' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---Present appeal, filed by the appellant/judgment, debtor, proceeds against judgment and decree, dated 4-1-2006, whereby the learned Judge Banking Court dismissed appellant's leave application and simultaneously passed a decree for the recovery of Rs,9,41,380 with costs of suit and costs of funds against the appellant.
2. Precisely stated facts of the case are that the respondent-Bank on 20-5-1999, filed the suit for recovery of Rs,14,38,018 against the appellant, before the then learned Judge Banking Court, inter alia, pleading that a financial facility of Rs,8,36,380 under Prime Minister's Transport Programe Scheme, for the purchase of vehicle, was provided to the appellant, he deposited his 10% equity share, charge documents were executed by him; the financial facility was availed by the appellant, who got the delivery of the vehicle, and that failure to liquidate the outstanding liabilities by the appellant necessitated filing of the suit. Upon presentation of the plaint, the learned Banking Court issued summons to the appellant through all the modes of service, as provided under the law, however, he did not appear and failed to file application for the grant of leave to defend the suit within the stipulated period, resultantly, the ex parte decree for recovery of Rs,11,30,980 was passed against him on 23-9-1999. Subsequently, the appellant filed the application for setting aside ex parte decree, which was allowed on 31-1-2002, and pursuant thereto the appellant filed leave application on 9-2-2002, which was resisted by the respondent-Bank through filing its reply. On 1- 11-2004, the appellant again absented from the proceedings and the learned Judge Banking Court, after dismissing his leave application, again passed a decree for recovery of Rs,11,30,980 along with cost of funds and c sts of the suit. The appellant, thereupon, filed another application for setting aside ex parte decree, dated 1-11-2004. It appears from the record that in the meantime, the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution, for the restoration of which, the respondent-Bank filed the application. Both the applications were taken together and the learned Banking Court with the consent of the parties to the suit, ordered for the restoration of the suit, set aside the ex parte decree, dated 1-1 1-2004 and it was directed that petition for leave to defend the suit will be deemed to be pending, vide order, dated 9-12-2004. Finally the appellant absented from the proceedings and the learned Banking Court dismissed his leave application and passed a decree for recovery of Rs,9,41,380 with costs of suit and cost of funds, against the appellant, vide impugned judgment and decree, dated 4-1-2006, hence the present appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant, while referring to clause 6 of the agreement of finance, states that since the possession of the vehicle was taken over by the respondent-Bank, therefore, suit for recovery of the balance amount could not proceed. He has submitted that the impugned judgment and decree is not sustainable in law.
4. We have heard the learned counsel and examined the summoned record. It appears appropriate to reproduce c! Fuse 6 of the agreement relied upon by the learned counsel:-- "It is hereby specifically agreed between the parties hereto that where the Purchase Price is payable in instalments failure on the part of the Customer to pay any instalment on its due date will entitle the Bank to demand immediate payment of the entire balance of Purchase Price remaining due notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this agreement a d for recovery thereof to take possession of the goods z d sell the same."
' It is clear from the bare perusal of the said clause that where the purchase price is payable in instalments, faire on the part of the appellant to pay any instalment on its due date would entitle the bank to demand immediate payment of the entire balance of Purchase Price and also to take the possession of the goods and to sell them. The said clause, in case of default by the customer, even for one instalment, empowers the bank, not only to demand immediate payment of the entire balance price but also to take possession of the goods. In case of default by the customer, two remedies have simultaneously been provided to the bank, firstly to demand immediate payment of the balance money and secondly to take possession of the goods. The learned counsel, when confronted with clause 6(ibid), could not substantiate his contention that if the bank has taken the delivery of the vehicle, the suit regarding the rest of the amount cannot proceed. It is evident from the available record that the Bank, after taking delivery of the vehicle sold the same and the sale proc.7eds of Rs,4,42,000 were credited in the account of the appellant. It is even otherwise unreasonable and beyond comprehension that in case a customer commits default, then the bank can only obtain the possession of vehicle and it is left without any remedy regarding the recovery of rest of the amount. We are of the view that interpretation of clause 6 of the agreement, as put forth by the learned counsel, is misconceived. It can neither be legitimately argued nor held that after taking possession of the vehicle, the bank is debarred from filing the suit to recovered rest of the amount. That interpretation of clause 6, as submitted by the learned counsel, if accepted, would lead to many complications inasmuch as clossal public money would go waste, thus causing a major loss and set back to the public exchequer.
5. The suit was filed on 20-5-1999 and since then the appellant is playing game of hide and seek.
Even according to the showings of the appellant, the ex parte decree was passed twice by the learned Banking Court, which were set aside on the applications of the appellant. Finally the appellant repeated his performance, absented from the proceedings and the learned Judge Banking Court was constrained to dismiss appellant's application for leave to defend the suit and passed the decree. The learned counsel, when asked, could not explain the cause of absence of either the appellant or his learned counsel, on 4-1-2006. The appellant does not deserve any leniency in the case, as the suit filed as far back as on 20-5-1999, has culminated, that too in the shape of ex parte decree, dated 4-1-2006, after a period of 5-1/2 years, while the banking laws were introduced to provide speedy remedy to the banks and financial institutions.
6. There is another aspect of the case. We have examined petitioner's application for leave to defend the suit and find that the appellant did not deny the execution of any of the documents, availing the finance facility and the delivery of possession of the vehicle to him. In view of the said admissions, it cannot be argued that the suit against the appellant nnot proceed or that the judgment and decree suffers in a any infirmity.
7. In the above perspective, we have examine 1 the impugned judgment and decree and find that the learned Banking Court did not commit any illegality in passing the impugned judgment and decree, which are hereby maintained.
8. Upshot of the above discussion is that the present appeal is devoid of merits, hence dismissed.