' SYED ALTAF HUSSAIN SHAH (MEMBER/RITU).---The KESC Labour Union, (hereinafter referred as the applicant), continued to function as an industry-wise trade union in the Establishment of the KESC, (hereinafter referred the objector) till May, 1999 when on coming & into force of the Ordinance No,VIII of 1999, the objector Establishment, insertion of clause (1) to section 1 of the I.R.O., 1969 was excluded from the purview of the I.R.O., and thus the trade union activities in the objector Establishment stood abolished. The applicant-union, since the time of the aforementioned exclusion from the I.R.O., appears to have been making efforts for the revival of its normal functions and these efforts, according to the applicant were still continuing when on the repeal of the Ordinance, 1969 and coming into force of the amended Ordinance, 2002 on 25-10-2002, it has found itself to be free from the aforementioned embargo and hence filed the instant application under section 20(2) of the I.R.O., 2002 for the certification of CBA in the objector establishment. This application appears to have been received in this Commission on 3-2-2003 and the matter was still under necessary legal process when the objector, through its Chief Law Officer, appeared and apposed this application on the ground that the I.R.O., 2002 is still not applicable to the employees of the objector establishment.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the documents they have relied upon. While addressing his arguments Mr. S. Rais Ahmed Jafri, learned counsel for the applicant, has submitted that although the trade unions in the objector/respondent-establishment, by operations of the aforementioned Ordinance No,VIII of 1999, were put in abeyance, yet the registration of the applicant was not cancelled and as such continued to remain intact, and now, by operations of Ordinance, 2002, the trade union activities also stood revived. Referring to sections 80 and 81 of the I.R.O., 2002 be has submitted that the registration of all trade unions which were existing on the date of the promulgation of the I.R.O., 2002 have been saved and section 80(2)(a) of the amended Ordinance. Relying further on the judgment of the Hon 'able Supreme Court reported as PLD 1997 SC 781, the learned counsel has stated that the instant matter being similar in nature to those decided in this judgment, the principle laid down therein are applicable to the matter in hand. He further argued that non-mention of the applicant trade union or the objector Establishment in the exclusion clause in section 1 of the I.R.O., 2002 is a clear indication to the effect that the amended I.R.O., 2002 is now fully applicable to the parties the instant matter.
3. Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, learned counsel for the objector Establishment on the other hand has vehemently controverted the above contentions of the applicant's counsel and has submitted that clause (i) of section 1 of repealed Ordinance, 1969, unless specifically mentioned to have been so repealed, cannot stand repealed, for, repeal of law is not recognized by implication unless intention of legislature to repeal it is clearly apparent and that too, free from all doubts. It has also been argued that the legislature enacts laws with complete knowledge of all the existing laws pertaining to same subject. It, therefore, follows he has added, that non-inclusion of the objector's employees in the amended Ordinance, 2002 is intentional and hence the applicant trade union continues to remain excluded from the purview of the I.R.O., 2002.
' Concluding his argument the learned counsel stated that unless contrary intentions appears nothing done under the repealed Ordinance can continue and be affected. Referring to clause (b) of section 80(2) of the I.R.O., 2002, he has submitted that anything done rules made notification or order issued under the repealed Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done, made and issued under the amended Ordinance, meaning thereby that execution clause in the repealed I.R.O., if not specifically revived in the amended I.R.O., shall be understood to have not been revived. Apart from this, the learned counsel discussed the impact of sections 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act and submitted that the legislature is deemed to be aware of the previous state of the law and if knowing this makes a change when repealing it re-enacting some of its provisions the intention is clearly to effect the change made therein and not otherwise. In this regard he has placed reliance on PLD 1967 SC 241 and 1970 SCM R 105.
4. The crux of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant however, is that the registration of the applicant-union, notwithstanding the insertion of clause (i) the repealed Ordinance, 1969 remained intact throughout the intervening period and it automatically stood revived after the promulgation of the I.R.O., 2002 whereby the I.R.O., 1969 stood repealed, this being so, according to the learned counsel there is hardly any need for the applicant trade-union to approach this Commission for its re-registration. Likewise, the trade union activities in the Objector Establishment also stood revive on the ground that I.R.O. 2002 did not specifically exclude the Objector Establishment or its employees/workmen from its purview. In the absence of any exclusion clause in the amended Ordinance, 2002, the learned counsel has submitted, the presumption would be that the I.R.O., is applicable to the Objector Establishment and, hence as a further step towards the revival of such activities, the applicant has become entitled to file the instant application for its certification of CBA through secret ballot.
5. The force and substance of the aforementioned contention of the learned counsel for the applicant however, cannot be valued unless viewed in the light of the relevant provision of law dealing with the effect of repeal. It, therefore seems advantageous if section 6 of General Clauses Act is reproduced and examined:-- ' Clause 6........
' Unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not:-
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which repeal takes place.
(b) effect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or saved thereunder:
(c) . .
(d) . .
(e) .. ..
6. Bare reading of the above section of General Clauses Act would reveal that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes place. It, therefore, follows that the legislature being aware of the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act did not interfere with operation of this section. I, therefore, cannot disagree with the contention of the learned counsel for the Objector that legislature is deemed to be aware of the previous state of the law and if it makes a change when repealing it and reenacting some its provisions and ignoring some others the intention is clearly to effect the change so made and not beyond that. In this view of the fact the contrary view expressed by the learned counsel for the applicant about implied repeal of clause (i) of section 1 of the I.R.O., 1969 cannot be entertained for the doctrine of implied repeal cannot be successfully pressed into service in the circumstances of the instant case. In my humble view, the non-inclusion of the respondent-Establishment is an intentional and conspicuous omission of a particular provision from the amended Ordinance, 2002 which gives sufficient indication towards non-applicability of the I.R.O., to the employees of the Objector Establishment, more particularly when law maker, at the time of enacting new law is presumed to be aware of the existing law relevant to subject available on the statute book. Since the repeal of aforementioned provision is not express hence the presumption arises against the implied repeal.
' In view of what has been discussed above, I am left with no other choice but to agree with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Objector Management and he that in the absence of any express and specific mention of the Objector Establishment in section 1 of the I.R.O., 2002 along with other numerous establishment, the exclusion of the respondent-Establishment and its employees from the purview of the I.R.O., 2002 remains intact. After having examined sections 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act and section 80(2)(b) of the I.R.O., 2002 in juxta- position, I am further constrained to hold that the applicant trade union still remains inoperative in the premises. In view of the above discussion, this application stands dismissed.