JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.---The petitioners/plaintiffs impugn the appellate decree, dated 11-3- 2000 whereby the decree of the learned trial Court dated 29-7-1993 was set aside and a suit filed by the petitioners was dismissed. In their suit the petitioners had sought two distinct reliefs, firstly, by way of the declaration and injunction and, secondly, for specific performance of contract of sale.
2. The facts of this case are simple. The Thal Development Authority auctioned the suit-land in favour of Muhammad Akbar, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, on 5-6-1954. The case of the petitioners/plaintiffs is that Muhammad Akbar sold the laud to them in 1961 and, with the object of obtaining approval of the sale, moved an application to the Thal Development Authority on 13-7- 1961. Along with his application he also filed his affidavit confirming the sale.
3. The aforesaid application remained pending with the Thal Development Authority and, after its dissolution with the successor 'Revenue Authority. When the application was pursued by Muhammad Akbar and by the petitioners at various times they were informed that there was a ban on transfers. The matter, therefore, remained pending.
4. Sometime after 1972, Muhammad Akbar denied the sale. He then filed a declaratory suit on 2-5- 1975 claiming absolute title to the suit-land and denied the claim of the petitioners. The suit was contested and extensive oral and documentary evidence was also led by the parties. When the suit was mature for decision, Muhammad Akbar withdrew the same on 20-7-1980. On 19-7-1981 Muhammad Akbar filed an application to the Revenue Authorities for grant of proprietary rights to him. The petitioners also put in an application based on the agreement in their favour and brought the matter to the attention of the concerned authorities. The Settlement Officer, vide order, dated 24-8-1981, ordered that the parties should get their respective rights determined by the civil Court.
It was observed in the order that the revenue forums will act in accordance with the determination made by the civil Court. Feeling aggrieved of this order, Muhammad Akbar filed an appeal before the Commissioner, which was dismissed on 25-1-1982.
5. The petitioners/plaintiffs filed their suit making the alternate prayers, referred to above, on 20-10- 1981. The suit was resisted by the respondents who denied any sale in favour of the petitioners.
Issues were framed by the learned trial Court on which documentary and oral evidence was led by the parties. The learned trial Court, as noted above, decreed the suit of the petitioners, holding that they had successfully proved the contract of sale made in their favour in 1961. The respondents, feeling aggrieved, filed an appeal which has been allowed. The learned Appellate Court has firstly held that the suit was time-barred and, secondly, that the agreement of sale was not proved by the petitioners. Hence this revision petition.
6. I firstly take up the question of limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that in view of the controversy between the parties before the Revenue forums and in the light of the order dated 24-8-1981 passed by the Settlement Officer, the suit of the petitioners, which was filed within two months of the said order, was within time. This contention is well-founded because title in the land was vested in the Province and the Province through the Revenue functionaries had decided to abide by any decision, which may be rendered by the civil Court. In these circumstances, the finding of the learned Appellate Court that the suit was time-barred is patently erroneous.
7. Coming next to the question as to whether the sale agreement was proved, I note that although the petitioners/plaintiffs produced more than 60 documents, the Appellate Court has taken note of only five of these. These too have been misread in material particulars.
8. It is worth-noting that the petitioners had produced in evidence Exh.P.24, which was the affidavit sworn by Muhammad Akbar on 13-7-1961. The document was attested by Habib Jillani, Naib Tehsildar. Likewise the application of Muhammad Akbar (Exh.P.25) seeking verification of his signatures and the application (Exh.P.23) for permission to transfer the land to the petitioners were also attested by the aforesaid Naib Tehsildar.
9. In the earlier declaratory suit, which had been filed by Muhammad Akbar and withdrawn on 20- 7-1980, the petitioners had produced Habib Jillani as D.W.2. He had confirmed attestation of Exhs.P.23, P.24 and P.25, on the identification of Jewan Khan, Lamberdar of Chak No.2-D, Depalpur, in which Muhammad Akbar owned land. In the present proceedings Habib Jillani could not be produced, as a witness because he had died. The extract from the register of deaths proving this fact was produced as Exh.P.63. The statement which had been made by Habib Jillani in the earlier suit was produced as Exh.P.53. It may be noted that Habib Jillani was thoroughly cross-examined by Muhammad Akbar in the earlier suit. His statement (Exh.P.53) conclusively proves the sale transaction.
10. Jewan Khan, who was Lamberdar and who identified Muhammad Akbar before the Naib Tehsildar, was produced by the petitioners as D. W.3. In view of the statement recorded by him, he was declared hostile by the Court and then cross-examined by the petitioners. His statement is also exhibited on the record, which shows that his denial of signatures on the affidavit is not at all credible. Furthermore, the signatures of Jewan Khan were proved through the statement of the Handwriting Expert, which was produced as Exh.P.67.
11. Most important however, is the testimony of Muhammad Akbar himself, when he appeared as a witness in the earlier declaratory suit filed by him. His statement is on record as Exh.D.12. He admitted having signed some blank documents. He specifically acknowledged that the application dated 13-7-1961 which was produced before the Tehsildar, bore his signatures. He only denied that he had presented the same before the Tehsildar. Muhammad Akbar's statement was produced on the present record by the respondents/defendants themselves. It conclusively shows that the signatures on Exhs.P.23, P.24 and p.25 were those of Muhammad Akbar himself. At this point it is also important to note that Muhammad Akbar who was an employee of the Board of Revenue and was well-versed with transactions relating to land could not explain why he signed any paper in blank on the asking of a person namely Faqir Hussain, who features nowhere in this litigation.
12. Considering the above evidence, which has not been taken note of by the learned Appellate Court, I have reached in inescapable conclusion that the sale transaction by Muhammad Akbar in favour of the petitioners was duly proved. At this stage it is also to be noted that B respondent No.4, who is one of the legal representatives of Muhammad Akbar, had acknowledged that the sale had been made by Muhammad Akbar.
13. Considering the above circumstances, I find the impugned appellate decree to be a result of illegality in the exercise of the Appellate Court's jurisdiction. The same is, therefore, set aside. As a consequence, the decree of the learned trial Court dated 29-7-1993 is upheld and affirmed.
14. The petitioner shall also be entitled to their costs throughout.