' JAVED IQBAL, J.--- This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment, dated 21-6- 1999 passed by learned Lahore High Court, Lahore, whereby the civil revision preferred on behalf of respondent has been accepted and judgment/decree of learned Additional District Judge, Bhakkar dated 16-5-1992 has been set aside and judgment, dated 19-5-1987 passed by learned trial Court restored.
2. Precisely stated the facts of the case as enumerated in the judgment impugned are to the effect that "Allu alias Ghulam Ali was owner in possession of the land situated in Khata No,19/19, 4/14, 21, and 25 Mauza Bhawanpura Shamali, Tehsil and District Bhakkar, who died in the year, 1936. Meera deceased, his son was governed by the Customary Law of land in Mianwali District. At the death of Meera, his property was inherited by Banoo Mai, petitioner/defendant No,1, as limited owner. She could not alienate the property by means of sale or mortgage. In case of her marriage, the property was to be reverted to the successors-in-interest of Meera deceased. Before partition of the Sub-Continent, Mst. Bano Mai contracted her marriage with one Faqiru son of Shera, therefore, she could not legally retain with herself the property. The mutation of inheritance No,647 dated 29- 9-1970 vide which 1/2 share of the property of Meeran deceased was transferred to Mst. Bano Mai petitioner and remaining 1/2 share was transferred in favor of respondents. The plaintiffs/respondents Nos.1 to 3 challenged this mutation of inheritance and also prayed for possession of the land through present suit. The suit was contested by the petitioner Mst. Bano Mai denying the averments of the plaint, raising some preliminary objections of cause of actions, non- maintainability of suit, bar of limitation and insufficiency of court-fee etc. On the pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed various issues and after recording and appreciating the evidence dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree, dated 19-5-1987. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents preferred an appeal and the Appellate Court/Additional District Judge, Bhakkar, disagreeing with the findings of the trial Court, accepted the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreed the suit vide judgment and decree, dated 16-5-1992 coming to the conclusion that Mst. Bano Mai petitioner, being a limited owner had married prior to the partition of the country before enforcement of Shariat Act, 1948 was not entitled to inherit the property of her father, because of the fact that the succession had opened at the time of her marriage". Being aggrieved Mst. Bano Mai preferred a revision petition which has been accepted, hence this petition.
3. It is mainly contended by Mr. Tariq Masood, learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioner that the legal and factual aspects of the controversy have not been appreciated in its true perspective which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice as the findings of the First Appellate Court being well-supported by evidence has been reversed without any lawful justification. It is urged that revisional jurisdiction as conferred upon the High Court under section 115 of C.P.C. Has been exercised in an arbitrary manner without having gone through the entire record of the case minutely. It is also contended that various important law points having direct and substantial bearing on the merits of the case went unnoticed which caused grave prejudice against the petitioner. It is contended with vehemence that learned High Court has ignored the fact that father of respondent No,1, at the time of his death before Independence, was being governed by the Rewaj-eZamindarah whereby a daughter was not entitled to get any share in the estate left by her father in case of her marriage and undoubtedly respondent No,1 having contracted marriage with one Faqiru before partition was not legally entitled for any share and the provisions as contained in Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1948 (IX of 1948) cannot be made applicable in this case. In this regard it is further contended that West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 (Punjab Ordinance XIII of 1983) having been promulgated and enforced with effect from 1-8-1983 the question of applicability of section 2-A does not arise.
4. We have given our anxious consideration to the contentions as agitated on behalf of petitioner in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. We have also perused the judgment/decree of learned Civil Judge, dated 19-5-1987, judgment/decree of learned Additional District Judge, Bhakkar dated 16-5-1992 and judgment impugned. The pivotal question which needs determination is as to whether Mst. Bano (respondent) is entitled to get 1/2 share from the property of Meeran (deceased) being his real daughter and mutation bearing No,647 dated 29-9- 1970 was validly sanctioned or otherwise? The case of petitioner revolves around the fact that Mst.
Bano was limited owner who had married prior to partition and before the promulgation of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948 and as such she was not entitled to inherit the property of her father because the succession was opened at the time of her marriage before partition and not on 29-9-1970 i,e, the date of attestation of the mutation. Let we mention it clear here at this juncture that ambiguity or confusion if any in such-like eventualities have been clarified by section 2-A, West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment Ordinance, 1983 (Punjab Ordinance XIII of 1983) and Customary Law was declared repugnant to the Injunctions of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah impact whereof was discussed in a comprehensive manner by this Court in case Abdul Ghafoor v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1985 SC 407, which is reproduced herein below for ready reference:-- "All the learned counsel while interpreting the latest Punjab Law of 1983 have tried to point out certain omission, technical or otherwise, shortcomings and/or so-called defects in this law. Be that as it may, it has undoubtedly achieved the major object contained in the directions of the Federal Shariat Court and the Supreme Court in the aforecited two judgments. It is highly important to note that in the opening clause of the newly added section 2-A (to Act V of 1962) it has been made absolutely clear that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 2 of 1962 Act 'or any other law for the time being in force'; and further, notwithstanding any custom or usage or decree, judgment or order of any Court, the governing law shall be Muslim Personal Law (Shariat); if, any male 'heir' had `acquired' any agricultural land under custom before the application of Act IX of 1948 on 15th March, 1948; provided the person from whom the said heir had acquired the land, was a Muslim. In order to make it more clear it has been provided that the said heir shall be deemed to have become, upon the said acquisition 'an absolute owner of such land, as if such land had devolved on him under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).
' Section 2-A has several implications. It would amongst others, also lead to the following results in so far as these four cases are concerned:--
(a) Wherever a male heir had acquired by way of inheritance (if there is other acquisition also it is not relevant there) agricultural land from any Muslim before 15th of March, 1948 he shall be deemed to be an absolute owner having the power of alienation as enjoyed under the Muslim Law.
(b) The power of alienation, even if it takes place before 15th March, 1948, shall not be controlled by any rule of customary law because the deeming provisions makes it clear that the male heir had become upon such acquisition (prior to 15th March, 1948) an absolute owner of such land.
(c) The foregoing two conclusions and consequences flowing from section 2-A shall not be controlled by what is contained in any law for the time being in force. This is without any exception thus, section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act IV of 1872 and the Punjab Limitation Customs Act (No,1) of 1920 and the Punjab Customs (Power to Contest) Act (No,11) of 1920 or any other law mentioned in section 7 of 1962. Act as also similar other laws, even to the extent they were previously held by the superior Courts to be applicable, would not affect the operation of the law enacted and declared in section 2-A.
(d) The phrase in section 2 of the 1962 Act: 'subject to provisions of any enactment for the time being in force' and similar other expression in section 7(2) thereof has lost its purpose and efficacy in these cases though the proviso to section 3 will not suffer similar erosion in so far as it gives effect to the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court and the Supreme Court regarding the limited estates which were earlier held by females. The same result has been provided in the opening part of section 2-A. That is, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 2 or any other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or decree or judgment or order of any Court, the said law shall have operation.
(e)Therefore, this new law has a far-reaching effect. Subject to the provision contained in its sub- clauses (b) and (c) it nullifies all orders, judgments and decrees as also neutralizes custom and usage and further to the extent any law is in conflict with the new law, it overrides the same. In this context, therefore, all rules of custom and all previous laws to the extent they remained alive notwithstanding earlier partial or ineffective repeal and despite the previous decisions of Courts would, by virtue of this new law and to the extent it makes a new provision to the contrary, would lose effect.
(f) The questions of retrospectively in ordinary technical sense is not relevant as this provision itself relates to a period prior to 15-3-1948 and is being enacted nearly half a century later. Such an operation of this provision would come only in a seeming conflict with section 6 of the 1962 Act but there can be no hurdle in reading section 6 in its own context and not affecting the retrospectively inherent in section 2-A. When both are put in juxtaposition to each other the following two important rearranged positions of section'2-A would emerge:--
(1) If a male heir had before the commencement of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)
Application Act, 1948 ... Acquired any agricultural land under Custom from the person who at the time of such acquisition was a Muslim.
(2) He shall be deemed to have become ,... An absolute owner as if such land had devolved on him under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).
(g) Thus, it will neutralize the effect of section 6 on 2-A. Not only this, sub-clause (b) of section 2-A also makes it more clearly retrospective because it not only affects pending suits but also proceedings which have culminated into final decrees. They, if contrary to the purview of the main substantive provision in section 2-A or in any way coming in conflict with any of the provisions of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1962 as amended, would now become inexecutable and of no legal effect under sub-clause (b).
(h) Same is the effect of sub-clause (c) which provides that all suits or other proceedings including the execution proceedings seeking possession of land under such decrees shall abate forthwith.
(i) Notwithstanding the foregoing reading of section 2-A visualizing it in substance as having application prior even to 15th March, 1948 as well and in this sense being retrospective, the proviso to sub-clause (c) thereof clearly excludes its operation in so far as the past and dosed transactions are concerned. They as explained therein would include only those cases where possession of the land has also already been delivered under such decree as is referred to in sub-clauses (b) and (c). To this limited extent therefore, the inherent retrospectivity of section 2-A has been controlled by the proviso to clause (c).
(j) In the light of the above analysis the provision being of a special character would require interpretation in peculiar context thereof. Therefore, it would not be necessary to examine the further contention advanced at the bar that declaratory legislation, a section 2-A pritha facie appears to be, is ordinarily retrospective though - the examination would lead to the same result ...."
5. A bare perusal of the above reproduced extract would indicate that retrospective effect has been given to section 2-A and nutshell result would be that Meeran (deceased) would be considered as absolute owner of the land in question being last male heir and accordingly his legacy shall be devolved upon the legal heirs in accordance with the Muslim Personal Law of Inheritance and resultantly Mst. Bano Mai shall be entitled to 1/2 share of the property left by her father namely Meeran. Mst. Bano Mai cannot be deprived from 1/2 share conferred upon her by Muslim Personal Law of Inheritance and authenticity and validity of Mutation No,647 sanctioned on 29-9-1970 is above board being in consonance with Islamic Law of Inheritance. No jurisdictional error, illegality or infirmity could be pointed out meriting interference in the judgment impugned.
' The petition being meritless is dismissed and leave declined.