' MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J.---The present appeal was filed by Dost Muhammad and Muhammad Ali sons of Allah Bakhsh deceased in their capacity as legal representatives of Allah Bakhsh against Sardar Ali son of Lal Khan others to assail judgment and decree dated 5-11-1995 passed by the learned Civil Judge decreeing three suits for specific performance of contract filed against Allah Bakhsh deceased by Sardar Ali respondent No,1 and by the appellants namely Dost Muhammad and Muhammad Ali in their purported capacity as the vendees. The judgment and decree dated 15-3-2001 of the learned Additional District Judge, Chiniot, dismissing appeal thereagainst is also under challenge.
2. The respondent No,1 Sardar Ali through his suit claimed specific performance on the basis of agreement to sell dated 5-12-1985 (Exh.P.1) executed by Allah Basksh deceased in his favour for land measuring 35 Kanals, 12 Marlas situated in Square No,43 of Mauza Mil Sipra Tehsil Chiniot, District Jhang. Sardar Ali as plaintiff claimed payment of Rs,1,02,000 as earnest money out of the sale price to be Rs,1,68,000 and also the subsequent payments of Rs,13,000 and Rs,20,000 against receipts. Thus claiming total payment of Rs,1,35,000 to Allah Bakhsh i.e, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, a decree on payment of the remaining balance of Rs,33,000 was sought. The deceased Allah Bakhsh as the original defendant filed a contesting written statement denying the agreement. The appellants then also filed two independent Suits bearing Nos.193 of 1992 and 192 of 1992 to seek specific performance of their respective agreements to sell dated 8-1-1986 from their father Allah Bakhsh.
3. The suits of the appellants were initially contested by Allah Bakhsh deceased and the purported agreements dated 8-1-1986 in favour of his sons were denied. Sardar Ali respondent No,1 on applications was impleaded as a defendant in each suit.
4. All the three suits were consolidated on 19-12-1991 and consolidated issues were framed.
5. Allah Bakhsh deceased thereafter admitted the suits of his sons i.e, the appellants though conceding statements dated 10-10-1995. The appellants thus did not produce any evidence. The respondent No,1 and Allah Bakhsh deceased, however, produced their respective evidence.
6. The learned Civil Judge on his analysis of evidence found Allah Bakhsh to have made agreement dated 5-12-1985 (Exh.P.1) in favour of respondent No,1 by Allah Bakhsh who had also admitted the agreement and receipt of earnest money and others in his reply to the impleadment application of respondent No, 1.
7. Regarding the suits of Dost Muhammad and Muhammad Ali; the present appellants, the learned trial Judge found the suits to have been filed collusively with their father i.e, Allah Bakhsh deceased and also that the agreements of sale produced by the appellants being later in date from Exh.P.1, were held not to be impediments in the specific performance of the agreement dated 5-12-1985 (Exh.P.1). The learned trial Judge decreed the suit of respondent No,1 for the sale of land measuring 35 Kanals, 12 Marlas.
' The suits of the appellants were also decreed by the learned trial Judge but to the extent of the land remaining balance after excluding 35 Kanals, 12 Marlas decreed in favour of respondent No, 1.
The decree for the half of the remainder of the land was made in favour of each appellant. This judgment was upheld by the learned first appellate Court through the judgment and decree dated 15-3-2001. Hence, the present second appeal.
8. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the respondent No,1 failed to produce Handwriting Expert to prove execution of agreement to sell dated 5-12-1985 (Exh.P.1) by deceased Allah Bakhsh to discharge onus of Issues Nos.4 and 5 and to disprove Issue No,6. Further contended that the appellants were not given any opportunity to produce evidence.
9. Contrarily the learned counsel for the contesting respondent No,1 supported the impugned judgment and decrees.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the record, this Court does not find any substance in the present appeal. Subsequent to the suit filed by respondent No,1 to claim specific performance of agreement dated 5-12-1985 (Exh.P.1) against Allah Bakhsh, the present appellants as the vendees filed their suits against their father Allah Bakhsh who initially denied their agreements but subsequently admitted their suits. In view of the unqualified statements of Allah Bakhsh admitting the claim of the appellants they did not produce any evidence. Their father Allah Bakhsh however contested the suit of respondent No,1 Sardar Ali and produced his evidence in answer to the evidence of respondent No,
1. On death of Allah Bakhsh the present appellants succeeded their father. They thus had no independent right to produce evidence as defendants as their predecessorin-interest had. Availed of such opportunity as the defendant. The learned Courts below held the two suits respectively filed by the appellants as collusive with their father deceased Allah Bakhsh. These findings were not challenged by the appellants and nor any ground thereagainst has been raised in the present appeal. As such the ruling of collusiveness of the suits of the appellants has become final.
11. The memo. Of the present appeal and the first appeal reveal that the appellants did plead the ground of absence of the expert opinion as adversely bearing upon the execution of sale agreement dated 5-12-1985 (Exh. P . 1) . Even otherwise the learned Courts below through thorough and detailed analysis of evidence concurrently found evidence on record sufficient to prove existence and execution of agreement dated 5-12-1985. It has not been shown that the concurrent findings of the fact recorded by the learned subordinate Courts were contrary to the law or erroneous. In a similar case titled Dil Murad and others V. Akbar Shah (1986 SCM R 306) the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan pronounced the law that where the two Courts below concurrently believe the evidence produced on the execution of the disputed document, it was not necessary for a plaintiff to produce an expert because the onus in such a case shifted upon the opposite party to call expert evidence to show that the document/agreement was not so made, signed or thumb-marked.
12. In view of the above stated reasons this appeal is dismissed with costs.