 2 from 'storing and selling petrol, oil and lubricants on the property owned by respondent No. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners refers to the case of Muhammad Afzal vs. Muhammad Tufail (2000 M LD 1858) to urge that it shall be deemed that the application has been allowed in its totality and the entire relief claimed has been granted. I ,am afraid the argument is without any force. In the said judgment the learned Trial Court pursuant to the application praying that possession of the applicant be not interfered with proceeded to order that the status qua be maintained. His Lordship opined that the injunctive order as worded is to be read in the context of the prayer made in the application. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents draws my attention to the judgment in the case of Qadeer Ahmad vs. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and another (PLD 1990 SC 787) wherein their Lordships have observed that in order to impose penalty, on the ground that the injunctive order has been violated, the same should be specifically worded. I have already noted above that the injunction has been issued in specific terms and there is not even an allegation that the respondents are storing or selling the said items on the property owned by respondent No. 2. The Criminal Original accordingly is dismissed.
Criminal Original accordingly dismissed.