1. Granted.
2. Granted subject to all just exceptions.
3 and 4. This appeal is directed against the order of the III-Banking Court, Karachi confirming sales of her property in favour of the respondent No,8. It appears that the respondent No,1 had filed a suit for recovery of the amount of outstanding debts against the appellants and respondents Nos.2 to
7. It was alleged that some money was advanced to the respondent No,2 company and as security for repayment a property owned by appellant and the respondent No,3 was mortgaged.
Respondents Nos.3 to 8 had executed personal guarantee for repayment.
' The suit was jointly and severally decreed as against the appellant and the respondents Nos.2 to 8 and the judgment and decree was not questioned before any higher forum. The appellant had also filed a suit for declaration that the property in question had not been mortgaged in favour of the respondent No,1 but the suit was dismissed and an appeal to the Division Bench as well as a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court met the same fate as candidly stated by learned counsel.
Mr. Asim Mansoor Khan learned counsel for the appellant has raised two contentions. In the first place he urged that the findings in the impugned order relating to mortgage of property, without considering the appellant's point of view was liable to be set aside. We are afraid we cannot subscribe to this view. Indeed the controversy regarding existence or otherwise of the mortgage had been finally resolved at the level of the Honourable Supreme Court and therefore, the learned Banking Judge was perfectly justified in not allowing the appellant to raise the issue de novo.
' Alternatively the learned counsel contended that the appellant was ready and willing to deposit his share of the liability towards respondent No,1 and in consideration thereof the mortgaged property ought to be released. We are afraid there is no force in this contention as the trial Court had evidently decreed the suit 'jointly and severally" against all defendants. The contention that the decree speaks of mortgage of the property of defendants Nos.1 and 3 whereas appellant was defendant No,4 is equally untenable, as once the factum of mortgage has been recognized the misdescription could only be a clerical mistake for these reasons we would dismiss this appeal in limine along with listed applications.