FAZLUR REHMAN KHAN, J.---Writ Petitions Nos.1277 of 2001, No.1572 of 2001, No.1155 of 2002 and No.1229 of 2002 are proposed to be disposed of by this common judgment as a common question of law is involved therein.
2. The brief facts, giving rise to these writ petitions are that petitioner Dilawar Shah Roghani in Writ Petition No.1277 of 2001 joined the service of Provincial Urban Development Board, Peshawar (respondent No.2 and hereinafter referred to as the "Board") on 15-7-1975 and after rendering 26 years' service retired as Legal Director on 20-1-2001, whereas Mahasal Khan, petitioner in Writ petition No.1572 of 2001 joined the services of the Board on 15-11-1976 and after rendering 23 years of service, stood retired as Deputy Director on 20-1-2000. Similarly, Mian Gul, petitioner in Writ Petition No.1155 of 2002 joined the Board on 1-9-1975 and stood retired as Director (Grade 20) on 20-6-1998 while Fakhre Alam, petitioner in Writ Petition No.1229 of 2002 was initially appointed as Family Planning Supervisor on 3-7-1965 but later on, joined the services of the Board as Administrator (Grade 17) and stood retired in the same grade on 11-2-1999.
3. According to the petitioners, on the persistent demands of the employees of the Board for the creation of a Pension/Retirement package, the Board in its 34th and 36th meetings held on 26-7- 2000 and 17-7-2001 respectively, approved a Scheme for Pension, Provident Fund and Gratuity but the same was given effect from 17-7-2001 instead of the date, the scheme was approved. The petitioners, therefore, have prayed that on acceptance of these writ petitions, this Court may be pleased to:-
(i) declare the date (i.e. 17-7-2001) of implementation of the retirement package scheme to be illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect; and
(ii) direct the respondents to give effect to the said Scheme from the 34th Board-in-Council meeting dated 27-6-2000 and released gratuity and other benefits to the petitioners accordingly.
4. In all the four writ petitions, the prayer is one and the same. However, in the Writ Petition No.1277 of 2001, the petitioner has selected the date of enforcement of the package as 26-7-2000 while in the remaining 3 writ petitions, this date has been taken as 4-3-1989. Perusal of the record would show that there is no provisions for Pension for the employees of the Board, nor any such Scheme was approved by the Board in its 34th or 36th meetings, but there is a provision contained in Rule 31 of the Provincial Urban Development Board Service Rules, 1979 (hereinafter called the "Rules) for the grant of gratuity and all these writ petitions in piths and substances are a challenge to the Notification No. PUDB/Admn/ 10601 dated 5-9-2001 whereby Rule ' 31 of the Rules was omitted and a new Rule was substituted therein. It would be appropriate hereto reproduce below the old rule as well as the new one, which read as under:-- "Gratuity-.---
31. Gratuity shall be admissible in lieu of termination of service at the rate of one month's pay per year of employment calculated at the average of the last 12 months pay drawn after completing a minimum service of 10 years with Board/L.A.A. Provided that the termination is not owing to misconduct. Provided further that where the services of an employee are terminated for reasons other than misconduct before his completion of 10 years service the gratuity admissible shall be 20 days wages calculated on the basis of the wages admissible to him in the last month of service for every complete year of service or any part thereof in excess of 5 months."
Gratuity:--- 31(i) The following number of gratuities shall be paid to the employees on their separation from PUDB either in case of attaining the age of superannuation, completion of service, early retirement, disability or death provided that the separation is not owing to misconduct:-- No. Of completed years of service No. Of gratuities 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 8 7 11 8 14 9 17 10 20 11 24 12 38 13 32 14 36 15 40 16 45 17 50 18 55 19 60 20 65 21 71 22 (sic)
23 (sic)
24 89 25 95 26 102 27 109 28 116 29 123 30 and above 130"
5. The new rule was substituted on 5-9-2001 but as per Dilawar Shah Roghani, petitioner, this rule should have been given effect from 27-6-2000, while according to the other three petitioners, from 4-3-1989 because the new rule is for more beneficial to theirs. However, their prayer is without any substance because it is an amendment in law, affecting rights/liabilities of the parties and it is well-settled principle of Interpretation of statutes that in the absence of either express or implied provision to the contrary, a statute affecting rights/liabilities of the parties shall be construed prospectively and not retrospectively.
6. In support of his argument, Mr. M. Sardar Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for petitioner Dilawar Shah Roghani, that the impugned Notification will operate retrospectively from the date chosen by the petitioners, has placed reliance on (i) 1992 SCMR 1652; (ii) 1997 SCMR 1244; (i.e) PLD 2001 SC 370; and (iv) PLD 2005 Pesh. 5, but the authorities quoted at S.No.(ii) to (iv) are not relevant to the issue. However, the principle laid down in the authority quoted at S.No.(i) supports the foregoing well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes, vide para.5 above, wherein their Lordships of a Full Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed that:-- "It seems to be well-settled proposition of law that a notification, which purports to impair an existing or vested right or imposes a new liability or obligation, cannot operate retrospectively in the absence of legal sanction but the converse i.e. a Notification which confirms benefit cannot operate retrospectively does not seem to be correct proposition of law."
7. In support of his argument that the impugned notification is to be given prospective effect the learned Additional Advocate-General has placed reliance on (i) PLD 2001 Lah. 506; (ii) 2002 SCMR 772; '(i.e) 2000 SCMR 1297; (iv) PLD 2005 Lah. 596 and 607 and (v) 2003 CLC 319. But out of these authorities, the only relevant authority is PLD 2005 Lah. 596, wherein his Lordship of a Single Bench of the Lahore High Court held that, "a subordinate Legislature like a notification cannot operate retrospectively but from the date of its issuance", while the rest of the authorities have no relevance to the issue.
8. As already noted, the impugned notification has amended the "Rules" by substituting Rule 31 thereof. It may be mentioned here that the principles, which regulate the interpretation of a statute, must be taken to regular the interpretation of the rules as well. In support, reference could be made to page 781 of Understanding Statutes - Canons of construction by S.M. Zafar, published by Brite Books, Lahore. As such, the principle of interpretation of Statutes, that a statute, which B affects the rights /liabilities of the parties, in the absence of express or implied provision to the contrary, shall be read to have prospective effect and not retrospective, will be equally applicable to the interpretation of such rules but for retrospectivity of such rules, the legal sanction must be contained in the Act, under which the rules have been made and not in the latter.
9. In support of the above proposition, reliance is placed on the case of Commissioner of Income- tax v. Messrs Adamjee Sons PLD 1967 Kar. 184 wherein their Lordships of a Division Bench of the West Pakistan High Court, Karachi Bench has held that, "It is a settled principle of law that a subordinate delegate authority cannot make rules or issue notification under a Statute so as to give a retrospective effect to them unless the statute itself grants such power". We respectfully agree with the foregoing dictum of their Lordships. In the present case, the Rules have been framed under the N.-W.F.P. Urban Development Ordinance, 1978 (N.-W.F.P. Ordinance IV of 1978) but there is nothing therein to show That the Ordinance has authorized the subordinate Legislature either to frame rules or amend the same with retrospective effect. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners i.e., therefore, without force.
11. Consequently, these writ petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with costs.