SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN).---The appellant Aftab Ahmed Mirza was appointed as Officer on Special Duty in the grade of Deputy Director in the Pakistan National Council of the Arts on 28th March, 1973. He was redesignated as Deputy Secretary and held that post upto 31st December, 1976.
He was promoted as Director in the same Organization and posted as Administrator, Liaquat Memorial Hall "until further order". His period of probation as Director was extended from time to time and appellant's case is that since he was not appointed on probation the orders of extension from time to time were not legal.
2. On 11th March, 1978, the appellant was redesignated as Deputy Secretary in grade 18 with effect from 7th December, 1977 but his pay as Director was protected. It appears that the appellant made certain repre--sentations but he was informed that the order of re-designation held good and post of Deputy Secretary being in grade 18 the appellant was given protection of pay as a special case, till further orders. Finally on 15th June 1978 in reply to another representation the appellant was informed that a Director is one step higher than the Deputy Secretary and that previously he had been promoted from the post of Deputy Secretary to the post of Director and was subsequently reverted to the post of Deputy Secretary with protection of pay as a special case.
The appellant's grievance is that this series of acts culminated in the reversion of the appellant and reduction in rank to a lower post without proper show-cause notice and was thus illegal. Ire seeks a declaration that he acquired substantive status of Director on 1st January, 1977 when he completed the 6 months probation and that he continued to hold the grade and rank of Director notwithstanding the order of re-designation. Further relief to the grant of increments and other benefits was also claimed.
3. The respondent Pakistan National Council of the Arts is a statutory body constituted under the National Council of the Arts Act, 1973 (LIX of 1973). The learned counsel for the appellant was asked to satisfy us if we have jurisdiction in this matter because the appellant is not a "civil servant", within the meaning of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 (LXXI of 1973). He admitted the position but contended that a right has accrued to the appellant to approach the Tribunal by virtue of the provisions of the Corporation Employees (Special Power) Ordinance, 1978 (XIII of 1978) which gives the appellant the status of civil servant and has made him entitled to approach the Service Tribunals by way of appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act, 1973.
The precise question had come up before the Full Bench in the case of Amir Ali v. Chairman, Capital Development Authority, Islamabad Appeal No. 34 (R)/78 and it was unanimously held that Ordinance No. XIII of 1973 does not give right to every employee of the Corporations to approach the Service Tribunal by way of appeal and that the right was restricted to only those cases where the person is appointed or promoted during the period from first day of January, 1972, to the fifth day of July, 1977, and was removed or reverted to his own' rank by the President or a person authorized by him in this behalf, it was further held that when in a case of corporation the removal according to the rules of the corporation, the provisions of Ordinance No. XIII of 1978, are not attracted, and, therefore, the Tribunal does not acquire power of appeal under section 5 of that Ordinance. In that case also Mr. Siddiqi was representing Mr. Amir Ali and he has urged that the decision of the Tribunal in that case has been challenged ' by him by way of review petition and that it does not lay down correct law. He referred to the case of Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills (PLD 1975 SC 244) and pointed out that a Court can issue orders against a corporation also and that the powers are not restricted to the issue of orders against Government only. The authority relied upon by the learned counsel has no analogy whatsoever with the case before us. In that case the question related to the exercise of power by the High Court to issue writ against a public limited company which was held to be person amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned counsel also made reference of the case of Muhammad Salim Khan v WAPDA (PLD 1976 Lah. 492) in.-which it was held that the employees of WAPDA which is also a statutory organization were "civil servants" and therefore, the High Court cannot entertain any proceedings in respect of any matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. This case too is out of context because under the Water and Power Development Autho--rity Act, 1958, all the employees of WAPDA have been declared to be "civil servants" for the purposes of Civil Servants Act, 1973, and jurisdiction of the Tribunal extends in respect of the terms and conditions of the service of its employees in all respects by virtue of the amendment made in the Act by insertion of subsection (1-B) in section 17.
4. The learned counsel then argued that in the present case the impugned order was not made during the period mentioned in section 3 of Ordinance XIII of 1978 and, therefore, the law laid down by this Tribunal in the case of Amir Ali v. Chairman C.D.A., referred to above does not apply. It was specifically observed in the above-cited case that jurisdic--tion of the Tribunal will extend only if the removal from service or reduction to lower post is made by the President or a person authorized by him in this behalf tinder Ordinance No. XIII of 1978, itself and not otherwise. The fact that the appellant was not affected by any order covering the period mentioned in section 3 of the Ordinance would itself not bring the case of the appellant within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
5. In view of the facts and legal position stated above, we are of the opinion that since in this case the action against the appellant has not been taken under section 3 of the Ordinance No. XIII of 1978, his appeal to the Tribunal is not competent.
6. The result is that his appeal is rejected in limine.
7. Parties be informed accordingly.