SAVED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J.--- Hundreds of Lecturers were appointed on ad-hoc basis during the period 1995-96 whose appointments were extended from time to time till 5.8.2000 when they were terminated. W.P. No. 16955/2000 was filed by them which was dismissed on 24.2.2001 by a learned Full Bench of this Court due to the bar of jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 that they had to avail the remedy before the Punjab Service Tribunal.
Their petition was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan also on 20.6.2001 i.e. Muhammad Sarfaraz and 174 others v. Government of Punjab through Secretary, Education Department, Civil Secretariat, Lahore and others (2001 OLC (C.S.) 1224). Eventually appeals were filed before the Punjab Service Tribunal, which were dismissed by the learned Tribunal. The matter reached before the Supreme Court of Pakistan when petitions were disposed of vide judgment dated 25.9.2002 i.e. Dr. Naveeda Tufail and 72 others v. Government of Punjab and others (2003 SCMR 291). Finally letters of appointment were issued to them. On such specimen of appointment letter is of Mr. Jehan Zeb of dated 5.9.2003. The present petition has been filed in a representative capacity with the grievance and prayer that:-- "(i) Respondent functionaries be directed to given proper effect to the judgment and Order of the Supreme Court attached above and to treat the petitioner and other persons as per attached list as having been retained in the posts on regular basis from the date of their first induction therein.
(ii) Furthermore, respondents be directed to treat the intervening period between 30.6.2000 and the date of regularization of the petitioner and all other persons as per list attached in terms of judgment made in Ahsan Ali Shah's case reported as 2000 CLC (CS) 643.
(iii) The petitioner as also other persons as per attached list, ibid, be treated in exactly the same manner as any regular employee and held entitled to all service benefits including seniority and back benefits."
2. It is contended by the learned counsel that the judgment of the Supreme Court has not been implemented by the respondents in letter and spirit as they were entitled to be regularized and retained in service from the day when their first appointment was made on ad-hoc basis.
According to the leamea counsel the process undertaken for regularization treatirg them as fresh recruits is contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court inasmuch as according to him their service had to be regularized with retrospective effect from the date of their induction into service, notwithstanding even the termination of their service. It is contended that in order to maintain their continuity into service the intervening period could be treated as extraordinary leave with pay.
Reference in this context has been made to Ahsan All Shah v. Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, New Sindh Secretariats, Karachi and 3 others (2000 PLC (C.S.) 643), Khalil Ahmed Soomro v.
Government of Sindh and others (1994 PLC (C.S.) 2001). Reference has also been made to Pakistan through General Manager, P.W.R., Lahore v. Mrs. A. v. Lssacs (PLD 1970 {{BLUR PAGE}} VQ4. Dainuqlo lnorrunovoa .V nsiDI dosaurtot 600f, S.C. 415) to contena could be ili 1-8r4116qhPfer6tAcilfa4gF81140)8A@PW-1844r grievance, v41(0944s198016hkjicifflRfidelikrhirifi il9MtWil the ad-hoc 1ARti.R4f3c11-14er10984S161904 ROYArit4%tilant. For that t HasetA%deffie T9A1-9198661f 6f1161tICIsim Asghar who has been, according to-19tW,111619gRuK6 benefit of ciggfil LIAYbWIljOlbsbquiginb5mocilwrIewizimilintilio allo4 thers. 0'S6k4,61 rktelotcptofflgtoymigfrifflitiinzjat Republic of PIAPtiajholfiR, 41V1d*IitiliAtiOOPEtd WEItin54-It 2"et311i berk4PFt?Ii\ib9.(131444413RifisfbitrAtRIA counsel for trwiD%tft'i414?s ifeasnagterei ft01M- PRIViiku6fIciDr. A. Basit, Advocate and st&tt (5M)tiglzi#Etsof*ketiSi193etition is the swleetENtre&ii@citi-i@ifticbpWitipp ttgialtmcccliwirsed *along tt -istrpAtitbsxe ni betseit ed ,bidi behostts Ions WOlcilffile'siRSie4n6A88itilWA1sfrAcR/V&Ste General, PliAlglAs2Meff0 vt?1)11Stils* (ZieiNginR) kricompetency and maintainability o4490@titi4secifarbliiii2iNfurt in view of twit eft WariiittcligtiAlleloAttatiOWbbilietAttici* 1I212 .Gf the clsw@fitni0orf# kRiwifoFigitstliai@CP@ititkpuel g70.Tactnorfigui tcorlifolliftr4Wit*iuttoitighA I t1lewic*%mod iiii9fwMglivbrginciotin4wiemichn6otithlYso i@vititarmobAn4d 00016-0645/Q9afiziaocbit Obaktikwi Pitt4ifffttftriizfticflOttfill\Wfit oictenglinibtiki@ir mstesiyi liwitbEitstatJew E041 smicept Tabewiterobabitalidito MI5Sictlitt bwitb-tbWVAIEY ittbat/EMPtftdc4411fixqggefiff*Slitrti9n60-1. aPPOINNIActilM FtialtlibiOrtilittNieeectktrbaff g510*IrtiiibliPfilPPbt PrgiVeglingotrOs NiSifbalftlle lolEthe 4ttilst rAOft ofslAte dstetti .8414440(1%4/4o poilmtrtirn* dhP rtZVPhtintricmillWRin Peiti$1qOurtitAWctillgIttQiii3t111061* conclitQfpillt senlicEbIgctbelMtilkineekiAdkriNAPid@rifle#51M2 oNiStiskighoo safrThili Quig744- 41-)Atittclitiitiv4049441rifisitimPle fi-Neleffitaternwhonecti PrillatorWirs,ofnihaNCoastilt41411ilt Iheld c OMPttillifistiNOliViigtfAtItvfltintlIt\OWPfltjtaqt,sttevt30004\W gmhyttiott i4itaine,simmflcm.pgv08,tpo jtIp04009rimAtc2k, S.LOPCOVE(GatirtO114 tIVRtO,ntiftsii;tY thmktecritilvAmiffigiito haiehteripedivirhimpAnvesttotigoict1446 41409ffleribonslieliw o7e t CIJcl) nEZZ' .N 910 S3 jlewelA C L. R, %A.){{BLUR PAGE}} {{BLUR PAGE}}.10 ape uapi ipe 2GISCIGG2 o4 fPG bripnc eq 40 9 .,818980 u!Auir $1,994AFJONT,48110krif bielnqIce to eiclioupdiuLiFiqi9,siptym opg* iehoppipJiu bauoci AoHod ii4041.41tOPH/19kgRiP9i#4!fflirlOWLeebougeule w!Elo loueaanuAlakuu.19#9,B lipjouPNWakeee!Ou ge seeAoldgiRipPOtPelpLe41* C-J 2eLA!Ce eqi luetule90000%.4J-1119RRARich-VP. JIARIM.19.4.1!Ou pus uogezpAnCLeNstg+9wsiv9.41kiik*,1091?113190tf epoAea m!!1 pewuJenoaatry@PAdoPkitAM9119biMi- tibFlp ewlploitese l UeLULLIGA00109866tUR411.906tRWIRPNIHMkke ILOW 41J0' lie legi pelmelaeilme9WAPIPBab@P!.1.Ecf 0!IcInd ay} Aibuov@ps Liivus41dow41 Ltit96lAyl pse!2 gm, uogezuein69,h1frpA19e sktiAl-K !OHIPgs5/99(9%1 be-R ouel-2 s!Seq ooqiig.)00bilediIMPIct9,41R@A@I141%)\' cieeleq si! Of luew1Wiellelit t s AN aegtoe4Uwww0 of gq-poc le JePed ':tfiltZtaROSiPES1241,%141/iNif3 eiMultitEllif 0 bnulep' puq elllet-i9ScWfirl2q..Ttli IAPitl,403!*.AaPlitig-isNYkotgiain!u tpa csruuol pe ellomeci-- AftMefoliePle6AMolifidd aye J04 1esd146oclitre/Mif # Atferit.041/1041-10u1Plifititigls ow! passeicioN&Paetiit*W3'104.16011-441 991160:4tidi1lsti1 ZOOZ'6'SZ lkilfi1elS13/4126)4**11-16W111,@! ti0{6d io lino atiAchiretezi.18$14es061W1609404360J2e41#6 go!Qm `ZOOZVOillitillibtkitftiV Ogili094-1941543%filisfOcakim LloRim `1Punchsl0iVilkle5te?1@f@Fid l giiiiecg468dtA11361Ictia11 /caul '1.00Z*(Yelio tinoo eWei iiiWtActfiSidLianWH4944WIft_e "t'A MOW:10d oNndebi L gigfSfielti0Otidift#A111936CiZtle dfftOstPcbi enp paueq prii)66q694%LeSAlitfluorikiR1 si3666eA606 i!Eul to lessedWikfifekluiliPifiedirAtilt'cibiNrcliciek?Fr pinous AeglifetWM101-61406tiffifoqu-tibtfeeigt tottidepb@gftAip seen go!tfm1Pnis4Stbefii@tineoPEttikiali' 01165 24149 SIbAleSq uo!Med hfriWiltAbesedtitfixiteeklitiriBlFetlierBitiqu.Kel aleM Sieillpeki6CRDE @qi owerwuctueoutimitti OCHTM slueAe luelukftbrid4ft3616LiolitiSaPitifi&beole*Iineiin4Rijictu 044 puegeicialis090*914W8410 bloilifiketifeSietki I 3' neon q ofpumuq fug': weA nApp Isclua 'JO .Pop Affocpiegtspsoz8 wanie wnRgmcipq own isieuom uetil lueleimp tenneql5tV wIsfN eseo 200 humatgu cnifi-dili'eN Vilizga064)a r IC) Aoi.
66V qufund JO Itiowunnop 'A ugol gozumpf 900z{{BLUR PAGE}} Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, would demand that they while facing the similar circumstances, should be treated in the same manner. The principle of equality would impliedly be attracted in favour of the petitioners as they being ad-hoc Lecturers in the Provincial Government, would stand at par to that of the ad-hoc employees of the Federal Government and therefore, it would be fair, just and proper to consider their cases for regularization. We having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Maqbool Elahi Malik, learned Advocate-General, Punjab, assisted by Mr. Tariq Mahmood Khokhar, Additional Advocate-General, are of the view that since substantial questions of public importance are involved in the present petitions, therefore, the technical objection that the questions not raised before the Tribunal, cannot be allowed to be raised before this Court, is not entertained. The authorities in the Education Department, Government of Punjab, while adopting the method of ad-hoc appointments as a continuous policy, created a legitimate expectancy in the mind of petitioners for their retention on regular basis and therefore, we deem it proper to direct that the respondents while seeking guidance from the scheme of regularization of ad-hoc employees of Federal Government referred above, will initiate the process of regularization of the petitioners through Punjab Public Service Commission giving the concession as mentioned in the reply filed by the respondents in the Punjab Service Tribunal within a period of one month and meanwhile without prejudice to the right of the selectees of the Public Service Commission for appointment on regular basis, the posts which were being held by the petitioners shall not be filled. It is clarified that the cases of the petitioners shall be sent separately to the Public Service Commission and shall not be tagged with the direct recruits. In case any of the petitioners is not found suitable, by the Public Service Commission, he shall not be entitled to be retained in service."
Review filed thereagainst by the Government of Punjab was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 9.1.2003. The matter was referred by the Government of Punjab, Education Department to the Punjab Public Service Commission for necessary steps to comply with the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. While it was. Under process contempt and other petitions were filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which were disposed of on 24.4.2003 with a direction to the Education Department and the Punjab Public Service Commission to expedite the process of regularization in the light of the judgment dated 25:9.2002: On completion of the process by the Punjab Public Service Commission appointment letters were issued to the petitioners, which has given rise to the present petition with the prayer mentioned above.
6. It may be mentioned that the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab as to the in competency and non-maintainability of this petition has engaged my attention. I have given serious thought to the same in view of the provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
7. Before examining the implications of the said provisions it may be observed that the present petition has been filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the relevant clause whereof reads as follows:- {{BLUR PAGE}} no tne,Vgiod bleri .pnig6 ai 11 .Bellit e 1113112 aienoifit t 901V198 oildu 6. Lot. Not ;in W eoi e pen rrtpdps9e8i 1 kistlgru 1 .Subject to the ouitiik % litilli9orprtema df it is satisfied a MototEsi ppfgrsgmafois provided by w6rif of vietsisdea tnee ed ent . ntiv0)eppElnedhlemapplizaticon reiazinynaggrieved party, ai aienoititeq grialte WISOttet3-fil .2t1151091 toeiib eoivie 8woilduirannyd BA , within the ed of beltifneemk_toft t,en _art utokia iniCAO ortai juris iciJorroirte rrt, functions in connection wittYlti'eaff4itedfli% Federation, a to trtymmevoPxouitticeobrtanilopainatithcirrO teeivitain from no two smslqioft beitis6lobpeginitlitd irwiarkiip to inemmevo@r4c1tcfecabOlnideh r requireciA59 MOM rch3; . eoivis8 oilduclodsinucl exit or tri9mhscisa noitsoub3 ,dsinucl erlt dtiw ffiifyalVit rnm3 ti eliriW .Nstai s o two meiqu end oitosiib thifillstaiff P4A4411AgerlitiVitiftgefOrn6P43 @e41001GAnWalilae fteeNal@RATIA Eti'SiFtA9f1000Y TriWzitgalaiWN't WAYAf IA9MINWSdri-itIASIgig1.4 EriaA51413NE,,0/40 mrfalkin kffl EIA1a5tRylA7c4 gri-OkagePArbditooctqw*Liegitiltif9c4fiegrAY 6Ygiologi;,dmri@r-qcoINIgPf dlIP rilniakintsP@Ptthet9WARAW SMIEt15ckeut0130InA14940fl 490 ftPfiIMPSItRilb9f AZ, 142n, rtgf 114q041%141Pg99NICT9MiiiitikWAtg@eRfireit5OnibitReVrill664til rlif4eJr(thWANI1 Stfit glaeWINALYARN9131,4,1@isisk* K it respondents and the contcptigg 641- ig11tljwil9CAOtjqp#1 Ad ocate General, Pu jab is. That luciciment of the Hon'ble seweefuif bianfclkaeagicrreti;nd in n 8a E 9.18i) ndEil6 ab rain titi8 i48fOMI P'6611FCRior 1.-XificIPTO4WiRe Wii6PiRe tm - th 'hitlirtfifit #TBS .42,, #TBE in the pa76'n'ki'lftiltWilii6q41RinaVitakq602191Re titimbie SmipregieSaquitt ofifIgkiatmatiegit*Wn- cQmpliance rit ijitcignlest siaitecti 253 f20g2iabkitt furthtigraCtOttiiiiiatv(thot oonsiotnialetioitotittrePretetsizb90edihinPlzamictfolttibmail, ttiseeziisr artmellainatartharitpittlavMpanvidiAhe oindexiltibiWif is considered to afAict their conditions of- sewirfttlaeyabould assail the same before the Punjab Service Tribunal anti the(. L. R, {{BLUR PAGE}} {{BLUR PAGE}} 2006 Jehanzeb Khan V. Government of Punjab 503 to tisq tnsvelei sit ot ffV1 _116.J..U,)eirit .e e ZtCiEtriuMffiANOn4iiPr8 ktigSiRA2 VoPRRAtituiiffin of Islamic Republic of Palqaprak,3g-rriygigpf*Nfzifi 9111 ,becOstnooPel(RISPNWPfrlfe/A eigifitRiPAROig nature 9c.4 t49t jbgspgiSf /.Ct*rtcpf vipiA FAskinipigpyprgeki(.T6mEt. 7,9008694itkifYhlif1134, sY41- sietiSrib 16t9 4figrAiVkft.ttg0 thernfee'RPIATIOtai%rriavii0/34.1aigiSR-9 81fg@fii6diitli executive and judicial authorities throughout the Country are WIS6811P6lict balg CATI'Mb964 ifleUr `1,%4Pt&crArt. Ffi)s Court ev*ull R64 iRvELItia-laie iafNeZR9udgments and ordeifegPSW443t1RAFtibbORA,ntcritAisibt% direction of s tiitintAto 1912rOloitiA tbcS) Malmo for its im 81 le .e tation exeution,7118ut where thematter is of in pr81 t iton ria..1 in? aeveR ityr? 9.0 eirtaken and the Jr
0. n ziebn e 81 a tese avea Vanant u)troacnuas to its fru 9 import, writ of t ?:11grnYirr ssuet8lb95ht0 8urt. Reference Vris t ? 188rik2 el. R-1 egeleb99or xnh 91 mu The Ha ue v. The 09(0, apix. a a m q . auoantraiip t A u orth41hiaraivicg and another (PLD'fg 3 6. s y, wnic urer erases fliareile that:- "Mandamus is a iit o odrbsc eltiotn. As u a no 119) a igeneral rule, e Isnuctiffistaxit gmbeittcErviofnatittanopistalettitisra matter thf to noitutitztraza 4titolbzi libteluabes Kity) isausia \abbsettlauaive b ns beriaildsekst agazhai-or pctitliAliftivitripiriev#14,4 in agape ell% ioszEilolautt rthottlymeisti thentididTtapaiititeedqtatleill Ile ei noilltlitorivartactidod?Rftielaktiietobtitietcsladoisiveleoliessittton rioue nirntpptit*switzineyibbileatItheAreixenjvits tfptieViti One 9111 ni vglft brilfs AiOnahtdwhibrvit libgeliftelinerlIttstdurtiotbno." elsoovbAefbawictji911-AaParesis/de mistd0o iklartric Raitrifliti aof bns arniablOgitanttiet0.Fttremer.Gbetti flgtInctI061%,11:1194)
P 111-;a1 venN.TO,bt sq6;18anS),_io ed ot t aienoitiis Isnudii ?Flay 7d fa u an 1.11U e fil9V181.J.i0,X9. Uenirleo tiro vlivslyEjito IgnWine iict , wpicrnio,tn.Ttrlisj, 116 ITOI acooraina, fo tRe 9Lejarne tionart VOCite Ceiterdl, . toponaven oirnslai to noitu itecrio Rrnctorc4inrx Rimiapelo2 to p doe not exist aue. 0 the tg Rt,e146 elanA to +loon, eni .Oebu T N t.y e Qnstuifion_ or IsIrc o. us-191)2cl,-) 2.6VV 91.)int.k nor L conpeat or .The., ma er being, aave ,a to in e s asknu-tio meninievor) oonsvNi 00tIlf1b, _SU cee Daraaraphs to rollow. . Leo u norrireq s MOT nwoio oisi sew bns (Na 0.8 eeer{{BLUR PAGE}}
9. At this juncture reference to the relevant part of the provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution may be appropriate, which lays down that:- "Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the appropriate Legislature may by Act [provided for the establishment of] one or more Administrative Courts or Tribunals to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in respect of--
(a) matters relating to the terms and conditions of persons [who are or have been] in the service of Pakistan, including disciplinary matters; Clause (2) of Article 212 contains a prohibition that:- "where any Administrative Court or Tribunal is established under clause (1), no other Court shall grant an injunction, make any order of entertain any proceedings in respect of any matter to which the jurisdiction of such Administrative Court or Tribunal extends."
(Portions underlined by me).
It is a matter of common knowledge that Tribunal as visualized by Clause (1) of Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 has been established and Punjab Service Tribunal is very much functional. The scope of the relevant clauses of Article 212 of the Constitution is all pervasive and extensive. It has overriding effect. In such context of the matter I find substance and force in the contention .Raised by the learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab that the matters relating to the terms and conditions of persons like the petitioners fall to be determined exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and jurisdiction of all other Courts including that of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 stand excluded.
The import of Article 212 of the Constitution and Article 199 was considered in Khalid Mahmood Wattoo v. Government of Punjab and ofhers (PLJ 1999 S.C. 64) and it was laid down that a petition under C.L.R.
Article 199 of the Constitution by a civil servant in relation to any matter connected with the terms and conditions of his service was not maintainable in view of provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
10. It may not be out of place to mention here that these very petitioners and others had earlier approached this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 qua their termination. Their petition was held to be hit by the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution, as their remedy lay before the Service Tribunal. That judgment as mentioned above was maintained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. Principle stated in paragraph-13 of the judgment i.e. Muhammad Sarfaraz case (supra), may be reproduced here for advantageous perusal:-- "13. The learned counsel for the petitioners have made an attempt to enlarge the scope of the dispute and bypass the Service Tribunal by challenging vires of Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals, Act, 1974, introducing fundamental rights and elements of discrimination, regularization and fitness for promotion etc. But the dispute essentially relates to the terms and conditions of service of the petitioners. In all cases relating to terms and conditions of service remedy available to an aggrieved civil servant is by filling an appeal before the Service Tribunal and not by invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The petitioners were civil servants at the time of termination of their service and their grievance is traceable to the terms and conditions of their service, therefore, they are obliged to seek redressal of their grievance from the Service Tribunal." (Highlighted by me). {{BLUR PAGE}} Pakistan (.fugglikiNtliklitARyrts (C.L.R.) Vol. VII ot noits1 ni tr vziee .Livi s yid noitutitano0 erit to ee r eloihA airs to, _ a 1 itbn oei?Ifis Yat.ltitNi'P118iogki8411%tiffiNrriRf ArtRitraw,iERT,89130911Evriw34,9 .Mr?Tatts.r,A,ogi. Rraangfk 09111nANM+961ilititgn&ISgriPib tke me .Ntibnea 'that the precedents cited by the learned counsel 164 tli@riptitiftirailtitVi.%PsVibbitt- 19AffithlihYP.Rndhief ,bcreta eilkteeffrith@MICIft SAW Welk:Walt `-g%rtalfArMAI,t1(1)CiYiiegiV oiftWA (N)0000Etle(0..) q5113)t% niiekhgOiNtm*SleoPiti8 i. 166,TernifiiWifElletirldifitatrkfrbtgikr (119)6kt It .91.1P ' rt1-4")
64@gitite6R1Wisvithiej AOrcAetiv,vgiii*cit qw 4Igitts etwk 11:1(10 rffITRatit1111.6trihdeii,VM089affitalf% ahlthinqM@IfirisitHeiirt5fiThe 6%rvkWrniaktiiiaLtsrIT .1snudilT .Nstai1169 to tiuoO emeiqua eldinoFi erit yd benistnism .9.i MAW C6therWMPOIClibE68fHtlhi*ANITI;(1P dIglirBgai9Of 9*Mii9VASABCfelrg4YbsmrdsriuM It may be added for the puipzstnpfettizetiglattteiiPThtf* .%iettlfidgeORPiC). rBtA-Ofl AFT' or 9 aiwcIfy 4i1A? 9AeohNifRiles,4geoght/entions of the f rift 80x4 tpiptgi6 pope 04o the point of hisiftm iiiii0fAte 8 gyp, AptiRmdsf the petition le * of AR Co it I is Republic of rra 3. Ab.Ovq iscukii? , . -27 e understood PlYeAr; egtey8latad wextR ffitlocke the merits of I tin g etuclaib edt tud .Oto noitommq to 9DiV192 to anoitibnoo bns artilefittoti Clisintiskod Accordingly. Amiet ot pnitslei aeaso Ils n1 .Aienoitireq erft ot eldslisys ybemei 90iV198 to artoitibnoo bns Iseqqs ns pnillit yd ai trZ9,06gtilab50iipps ns gnblovni yd ton bns Isnudiligfilype et elated erit Iwo fipki exit noitoibahu( thw to emit edt is giessei4aqholJaigkANA9titbq eonsvehp liergkilfetidWiNfilPEYhtShrlfriidriiThlas 'let to enoitibnoo bus armeVrilot eldseosit ai )1998 Of bepildo eis yerlt ,8486erit ,eoiviea e Muisafnaniachlish-sarrifakEigi,isattdtakctqatisition Collector-II, Lahore Develemerttakt4hittriti),"Liahortiellnd others Writ Petition No. 2728 of 2005, decided on 23rd February, 2005. C.L.R.{{BLUR PAGE}} {{BLUR PAGE}} aVcou avnoiiitec2r to ieanuooq meal eri .s igio `Tig011P9rRIbgIRR/51Fik-171 triebnoqesi erlt isrit efit-AritV-1110 r9(2631--IfietiterpEh I a testsnAtZq 1 /1971,o8slia4i-A14-- bOnlec petkied, laitabiludiciaticauthottitri4i4RecOsinerienth219-- tifilutztoorefeeWititgetitienE00614itiZturtottritheitsetdriktitirrie btOit thEst oughtifbee- HEildtehthiatigratiat quittruivati passiftlefqy irate(' ,4704Uititiort Leottetteogailirlaubtic01.4160Tlimfbraindnand ttheicaltriauthettitsaprsdualeclabp pdtittoribWin tihe t:itnpugrrede order twlhicfi7wat %rot nttaz !Nal edbrliet ooleep@sseditaiuNejti Cosuit inritai4dwrItteiellitionalrtIPurragtherdevridfieitiebtletaseitztittsutickidi..-isbio benpuqrni tud bonguqmi erit to S .o1/1 riqsIgsmq ( arato) eaorit of Bolton eAst bns aeuoaib ton bib r .o1/1 tns nociael ,140)S%WfVfillgilOgderfb--tisq eyitsieqo erg ni etnemuoob eta ~a~Y~dtigGfW ai lebib benguqmi erit ,moteierit lonsi to noitsgildo bns ytub silt 2i ti tsrlt atimdua lerihut silt neewted yaievoitnoo snit ebioeb at lotoello0 noit01915.BR)
Istit)4ftrasli-Jkstikitstauttantttycpi eriT .Anoasei ritiw aeihsq iettarn, erit ,babloeb asri lotoello0 noitieiuool 16_1 aril --order or---hequirement---tve9DnffwngiB ggewt impose such an obligation, it is necessary -or qtaclaskjudicial atflithafityna "i*t.Tolict ralitt44 Ip4iible safeguard ealtalirldt iabtirEittiooticabP4106- ods bprolectionmattne Oirsorttertoteadvisfiaitwaffeektt benguqmi neewted yelevoll000 aril bebioeb asrl lotoello0 noitiidupg a eH Ituo0 airit yd bedhoaelq aletems-isq niritiw ar 9 effotbstleRetilicgleffbMittrinFOVVOr4td-Oillt 4411Chchliatlealtar alelbairlfalikeMitioAdAtOlcateSetnebnoqaei Brit to yoiloq ritiw b 9i416048/11g.E211/WArfilitilifithttiin.
9fri6Faitlifitli6riciAviaVolitiEw4DE01,6&iiiiVai90 ni rpEt' ni yaievoitnoo bebioeb asri iotoello0 noitiaiupoA bns_I riCtitigific909*944,50 FOr,WITilf4F,Pybie evitsitainimbs erit lsioibui 86 19b10 bvpixopt silt beaasq esri erl tsrit gninoit ; 19 I a bebipsb ,ffioteterit out to f IF-1-6m8Sb mt,psabli$q 13}Me Ek9C, INomg (fit 91-Aik090.Ratuft-haqiiiii*r b 2 .1 .207)4'throug A9.1-iViTtRIVRoititeci thW silt{{BLUR PAGE}}
2. The learned counsel of the petitioners submits that the respondent No. 1 (LAC) passed the impugned order in violation of parameters prescribed by this Courts in the earlier round of litigation vide order dated 29.9.2004 passed in Writ Petition No. 13715-2003 alongwith connected writ petitions. He further submits that the petitioners have filed various documents before respondent No. 1 (LAC) before deciding the case in terms of direction of this Court, which are at pages Nos. 12 to 78, but the same were not considered by the Land Acquisition Collector in the impugned order. He further submits that he mentioned this fact in paragraph No. 2 of the impugned order, but respondent No. 1 did not discuss and take notice to those documents in the operative part of the impugned order, therefore, the impugned order is without lawful authority. He further submits that it is the duty and obligation of Land Acquisition Collector to decide the controversy between the parties with reasons. The impugned order itself reveals that the Land Acquisition Collector has decided the matter without application of mind.
3. The learned legal advisor of the respondents entered appearance of Court's call, the submits that the impugned order contains reasons. The learned Land Acquisition Collector has decided the controversy between the parties within parameters prescribed by this Court. He further submits that the impugned order is in accordance with policy of the respondents. He further submits that this Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the disputed question of fact in Constitutional jurisdiction.
He further submits that the Land Acquisition Collector has decided the controversy in the administrative side, therefore, it is not expected from him that he has passed the impugned order as judicial officer, therefore, he has decided the same after noting, mentioning and perusing the documents and after spot inspection of the premises in question, hence, the impugned order is valid and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of learned counsel of the parties and perused the record.
5. In case, the documents attached with the Constitutional petition, contents of writ petition and impugned order are put in juxta-position, then it is crystal clear that the Land Acquisition Collector has decided the controversy between the parties without judicial application of mind which is condition precedent to decide the controversy between the parties after application of mind. It is pertinent to mention here that the public functionaries are deciding the cases without application of mind that is why the competent legislative authority has added Section 24-A in the General Clauses Act, which is procedural in nature, therefore, the same has retrospective effect, as per principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in "Zainyar Khan Vs. The Chief Engineer, WAPDA, etc." (1998 S.C.M.R. 2419) It is the duty and obligation or public functionaries to decide the controversy between the parties after application of mind as is envisaged by Article 4 of the Constitution read with Article 5(2) of the Constitution and Section 24-A in the General Clauses Act, as per principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in "M/s. Airport Support Service Vs. The Airport Manager, Karachi' (1998 S.C.M.R. 2268). It is also settled principle of law that nobody should be penalized by inaction of public functionaries, as per principle laid down by this Court in "Ahmed Latif Qureshi Vs. Controller of Examination, Board of Intermediate, Lahore" (PLD 1994 Lah. 3). The respondent has decided the controversy between the parties under statutory power, therefore, even if it is administrative order, even then it is open to review by this Court, as per law laid down by the Superior Court in the following judgments:- "Tariq Transport Co. Vs. Sargodha Bhera, Bus Service" (PLD 1958 S.C. (Pak.) 437) {{BLUR PAGE}} e(k . inEr1D nurp.1_1 br.Mrrmrial .V tinrI2 iirfcS Bbfivind? f)00:... . i1. ,t)wtisi I\ --11'1 .01_ , "N.Q. Industries Vs. Mst. Bapai kaikhusro" (PLD 1968 out Isi.Oqiiipienoo auoixris ym nevip evsd I ,4 beameg brie eeinsa ertt to leanuoo bernsel tc 2noitnetnoo. The respondent has decided the controversy betv49kB4wit parties in the capacity as Quasi Judicial Authority._ Lord DinI% *gifiq.scdiaelOViil leAiR @W-1.Ti) sayg,."the gktffi efni klAs5i9S/if9Y ti EhIP 28Ve'RfriliEfifigOilAsnat1688 adiiiirlAitilblig.'tWeaSticlitidifloriM86)8.18gbfiOilirblitiaqi ciXAi vtlePkObsiistilNi'aefigseRPElatiOfi81YRa .p J. Ceq-P fii q1piWsf1A9zIliigro*ibYlki9gAellrosq Ma@w d J .b.08Pcr gadfinvianvap4V828-retAlle.WiiliierrOnth%ai pu SilLlit1719tohlaYlli' Ai-18:06Y1 .t8f ri54Y PgAtIbrigiteci I 'V8 &-PNR-9,'?Eart fibNiciit.Ictitialiiii 2414s0 ti)Nd G 4ayA\a\.Nit r dAji.'seiip Pn6V0iiclaVv tWArlw th* I ,s9 J6' UirAi;ci?Fr114.'Jsi6giofir,1-061ieNVigagilRI6199' reret`111? cra061fidive,4 t iq rib is 'b V fikilidig in 6 'Pali-661,g fifte A Eff6iqtAfk4g1 666119ffiPe oai atilSO 'i,_ l'414. ' for I WarileatalliiitirNIArbOt rea ok. Y it .66-.t1 94ihii:iiiP s %-) V ikf*Aft1 kiiiP pesigidentYstWe eal)if 166iiiirineiiihd`PafibliA20aJ8fibn thk e) qrtiVidgilV,dNAPF06068.,t466190Asilga&60itit99 iii-lVi.' etAViifhlK4i$76)*NINcb8rf*ti.116bifOffivaicb-ai b 4 9ciiNd''Otd)i tli6ligigifiejilif Eig'Mg6nFibtivlf6iFtliAWa is riiig% the',0.1 .e165:yiiii. f6?'inaPcigArfir'witielhiPillP pUtix Sanili,W 11 ope 41-.).Weikigkf.,,.,fi-A, i-i8cleir64-6iile ralo_af 14xlig b I-11 Re stl.Mglag.Ticlaii1P-ai6.1118SigP\ A tiecf.d690 ir? I illtitail 61-Yi88isIbliirliicJ4861fa b0 stCle Pk ' 9 t AlPaganYl;g1.11igaiiiPRUitri thi p si b 'LiJAWViellailicAle(91A1Arit .. 1 ma 19 S. . .91 ill rig '4 B-ViiifiV2 tRailt48RP in9sVstrrownte s'ONYR rifPrig b8R138460Eliirl8P6i16PloK4146 toffolivhingi renaesvasfpio 919 I ,iewoq ylotutta iebnu eethzq aidi yu W91V91 of nego al ti net neve .- ielmo evitmtainimbs erg n(POuo5litailkwitYoggrOPP9613aBirl0covscisiWYtOP- itkile0 - . Demonstrate before the appejjoBtmlabEfeyojAIRRAT u ' '" auYii"46' 'fb-r4 t wistaNificiVerroViAlis; - t s, claCoul that, NrIfeasolis which wrsciagetcl the -P. Pig .J.8 8a9 r CLF1) "eSme?...{{BLUR PAGE}} {{BLUR PAGE}} In/ i0V (.51-1.D) atiqvg iffoitshia/prilua nothing ; I
(B) The obligation to record reasons operates as a .02 oe r R e t 2.4q1KA4c10Ellgohng i6n by executive authority invested w64judicial FAA) esso elAWProMittnuopoA beiehsr10 to Witten!
(C) It gives satisfaction to the rcgtyaaiaigrwhorn (eaa r .3.1a 11390prFkimp4r44,6 alliM isgue ispsrihsH
6. #48 ass aettle0110@zipipiatiitoklbM4qAtiP rule requiring reasons iio80.91*806. ?Ryon of prdlrikip, like principle of Audi Atteram lidaer'n, a basicnSE498 chiatural justic(335Mici:D.2ieiteitifdlii) tiewaye'tqw#046,111itialopalsitaOs and this rule must teg.:)jejvNetbinFliw) gmes.Ofliqn mere pretence of compliance with it would not ?Atis y the requireMA .R.Wal:ANsrMiOr988Rrn@diVilifAiNVelaiikKupra. is also s094iltpxIngirdgeqf fliosotkult3S-40yrigisicecajiks are eqlsctpsiMapLfairly and justly, mann% which sho,y1c1 not giVe"tbuMilPeeVi3t acriNmPti cliTM1 in 11 WIPegti nt of discriminatory treatment or otherwise as per priQ ee laid &WI@ 1.3238821-AilitthdalbsesebfloisabourimentMeilkistan and others"
(176.1.ANA.9.iveagtiaezqine6-ibis relention here that the a oresaid principle or law is Pounc68 on the prt@iicit asictt-44,Tetfitirif)0111814fliblittOillitV".f,' AeliNgatitabfitilT fitchilV#13lOidbYth15)
102,b9F0DADR428144tn661V19Pgtrig, r~afr4 S. equitable, reasonable -MtlYttAit)t efirws Vimol?r-vphefluatlxii iArciAlAiqtY3en'Olq3b.P%Wl3OrMitiVba%-44sii/ app ,able a giyinpciijkfifige %ip6Wrippinti c6sigery4t18rAem Flybstance can bsii,seggpM tbrauqllggflpigigAV3w1writiirlOr Article 199 of the ConstittApfiBriibisoilif9dsoyM3QArcip&fit law that the public functionaries are duly bound to pass the order by IN I X blittidrr98Pre 4alfla I t8T0fAigqif a dacJe by .a 8t t atRhoriirRiVRWthe9qbncYMOriiixfhat flow as a rggtilfrg hiel3P806gisH1981d3gigfiifgg1 briffustRielves proper application olifithbr,%tj_freTPA1SHRIYIT1fria;9thfsha Khan. Vs. Saltdiorriammitteeb r;9,ettlWorfigegi @mind #;pthers" (69B1riark- Coa664O6Re1twen8ecbiaYsioltgbibtsb:fnade to the following judgmeassei gniblooei to tnerneliupei noieivei 10 Iseqqs of toeidue ei iekno erit tl e?MtiA iebnu noititeq evsel Isiaeqe ignibuloni){{BLUR PAGE}} Raipur Development Authority's case (AIR 1990 S.C. 1426)
Institute of Chartered Accountant of India's case (AIR 1987 S.C. 71)
Harinagar Sugar Mills' case (AIR 1961 S.C. 1669) M.P. Industries' case (AIR 1966 S.C. 671)
Mukarji's case (AIR 1990 S.C. 1984)
Collector of Monghyr's case (AIR 1975 S.C. 2226) Bhagat Raj's case (AIR 1977 S.C. 567)
Mohinder Singh Gill's case (AIR 1978 S.C. 851) Neelima Misra's case (AIR 1990 S.C. 1402)
Sudarshan Trading Company's case (AIR 1989 S.C. 890)
Neelkantan and Brother's case (AIR 1988 S.C. 2045) Padfield's case (1969 Vol. 1 All E.R. 694)
The law relating to "speaking order" on the basis of Section 24-A in the General Clauses Act and gist of law laid down by the Superior Courts are as follows:--
(1) Where a statute requires recording of reasons in support of the order, it imposes an obligation on the adjudicating authority and the reasons must be recorded by the authority.
(2) Even when the statute does not lay down expressly the requirement of recording reasons, the same can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.
(3) Mere fact that the proceedings were treated as confidential does not dispense with the requirement of recording reasons.
(4) If the order is subject to appeal or revision (including special leave petition under Article 185 of the Constitution), the necessity of recording reasons is greater as without reasons the appellate or revisional authority cannot exercise its rower effectively inasmuch as it has no material on which it may determine whether the facts were correctly ascertained, law was properly applied and the decision was just and based on legal, relevant and existent grounds. Failure to disclose reasons amounts to depriving the party of the right of appeal or revision.
(5) There is no prescribed form and the reasons recorded by the adjudicating authority need not be detailed or elaborate and the requirement of recording reasons will be satisfied if only relevant reasons are recorded.
(6) if the reasons recorded are totally irrelevant, the exercise of power would be bad and the order is liable to be set aside.
(7) It is not necessary to record reasons by the appellate authority when it affirms the order passed by the lower authority.
(8) Where the lower authority does not record reasons for making an order and the appellate authority merely affirms the order without recording reasons, the order passed by the appellate authority is bad.
(9) Where the appellate authority reverses the order passed by the lower authority, reasons must be recorded, as there is a vital difference between an order of reversal and an order of affirmation.
(10) The validity of the order passed by the statutory authority must be judged by the reasons recorded therein and cannot be construed in the light of subsequent explanation given by the authority concerned or by filing an affidavit. "Orders are not like old wine become better as they grow older".
(11) If the reasons are not recorded in support of the order it does not always vitiate the action.
(12) The duty to record reasons is a responsibility and cannot be discharged by the use of vague general words.
(13) If the reasons are not recorded, the Court cannot probe into reasoning of the order.
(14) The doctrine of recording of reasons should be restricted to public law only and should not be applied to private law, e.g. Arbitration proceedings.
(15) The reasons recorded by the statutory authority are always subject to judicial scrutiny.
It is also settled principle of law that law is not confined to statute law alone but is used in its generic sense as connoting all that is treated as law irl this country including even the judicial principles laid down from time to time by the Superior Courts as per law laid down in "Government of West Pakistan Vs. Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmir,' (PLD 1969 S.C. 141). It is settled principle that law always gives guidance to only 19w abiding citizens. In fact awareness has been given to the world 1400 years ago by Almighty Allah in the Holy Book Qura'n. Almighty Allah in Sura Rehman warned the human being not to disturb balance in any sphere of life. Otherwise destruction is must. The aforesaid command is embodies in Article 5(2) of the Constitution that everybody is bound to obey the command of the Constitution as the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Ch. Zahoor Ellahi's case (PL 1975 S.C. 383). The public functionaries are also duty bound to act in accordance with law in view of Article 4 read with Articles 189, 190 and 201 of the Constitution. Meaning thereby to act within the framework of law and Constitution as the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Zahid Akhtar's case (PLD 1995 S.C. 530). Laws are made not to make them merely on the statute book which are framed to act upon them which is in consonance with the Holy Quran as enshrined in Sura Baqra. It is not only the duty of the Courts to provide justice to the people of Pakistan but it is the duty of every organ and functionary to provide justice by discharging his/its duties in accordance with law without fear, favour and nepotism. In case the Tribunal constituted under the law would decide the cases after application of mind then the workload of this. Court shall be reduced automatically and people will be happy and prosper and avoid to come to knock the doors of the Courts. This purpose could be achieved only and only in case, everybody should work according to law after application of mind putting himself in place of the aggrieved person then nobody can decide the matter against the conscience.
7. The impugned order as mentioned above, is passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, without application of mind and without referring the documents produced by the petitioners, in the impugned order, which is not in consonance with earlier order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 13715-2003 alongwith connected writ petitions vide order dated 29.9.2004. It is admitted fact that order of this Court has not been challenged by any of the parties before any higher forum, therefore, the same is final between the parties on the well-known principle of res judicata, as per principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in "Pir Bakhsh Vs. Chairman Allotment Committee" (PLD 1987 S.C. 145), therefore, the Land Acquisition Collector is duty bond to decide the controversy between the parties in terms of order dated 29.9.2004 passed in the aforesaid writ petitions.
8. In view of what has been discussed above, the impugned order dated 27.12.2004 passed by LAC, is set aside. Therefore, the petitioners are directed to appear before the Land Acquisition Collector in his office at 11.00 a.m. On 3.3.2005, who is directed to decide the matter of,the petitioners afresh after application of mind strictly in accordance with law keeping in view of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, as expeditiously as possible.
With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of, Copy Dasti on payment of usual charges. .