' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---Appellants/judgmentdebtors, through the present appeal, under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 have called in question judgment and decree dated 7-4-2005, whereby the learned Judge Banking Court, after finding that no serious dispute, needing trial has been raised, dismissed appellant's application for leave to defend the suit and consequently passed the decree for recovery of Rs,3,54,981 against the appellants jointly and severally with costs of suit and costs of funds.
2. The respondent-Corporation filed the suit for recovery of Rs,3,54,981, against the appellants, before the learned Judge Banking Court, inter alia, pleading that the appellants obtained certain equipment, on lease, they executed the requisite documents, as mentioned in the plaint, and subsequently they defaulted and failed to make the payment of outstanding amount, which necessitated the suit for recovery. The appellants, in response to the summons issued by the learned Banking Court, as provided under the law, filed the application seeking leave to defend the suit and they besides raising preliminary objections denied the liability. The learned Judge Banking Court, after hearing the parties and holding that "As the liability to make payment of the amount is admitted, no serious dispute needing trial by this Court has been raised" proceeded to dismiss appellant's leave application and resultantly passed a decree for recovery of Rs,3,54,981, against the appellants jointly and severally, with cost of funds and costs of suit, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 7-4-2005, hence the present appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants states that the learned Judge Banking Court, while passing the impugned decree, has miscalculated the "amount due" and has not taken into consideration that the bank has illegally charged certain amounts in the statement of accounts. He has added that the impugned decree is not sustainable in law. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent, while supporting the impugned decree submits that the bank is competent to charge rentals and also mark-up.
4. We have heard the learned counsel and examined the available record. Upon perusing the impugned judgment, we find that the only plea, which persuaded the learned Judge A Banking Court to pass the impugned decree, is that the appellants have admitted the liability to make the payment. In order to ascertain as to whether the appellants did admit their liability to make the payment, we have thoroughly examined the contents of the application, filed by the appellants, seeking leave to defend the suit, however, we are unable to find any such admission in their leave application. Rather that appellants in their leave application, besides raising different preliminary objections, have pleaded that the amount for the recovery of which, the plaintiff has filed the suit, is not recoverable as the same is based on patently dishonest claim (para.3); the defendants controvert and challenge the genuineness of the documents (para.5); the defendants denied the claim as brought by the plaintiff in the garb of the present suit (pa ra.6); the plaintiff has calculated illegal mark-up (para.10) and they also challenge genuineness and correctness of statement of accounts. Strangely enough, it is not even the case of the respondent-Corporation that the appellants have admitted their liability. Even summoned record does not manifest any such admission made by the appellants, during the currency of the suit. It is not discernible from the available record, as to upon which material, the learned Judge Banking Court concluded and made the sole basis for passing a decree that the appellants admitted the payment of the liability.
Aforenoted facts are sufficient to show that the impugned judgment was passed in complete oblivion of the record of the case. Even the learned counsel for the respondent could not point out any material on record to show that the appellants, at any stage of the proceedings, admitted their liability.
5. There is another aspect of the case. Although the appellants in their application raised various grounds for the grant of leave to defend the suit, yet none of them was dealt with by the learned Judge Banking Court, presumably on the erroneous ground that the liability to make the payment was admitted. As held above, the appellants did not admit the liability rather they contested the claim of the respondent. In the absence of any admission of liability, the learned Banking Court was obliged under the law to deal with the grounds raised by the appellants at the time of hearing the leave application. Record of the case does not indicate that the appellants did not press any of the grounds.
6. We find from the record an interim order of even date showing that appellant's leave application was dismissed for non-prosecution. However, the detailed order does not mention about the interim order and it proceeded on the assumption that the leave application was argued.
7. In the above perspective, we have examined the impugned judgment and decree and find that the same are not sustainable in law and thus we are persuaded to interfere.
8. Upshot of the above discussion is that the present appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and decree dated 7-4-2005 are set aside with no order as to costs. Resultantly, appellant's leave application and respondent's suit shall be deemed to be pending before the learned Judge Banking Court, who shall, firstly, decide the leave application and then the suit, after hearing the parties and of course in accordance with law. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.