' MUHAMMAD ATHAR SAEED, J.---The petitioner is aggrieved by the levy of 10% regulatory duty levied on their imports in pursuance of S.R.O. 1050(1)195, dated 29th October, 1995 under para. (ii) of which 10% regulatory duty has been levied in cases where the goods are chargeable to a statutory or concessionary rate other than of zero per cent on imports into Pakistan.
2. The main thrust of the arguments of the learned counsel for petitioner is that vide S.R.O. Dated 4th October, 1995 specific exemption was provided in respect of machinery which was exempted under S.R.O. 79)(I)191, dated 15th August, 1991 (since expired) and in respect of machinery letter of credit which had been opened up to 30th June, 1995, from customs duty in excess of 25% and sales tax leviable. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner qualified for exemption, under this S.R.O.
However another S.R.O. Quoted above was issued on 29th October, 1995 by which regulatory duty was imposed at the rate of 10% in accordance with para. (ii) of the said notification.
3. The bill of entry was presented for clearance on 6-1-1996. The A petitioner's case is that since the goods were exempted under S.R.O. Dated 4th October, 1995 therefore this exemption could not have been taken away by S.R.O. Dated 29-10-1995. In reply to a query by the Court, the learned counsel for petitioner replied that his contention was that S.R.O. Dated 29th October, 1995 will come into effect after the date and will not apply retrospectively. However, from the fact of the case it is clear that this notification has not been applied A retrospectively as the bill of entry for the clearance of goods in question was presented on 6-1-2000 i,e, more than 2 months after coming into force of this notification. Under section 30 of the Customs Act the date of determination of rate of duty is either the date of filing bill of entry or clearance of the goods from warehouse as the case may be. The date of establishment of letter of credit however is irrelevant.
4. Both the learned counsel drew the attention of this Court to the earlier order passed by this Court in Constitutional Petition No, 731 of 1996 in respect of same petitioner wherein this Court had dismissed the petition and up held the vires of the notification dated 29-10-1995. In this judgment this Court also held that since the goods were cleared after the coming in force of S.R.O. 1050 of 1995 therefore they were liable to the levy of regulatory duty. Both the learned counsel also referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Customs v. Ravi Spinning Mills 1999 SCM R 412 but in our opinion it clearly supports the respondent's point of view. In the first place it was held that regulatory duty under section 18(2) was something completely different from customs duty leviable under section 18(1) read with First Schedule and it would depend upon the language of the notification granting exemption whether it was also intended to 'extend' to regulatory duty. In the instant case the notification dated 4th October, 1995 only purported to extend the benefits conferred by the expired notification dated 15th August, 1991 leviable under the First Schedule. However, unless expressly stated in the notification, the exemption would apply only to B existing change of customs duty and not duties which may be leviable in future.
5. The petitioner has been unable to convince us that the notification dated 29th October, 1995 is not applicable and the judgment of the Court in C.P. No,731 of 1996 is not squarely applicable to their case and therefore the regulatory duty has been wrongfully and illegally levied.
In the circumstances we do not find any force in the petition which is accordingly dismissed.