SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J.--- Through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, order dated 15-3-1971 and dated 13-6-1973 are sought to be declared as having been passed without lawful authority and without jurisdiction.
2. The litigation between the parties has chequered background inasmuch as land allotted to the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners in excess of his entitlement was cancelled by the competent authority in the Settlement and Rehabilitation Department which action of the Settlement Authority gave rise to litigation. After failing before the High Court in the Settlement Revision, the controversy reached before the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan and their petition (C.P.L.A. No.77 of 1971) was dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan on 7-6- 1971. It was observed by their Lordships that "We may, however, add that under letter No.7511- 66/239-R(L), dated the 6th May, 1966, it is open to the Settlement Authorities in specially deserving cases not to resume the land from an allottee who has obtained excess land to sell the land to him at a price fixed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. It is open to the petitioner to move the Chief Settlement Commissioner in this behalf"". On the application filed by the petitioners, order, dated 26-4-1972 was passed for the sale of the excess land on payment of price and interest. The said order was, however, withdrawn by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on 13-6-1973 which reads as follows:-- "It has been revealed that the land sold to Din Muhammad etc. Under section 12(b) of Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, had been confirmed to another claimant prior to issuance of the orders communicated to you vide this office memo. No.2146/72/728-R(L). The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Punjab, has therefore, been pleased to order that the previous orders issued vide this office memo. Referred to above, may be withdrawn. You are, therefore, requested, to ensure strict compliance of the orders of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Punjab."
3. The reason for recalling of earlier order dated 26-4-1972 is quite evident and obvious from the perusal of order, dated 13-6-1973. Even this order was challenged by the petitioners through Writ Petition No.563/R of 1973 which was dismissed on 28-5-1974. The matter was then agitated through C.P.L.A. No.590 of 1974 which was dismissed on 21-5-1975 by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. It thus, becomes crystal clear that both the orders i.e. 15-3-1971 and 13-6-1973 (which are now sought to be assailed through this petition) had been the subject-matter of litigation not only up to this Court but also up to the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners however, contends that, since both the orders passed by the Settlement Authorities were without jurisdiction, this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is fully vested with the power to declare the same as of no effect. It is contended that since second application by the informer was not maintainable, order dated 15-3-1971 was nullity in law. It is further contended that once the Chief Settlement Commissioner had passed the order selling the property in favour of the petitioners, he had no power thereafter to recall the said order. According to him, since these points were not raised in the earlier round of litigation, the same can be raised now. Reliance in this context has been placed upon The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others PLD 1975 SC 331; Ali Muhammad v. Hussain Bakhsh and others PLD 1976 SC 37; Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi PLD 1969 SC 407 and Zafar Iqbal Alvi and others v. Bashir Ahmed and others 1996 SCM R 795.
The learned counsel for respondent No.2 on the other hand while pointing out the orders passed by the Courts in the earlier rounds of litigation between the parties, has objected to the very maintainability of this petition.
5. The settled position of law is that all authorities and Courts are bound by the orders passed and judgments rendered by the superior Courts, particularly the Supreme Court. It is not permissible for anyone to reopen the matter once again. This is not only because of Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 but also for the reason that judgment inter partis, in personam binds the parties. An attempt has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioners to attribute some inaccuracy to the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan rendered in the earlier round of litigation. Suffice it to observe that it is not permissible for this Court to make any comment about the verity of judgment of the apex Court. Even no such attempt can be countenanced which may have the effect of eroding the legal efficacy and finality of the previous determination made by the Courts. Indeed to such a situation, the law laid down in Pir Bakhsh represented by his Legal heirs and others v. The Chairman Allotment Committee and others PLD 1987 SC 145 gets attracted. Hi that case, the orders passed by the Courts in the litigation between the parties qua allotment of evacuee land were sought to be agitated over again by those who were party to the litigation in the earlier round. Such a recourse was not approved by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan on the principle of stare decisis and doctrine of res judicata observing that:-- "The result of this examination has been aforestated and all the petitions were dismissed except Writ Petition No.243/R of 1971, which was allowed and the impugned order of Settlement Commissioner set aside. The conclusions, however, also necessitate the consideration as to the effect of Supreme Court judgment in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution on the rights of the parties determined by the judgments of the High Court which has assumed finality. It is to be noted that the appellants were specifically arrayed as respondents in those writ petitions and the dispute was inter parties."
"Cooley in his treatise "on the Constitutional Limitations" at p.50 while commenting on accepting adjudged cases as precedents, quotes Chancellor Kent saying:-- "If a decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption-is in favour of its correctness, and the community have a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by it. It would, therefore, be extremely inconvenient to the public if precedents were not duly regarded, and implicitly followed.
It is by the notoriety and stability of such rules that professional men can give safe advice to those who consult them and people in general can venture to buy and trust, and to deal with each other.
If judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded, we should disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of property. When a rule has once been deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed unless by a Court of appeal or review, and never by the same-Court, except for very urgent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if the practice were otherwise, it would be leaving us in a perplexing uncertainty as to the law."
This, in my view, is a very subtle exposition of a precedent being the highest evidence of the law and holds the field so long it is regarded as a good law on the principle of stare decisis."
It was further noted that: "The question whether decision is correct or erroneous has no bearing upon the question whether it operates or does not operate as res judicata. The doctrine is that in certain circumstances the Court shall not try a suit or issue but shall deal with the matter on the footing that it is a matter no longer open to contest by reason of a previous decision. In these circumstances it must necessarily be wrong for a Court to try the suit or issue, come to its own conclusion thereon, consider whether the previous decision is right and give effect to it or not according as it conceives the previous decision to be right or wrong. "
6. Even if it be assumed that the grounds now sought to be urged qua the orders passed, were not taken in the earlier round of litigation, the petitioners do not stand on any better footing. Even this aspect of the matter was taken note of in Pir Bakhsh's case (supra) and it was observed that:-- "Additionally, it may also be pointed out that the respondents did not, in the earlier writ petition, base their defence on this order, and for that matter Explanation IV to section 11 would be applicable namely, that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. This explanation is based on the principle that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter, that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided." (underlining supplied due to relevance).
7. In presence of such legal position stated by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners lose all their significance and deserve to be repelled.
As a result, this petition is without any substance and merit, it is dismissed accordingly.