' It this writ petition the judgments of the Family Court, Kohat and the District Judge, Kohat on appeal of the former have been assailed. This petition has been moved in the following state of facts.
2. The respondent No, 1 is the legally wedded wife of the petitioner. She had, on 29-3-1978, instituted a suit in the Family Court, Kohat against the petitioner for the recovery of her dower amounting to-
(a) Rs, 5,000 is cash, (b) 8 Tolas of gold valued @ Rs, 6,400, and (c) 1/2 of the house described in the plaint. While a money decree was prayed for the items (a) and (b), decree for possession was sought is respect of item (c) above. This claim was based on an unregistered Kabeen Nama dated 19-5-1977. A counter suit was instituted in the same Court by the petitioner for the restitution of conjugal rights against respondent No, 1.
2. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Kohat as Family Court, on 8-4-1979, decreed both the suits. The petitioner was granted decree for the restitution of conjugal rights against the payment of Rs, 4,600 and the suit of the respondent No, 1 was also granted for the same amount as dower. The rest of the suit of the said respondent was dismissed as the learned trial Court found the kabeen Nama a forged document and the items (a) and (c) in suit not forming part of the dower.
3. Both the petitioner and the respondent No, 1 took separate appeals to the learned Additional District Judge, Kohat from the judgment and decrees of the Family Court. The learned appellate Court held the Kabeen Nama a genuine document, executed both by the petitioner and his father although not thumb-impressed by the petitioner. On the basis of the same, the learned appellate Court by a common judgment, dated 13-6-1979, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and accepted that of the respondent No, 1 in that she was awarded an additional decree for the amount of Rs, 5,000 over and above that already granted. In to regard item (c), the 1/2 of the house, it was declared as part of Dower but relief in the form of possession by partition was held to be beyond the competency of the Family Court and that part of the plaint was, therefore, restored to the file of the civil Court. Parties were left to bear their own costs.
4. The petitioner being aggrieved, she now by way of this petition, assailed the decrees of the Courts concerned on two-fold ground
(1) that the impugned judgments and decrees are without lawful authority and of no legal effect for lack of jurisdiction in the Family Court and the appellate Court in the matter ; and
(2) that the Kabeen Nama purported to have been executed both by the petitioner and his father was actually executed by the father alone and, therefore, could not form part of the power as liability to pay dower is, under the Mohammadan Law, solely on the husband.
' The jurisdiction of the Courts below has been challenged on the ground that it did not extend to passing any order in respect of movable property like a house or the ornaments apart from the agreed amount of dower in cash. It was contended that any matter covering property would be for the civil Courts to decide.
5. To us there does not appear any force in either of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, firstly because any matter pertaining to the Dower has been brought within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Courts by virtue of section 5 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 read with the Schedule appended thereto. Now, it is well-settled law that the Dower of a wife can either be in cash or kind or it may be in the form of the rendition of personal service as was done by Hazrat Moosa, as the dower of his wife, the daughter of Hazrat Shoeb (Peace be upon both of them)- Sura 28 of the Holy Quran contains two varses , i,e, Nos. 27 and 28 on the subject. These are rendered into English by the great Muslim Scholar, Mr. Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthal as under :- "(27) He said, Lo: I fain would marry thee to one of these two daughters of mine on condition that thou hirest thyself to me for (the term of) eight pilgrimages. Then if thou completest ten it will be of thane own accord, for I would not make it hard for thee. Allah willing, thou wilt find me of the righteous.
(28) He said : That (is settled) between thee and me. Whichever of the two terms I fulfil, there will be no injustice to me, and Allah is Surety over what we say."
' Section 285 of the Principles of Muhammadan Law as compiled by Sir D. F. Mulla is as follows :- "285. Dower defined. -Mahr or dower is a sum of money or other property which the wife is entitled to receive from the husband in consideration of the marriage."
' As regards the non-liability of the petitioner for the dower contracted by his father, reliance was placed on section 288 (ibid) which is as under :- "A contract of dower made by a father on behalf of his minor son is binding on the son. Such a contract may be made even after marriage provided the son was then a minor. Among Sunnis the father does not, by entering into such a contract, become personally liable for the dower debt, nor is he liable for it merely because he consents to the marriage. But by a recent decision of the Judicial Committee the rule is otherwise among Shias when the minor son has no means of his own."
6. On the authority of the above proposition of law it was urged that a contract by the father on behalf of a minor son can only bind that son and as in the instant case, the son was major, he could not be bound by such a contract as that in dispute.
7. In the instant case the learned Appellate Court has come to the conclusion from the evidence on record that although the petitioner did not thumb-impress the document in question, it was executed on behalf of both the father and the petitioner at the time the Nikah was performed and was so witnessed by the Imam, who performed the Nikah. The petitioner, it was held, was a party to the same. Moreover, half of the house belonged to the father and the document in question having been found executed by him was binding upon the donor and respondent No, 1, thereby, became lawful owner of the same.
8. The Family Court or the Court sitting in appeal of its decrees have exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of dower and, therefore, these Courts were competent to determine whether any property movable or immovable in, nature, formed part of the dower or not. No exception can be taken to the impugned decree on this ground. The delivery of possession by effecting partition of the suit share has rightly been left to the civil Court by the learned appellate Court.
9. As regards the binding nature of the Kabeen Nama in question, suffice it to say that it stands ratified by the petitioner, firstly by the conducted in the performance of Nikah as is evident from the testimony of the Imam who not only performed the same but also witnessed the deed in question and, secondly, by the acceptance of liability to pay Rs, 5,000 (item (a) above) by the petitioner himself before the Courts below by offer to pay the same on the conditions' that (I) it was paid in instalments and (2) that respondent No, 2 resides with him.
10. We, therefore, are clear in our mind that the impugned decrees do not suffer from lack of jurisdiction and findings of the appellate Court in regard to genuineness of the Kabeen Nama. And its binding effect on the petitioner were the matters within its competence.
' Consequently, we see no force in the petition, which is dismissed in limine.