' SYED HAMID ALI SHAH, J.---This single order will dispose of Writ Petition No, 18386 of 2005 titled "Haji Sheikh Noor Din and Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Muhammad Fayyaz", Writ Petition No,18387 of 2005 titled "Haji Sheikh Noor Din and Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Iftikhar Ahmad", Writ Petition No,18388 of 2005 titled "Haji Sheikh Noor Din and Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Zakir Hussain", Writ Petition No,18389 of 2005 titled "Haji Sheikh Noor Din and Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Muhammad Iqbal and others", Writ Petition No,18390 of 2005 titled "Haji Sheikh Noor Din and Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Ameer Ali and others" Writ Petition No,18428 of 2005 titled "Rai Textile Mills Ltd. Kasur v. Authority under Payment of Wages Act and others" Writ Petition No,19322 of 2005 titled "Gulistan Textile Mills Limited No,4 v. Punjab Labour Court No, III and others" and Writ Petition No,19323 of 2005 titled "Gulistan Textile Mills Limited No, 4 v. Punjab Labour Court No,III and others" as common questions of law and facts are involved in all these petitions.
2. The petitioner in the instant case has challenged the order of the Authority in appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 on account of non-annexation of the requisite certificate of the Authority to the effect that the appellant had deposited with the Authority, amount payable under the direction. Respondent No,3 dismissed the appeal being incompetent without annexation of the requisite certificate vide order, dated 6-9-2005. The petitioners have called in question the order of dismissal of the appeal on the question of non-maintainability, through these petitions.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to an unreported judgment of this Court rendered in Writ Petition No,21923 of 2001 in case of "Messrs Citizen Electrical Co. v. The Authority under the payment of Wages Act and another" wherein condition regarding the deposit of entire disputed amount, before preferring the appeal, was declared to be unlawful. Learned counsel for the petitioner repeated the arguments addressed before the Labour Court and referred to the case of "State Bank of Pakistan through General secretary v. The Democratic Workers Union, State Bank of Pakistan through General Secretary and another" (2003 PLC 391) and "Messrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. And others v. The Banking Tribunal Lahore and others" (PLD 1996 Lahore 672).
Learned counsel then referred to the case of "Messrs Eastern Rice Syndicate v. Central Board of Revenue and others" (PLD 1959 SC (Pak) 364) to contend that imposing the condition for filing the appeal amounts to negation of the right of appeal and such unreasonable restriction on the right of appeal is not sustainable. Learned counsel argued vehemently that proviso cannot render the main provision of law ineffective or redundant. He in support of this contention has placed reliance on "Enmay Zed Publications (Pvt.) v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal through Director-General" (2001 SCMR 565).
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has addressed two fold arguments; firstly that impoition of condition of furnishing certificate with the appeal is unconstitutional and has the effect of snatching the right of appeal which otherwise is guaranteed by law and; secondly that the Labour Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, in disallowing the petitioners to make the deficiency of the payment of the amount as per direction of the Authority.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent, in the connected cases, on the other hand, has fully supported the impugned judgment and has submitted that the order passed by the august Supreme Court, is a law declared and is binding on all the Courts as contemplated in Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. While referring to the case of "Syed Match Factory through Managing Director v. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and others" (2003 PLC 395) it was submitted that the august Supreme Court has held that Payment of Wages Act is primarily a beneficial legislation which has been enacted to provide relief to the worker and it cannot be construed otherwise, therefore, the interpretation, which directly or indirectly nullifies the provision of law, cannot sustain in the eyes of law. Writ petitions, which were filed to defeat the provisions of section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, are not competent. It was contended that in view of the law declared by the apex Court the appeals cannot proceed, as no certificate as per requirement of section 17(1)(a) of the Payment of Wages- Act, 1936 was annexed with the appeal.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The question requiring determination is that whether an appeal against the direction of Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, passed on application under section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, is competent without providing certificate of the Authority, to the effect that the appellant has already deposited with the Authority the amount payable under the direction appealed against. Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act deals with the appeal against the direction made under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15, which reads as under:-- "Appeal (1) An appeal against the direction made under (subsection (3) or subsection (4)) of section 15 may be preferred within thirty days of the date on which the direction was made before (Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose).
(a) By the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under section 3, if the total sum directed to be paid by way of wages and compensation exceeds three hundred rupees: (provided that no appeal under this clause shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate of the authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with the authority the amount payable under the direction appealed against, or)"
' The question of pendency of appeal without strict compliance of the provisions of section 17(1)(a) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 was dealt with by the apex Court in the case of Syed Match Factory (supra). The same question came up for consideration before the august Supreme Court subsequently in the case of "Mughal Surgicals and others v. Presiding Officer Punjab Labour Court- VII and others" (2005 PLC 634) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-- "Reliance had been rightly placed by the learned Judge in Chambers on the case of Syed Match Company Limited 2003 SCMR 1493 by distinguishing the same from other cases decided by this Court on the ground that Payment of Wages Act, 1936 was a law which had been enacted for the benefit of the workmen and had to be interpreted and applied in the spirit which had led to the enactment of the said law. The judgments cited by the learned Advocate Supreme Court were the judgments arising out of enactments other than the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and were no precedent for deciding the present case. It may be added that the right of appeal is not a natural or an inherent right of litigants but is a statutory right granted by different laws under different enactments and such a right had to be considered and examined in the light of the conditions prescribed by the law granting the said right. Needless to add that under the enactment in the C.P.C. Or the Cr.P.C. Every order and decision is not appealable and we know that even under the C.P.C. There are provisions which prohibit grant of interim relief unless the decretal amount was deposited."
8. It is well-settled that the real intention of the legislature must be gathered from the language used. When the negative word is used, Court will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in nature. The provisions coached with negative covenant in the proviso of section 17 make the condition mandatory. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of reference by the President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1957 Pak 219) while quoting Crawford has held:-- "One general rule that emerges, and it is an ancient rule, from discussions on the subject is that in the interpretation of written instruments, whether they are constitutional character or ordinary statutes or other documents the first object of the Court is to discover the intention of the author and that such intention is to be gathered from the words used in the statute or document. The tenth edition of Maxwell, the celebrated authority on the Interpretation of the Statutes, opens with the statement: "A statute is the will of the legislature, and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded, according to the intent of them that made it". If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature. The subject of all interpretation of a statute is to determine what intention is conveyed, either expressly or impliedly, by the language used so far as is necessary for determining whether the particular case or state of facts language is not only plain", says the learned author at page 4, "but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. It is not allowable, says Vattel, to interpret what has no need of interpretation. Such language best declares without more the intention of the law-giver and is decisive of it. The rule of construction is to intend the legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. It matters not, in such a case, what the consequences may be."
9. It is clear from the language of section 17(1)(a) that no appeal lies unless memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate of the authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited the impugned amount directed to be paid by the authority. As per principles of interpretation, the function of a proviso is to limit or otherwise to qualify the provision to which it follows. Thus the natural consequence, which flows out or ensues from the words employed in a proviso with negative covenant or with its opening with non-affirmative words or negative clause, would be nothing except the logical conclusion that such proviso, when occurrence, will be deemed to impose a condition and restrict the operation of its parent provision. If such condition is not adhered to or not fulfilled, such proviso, pregnant with same positive purpose, should be strictly construed.
10. The cumulative of above principle of law enunciated by the apex Court in the above referred decisions which fully apply on facts and circumstances of the case in hand, leave no doubt in my mind to hold that appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act without deposit of certificate of the authority, is not competent.
11. The law applicable in the instant case, has specifically been decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which is based upon a principle of law and it is binding on this Court. There is no room for this Court to prefer the Full Bench decision over the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on a question of law. While holding so I seek guidance from the case of "Sher Muhammad v. Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner Multan and others" (1981 SCMR 520).
12. Reverting to the second argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that a request was made to respondent No,3 and same was declined qua the permission to deposit the amount directed by the learned Labour Court. The sought for permission, was not allowed by the learned Labour Court as the request was made after the expiry of 30-days i,e, after the lapse of statutory period of filing the appeal. The request was as such rightly declined and there is no illegality in the impugned order.
13. The case referred by-the-petitioners "Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Rawalpindi v.
Muhammad Aslam and 25 others" (1986 SCMR 1607) was decided with regard to the question whether the certificate should be deposited at the time of filing of the appeal or within the period of 30-days and it has not been declared in the said case that at the subsequent stage after the lapse of 30-days, the amount can be permitted to be deposited. The submission that on the dictum of judgment 1986 SCMR 1607 (supra) the apex Court permitted the amount to be paid, even beyond the period of 30-days, is not well-founded.
14. The upshot of the above discussion is that learned Labour Court has passed the impugned order, on the basis of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which has the binding impact, therefore, does not call for any interference. There is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order.
The petitions are without any merit and are dismissed accordingly.