Proceedings under section 13 of the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959 (hereafter called the said Ordinance) have been instituted against him. Shahdadpur but no final orders have been passed against him. According to the petitioner these proceedings therefore, he filed a revision application under the Ordinance read with section 561-A, Cr. P. C. 1969 the petitioner filed an amended application, which has now come up for hearing before me.
2. The petitioner has appeared in person and advanced only two legal objections to the proceedings instituted against him. These objections are that the said Ordinance is ultra vires of the powers of the Governor and that the Tribunal in Shahdadpur before whom the petitioner has to appear is illegal because there is already another Tribunal under the Ordinance functioning in the District of Shahdadpur.. The provisions of section 19 of the Ordinance state as follows :- "In relation to any such order under section 4, or section 13, or section 16 the High Court may call for the record of the case and if the Tribunal or the Commissioner appears
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally, the High Court may make such .Direction as it may deem sufficient for the rectification of the error or omission and the Tribunal or the Commissioner shall conduct itself, or himself, as the case may be, accordingly."
On a plain reading of this section, it appears to me that tl- is Court's jurisdiction is barred because no order whatever ha been passed against the petitioner. However, the petitioner contended that his case was supported by a judgment of this Court in Sher Muhammad v. The State (PLD 1965 Kar. 61). In that case a learned Single Judge of this Court had set aside the order of a Tribunal revising a security bond under section 19 of the Ordinance. The order of the learned Single -Judge was passed against a final order for security passed under the Ordinance, therefore, the judgment cited has no relevance to the petitioner's case, as in the instant case proceedings have merely been instituted against him. Additionally, section 24 of the Ordinance states as follows :-- "No proceedings taken or orders passed under this Ordinance, shall be called in question otherwise than as provided hereunder, and no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted against any person for anything done or intended to be done under this Ordinance, or against any person for any loss or damage caused to, or in respect of any property as as result of an act done or intended to be done under this Ordinance."
The provisions of this section are clear and mandatory, there--fore, the objection advanced by the petitioner cannot be raised in this application, though it may be open to him to file a petition u r Article 98 on these grounds.
3. However, the applicant has argued that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are applicable to the said Ordinance, therefore, he is entitled to relief under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The question. Whether the Criminal Procedure Code is applicable depends on the provision) of the said Ordinance and the provisions of sections 1 and 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code. At the out-set it is relevant to observe that proceedings under section 13, which have been instituted against the petitioner, are preventive proceedings and not proceedings for the prosecution of an offence. Further the Ordinance has prescribed the procedure for these proceeding and has enacted that certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code shall be applicable to the Ordinance. For instance, under section 16 of the Ordinance, the provisions of section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code have been expressly made applicable. This means that except to the extent specified the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are not applicable to the Ordinance. However, the petitioner argued that his case was supported by section 10 of the Ordinance. This section enacts that the Tribunal shall follow the procedure prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Code for conducting trials and recording evidence, but subject to the provisions of the Ordinance. The very fact that express provision was made in this respect implies that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code were not applicable to the Ordinance. There is therefore nothing in the Ordinance to support the petitioner---s argument that this Court has jurisdiction under the section 561-A, Cr. P. C. To proceeding in the Ordinance; on the contrary, in the circumstances stated, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code would not be applicable to proceedings to proceedings under the Ordinance in view of the provisions of subsection (2) of section 1 and section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
4. However, in support of his argument, the petitioner has referred me to a judgment of a learned Single judge of this Court in Criminal Transfer Application No. 296 of 1956. In that judgment, the learned Single Judge has held that this Court was entitled to transfer proceedings under the Ordinance in the exercise of its powers under section 526, Cr. P. C. As the provisions of this section are applicable only to Courts, the judgment cited supports the petitioner's argument. However, the judgment does not contain any reasons for holding that a Tribunal under the Ordinance is a Court under section 526, Cr. P. C. And for the reasons stated, with great respect, I am not able to agree with the view of the learned Single Judge in the judgment cited.
5. Further the very question raised before me has been decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Gahina v. The State (PLD 1968 Lah. 1266). Prior to this judgment, there had been a conflict of authority in this Court on the question whether this Court could grant bail in proceedings pending before the Tribunalunder the Ordinance. In view of the divergence of opinion, the question whether this Court could grant bail in proceedings under the Ordinance was referred to a Division Bench.
The Division Bench held that this Court was not competent to grant bail because the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code were not applicable to - proceedings under the Ordinance. After considering the provisions of the Ordinance of the provisions of section 1(2) and section 5(2) of the Criminal .Procedure Code, Sardar Muhammad Iqbal, J., who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench, observed at page 1271 as follows :- "The position which emerges is (a) that all the offences under the Penal Code are to be investigated, inquired into, and tried in accordance with the procedure in the Criminal Procedure Code; (b) that an offence under a special or local law is likewise to be investigated, inquired into and tried in accordance with the procedure given in Cr. P. Code unless the special or local law provides for a different procedure: and (c) that in respect to all other matters, covered by special or local law, the Cr. P. Code is not applicable, unless there is a specific provision to that effect. The Ordinance does directly create any offence, and "being a special and a local law the Code of Criminal Procedure will not be applicable to the proceedings under it, unless it is shown that there is a specific provision in the Ordinance or in the Code of Criminal Procedure providing for the application of procedure given in the Code."
6. As proceedings under section 13 of the Ordinance are preventive proceedings and as the Ordinance did not attract the provisions of section 498, Cr. P. C., the Court held that section 498, Cr.
P. C. Was not applicable to the proceedings under the Ordinance. I have observed in para. '3' that the Ordinance does not contain any provisions from which it could even be inferred that section 561-A, Cr. P. C. Was applicable to the Ordinance, therefore in view of the principle laid down in this judgment it follows that section 561-A, Cr. P. C. Is. Not applicable to the Ordinance.
7. However, the petitioner argued that his case was supported by a Division Bench of this Court in Ali Sher Sarki v. The State and another (1968 P Cr. L J 246). The facts of that case were that an order under section 13 of the said Ordinance had been passed against the petitioner, who filed an appeal before the Commis--sioner and asked for an interim stay of the order passed against him. This request was refused by the Commissioner on the ground that he had not power to grant an interim stay pending the hearing of the petitioner's appeal. The petitioner there--upon filed a petition under Article 98 of the Constitution in this Court challenging the order of the Commissioner refusing an interim stay. In allowing this petition the Division Bench observed that under section 10 of the said Ordinance proceedings under it had to be conducted according to the procedure prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code, that an. Appeal was only a con--tinuation of the trial, therefore, as there were no provisions to the contrary in the said Ordinance, the Commissioner should have the same powers of granting relief in an appeal as the Tribunal had and observed the power to pass an interim order thus must be deemed to be inherent in the appellate Court or for that matter in the revisional Court". I am in respectful agreement with these observations, but the question for determination before the Division Bench was totally different from the question for determination in this revision application The Division Bench had only to consider whether the Commis--sioner could grant an interim relief, therefore, the Division trench did not have to consider whether the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code were generally applicable to proceed--ings under the Ordinance. The judgment cited is, therefore, distinguishable and is not relevant to this revision application, therefore, I am respectfully bound by the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Gahina v. The State.
8. No other argument was advanced. The revision application is without merit and is dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.