Fazl-ur-Rehman Khan, J.--Writ-Petitions No, 1277/2001, No, 1572/2001, No, 1155/2002 and No, 1229/2002 are proposed to be disposed of by this common judgment as a common question of law is involved therein.
2. The brief facts, giving rise to these writ-petitions are that petitioner Dilawar Shah Roghani in Writ- Petition No, 1277/2001 joined the service of Provincial Urban Development Board, Peshawar (Respondent No, 2 and hereinafter referred to as the "Board") on 15.7.1975 and after rendering 26 years service, retired as Legal Director on 20.1.2001 whereas Mahasal Khan, Petitioner in Writ-Petition No, 1572/2001 joined the services of the Board on 15.11.1976 and after rendering 23 years of service, stood retired as Deputy Director on 20.1.2000. Similarly, Mian Gul, Petitioner in Writ-Petition No, 1155/2002 joined the Board on 1.9.1975 and stood retired as Director (Grade-20) on 20.6.1998 while Fakhre Alam, Petitioner in Writ-Petition No, 1229/2002 was initially appointed as Family Planning Supervisor on 3.7.1965 but later on, joined the services of the Board as Administrator (Grade-17) and stood retired in the same grade on 11.2.1999.
3. According to the petitioners, on the persistent demands of the employees of the Board for the creation of a Pension/Retirement Package, the Board in its 34th and 36th meetings held on 26.7.2000 and 17.7.2001 respectively, approved a Scheme for Pension, Provident Fund and Gratuity but the same was given effect from 17.7.2001 instead of the date, the Scheme was approved. The petitioners, therefore, have prayed that on acceptance of these writ-petitions, this Court may be pleased to:
(i) declare the date (i,e, 17.7.2001) of implementation of the retirement package scheme to be illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect; and
(ii) direct the respondents to give effect to the said scheme from the 34th Board-in-Council meeting dated 27.6.2000 and release Gratuity and other benefits to the petitioners accordingly.
4. In all the four writ-petitions, the prayer is one and the same, However, in the Writ-Petition No, 1277/2001, the petitioner has selected the date of enforcement of the Package as 26.7.2000 while in the remaining 3 writ-petitions, this date has been taken as 4.3.1989. Perusal of the record would show that there is no provisions for Pension for the employees of the Board, nor any such Scheme was approved by the Board in its 34th or 36th meetings, but there is a provision contained in Rule- 31 of the Provincial Urban Development Board Service Rules, 1979 (hereinafter called the "Rules') for the grant of Gratuity and all these writ-petitions in piths and substances are a challenge to the Notification No, PUDB/Admn/10601 dated 5.9.2001 whereby Rule-31 of the Rules was omitted and a new Rule was substituted therein. It would be appropriate hereto reproduce below the old rule as well as the new one, which read as under:-- "Gratuity.--
31. Gratuity shall be admissible in lieu of termination of service at the rate of one month's pay per year of employment calculated at the average of the last 12 months pay drawn after completing a minimum service of 10 years with Board/L.A.A., provided that the termination is not owning to mis- conduct. Provided further that where the services of an employee are terminated for reasons other than misconduct before his completion of 10 years service the gratuity admissible shall be 20 days wages calculated on the basis of the wages admissible to him in the last month of service for every complete year of service or any part thereof in excess of 5 months."
31. (i) The following number of gratuities shall be paid to the employees on their separation from PUDB either in case of attaining the age of superannuation, completion of service, early retirement, disability or death provided that the separation is not owing to misconduct:-- Gratuity No, of gratuities No, of completed Years of Service.
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 8 7 11 8 14 9 17 10 20 11 24 12 28 13 32 14 36 15 40 16 45 17 50 18 55 19 60 20 65 21 71 22 77 23 83 24 89 25 95 26 102 27 109 28 116 29 123 30 & above 130
5. The new rule was substituted on 5.9.2001 but as per Dilawar Shah Roghani, Petitioner, this rule should have been given effect from 27.6.2000, while according to the other three petitioners, from 4.3.1989 because the new rule is for more beneficial to them. However, their prayer is without any substance because it is an amendment in law, affecting rights/liabilities of the parties and it is well settle principle of Interpretation of Statutes that in the absence of either express or implied provision to the contrary, a Statute affecting rights/liabilities of the parties shall be construed prospectively and not retrospectively.
6. In support of his argument, Mr. M. Sardar Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for petitioner Dilawar Shah Roghani, that the impugned Notification will operate retrospectively from the date chosen by the petitioners, has placed reliance on (i) 1992 SCMR 1652, (ii) 1997 SCMR 1244, (iii) PLD 2001 SC 370 and (iv) PLD 2005 Peshawar 5 but the authorities quoted at S. Nos, (ii) to (iv) are not relevant to the issue. However, the principle laid down in the authority quoted at S. No, (i) supports the foregoing well settled principle of interpretation of statutes, vide Para-5 above, wherein their Lordships of a Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed that:-- "It seems to be well settled proposition of law that a Notification, which purports to impair an existing or vested right or imposes a new liability or obligation, cannot operate retrospectively in the absence of legal sanction but the converse i,e, a Notification which confirms benefit cannot operate retrospectively does not seem to be correct proposition of law."
7. In support of his argument that the impugned notification is to be given prospective effect, the learned Additional Advocate-General has placed reliance on (i) PLD 2001 Lahore 506, (ii) 2002 SCMR 772, (iii) 2000 SCMR 1297, (iv) PLD 2005 Lahore 596 and 607, and (v) 2003 CLC 319, but out of these authorities, the only relevant authority is PLD 2005 Lahore 596, wherein his Lordship of a Single Bench of the Lahore High Court has held that, "a sub-ordinate legislature like a Notification cannot operate retrospectively but from the date of its issuance", while the rest of the authorities have no relevance to the issue.
8. As already noted, the impugned notification has amended the "Rules" by substituting Rule-31 thereof. It may be mentioned here that the principles, which regulate the interpretation of a statute, must be taken to regulate the interpretation of the rules as well. In support, reference could be made to Page-781 of "UNDERSTANDING STATUTES - CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION" by S. M. Zafar, published by Brite Books, Lahore. As such, the principle of interpretation of Statutes, that a statute, which affects the rights/liabilities of the parties, in the absence of express or implied provision to the contrary, shall be read to have prospective effect and not retrospective, will be equally applicable to the interpretation of such rules but for retrospectivity of such rules, the legal sanction bust be contained in the Act, under which the rules have been made and not in the latter.
9. In support of the above proposition, reliance is placed on the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s. Adamjee Sons (PLD 1967 Karachi 184) wherein their Lordships of a Division Bench of the West Pakistan High Court, Karachi Bench has held that, "it is a settle principle of law that a subordinate delegate authority cannot make rules or issue notification under a Statute so as to give a retrospective effect to them unless the Statute itself grants such power". We respectfully agree with the foregoing dictum of their Lordships. In the present case, the Rules have been framed under the NWFP Urban Development Ordinance, 1978 (N.W.F.P. Ordinance-IV of 1978) but there is nothing therein to show that the Ordinance has authorized the subordinate legislature either to frame rules or amend the same with retrospective effect. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is, therefore, without force.
11. Consequently these writ-petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with costs.