1. ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.-This petition seeks leave to appeal against an order made by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court on the 26th of November 1977, by which a writ petition moved by the present petitioner to challenge the refusal of the Municipal Committee, Jhelum, to renew his licence for holding a cattle market for the year 1977-78, was dismissed.
2. The relevant facts are that under an agreement entered into between the petitioner and the Administrator of the Municipal Committee, Jhelum on the 15th of July 1972, a licence was issued in favour of the petitioner by the Municipal Committee, authorizing him to hold a cattle market within the Municipal Limits of Jhelum, This action was taken in accordance with an order made by the Controlling Authority on the 8th of July 1972. Clause (vi) of this order contemplated that "the Municipal Committee, Jhelum, reserve the right to revoke the licence at any time without assigning any reason". The licence fee was fixed at Rs. 50,000 per year. It appears that the licence was renewed from year to year, until in January 1977, the authorities decided not to grant any further extension of the lease to the petitioner, and instead to auction the lease right for holding the cattle market. On the 12th of April 1977, a formal notice was served on the petitioner informing him that accord--ing to the instructions of the Provincial Government the lease/licence in question shall be put to auction for period 1st July 1977, to the 30th June 1978, and that the petitioner should take part in the auction. The petitioner managed to obtain a stay order from the Provincial Government, but the same was withdrawn on the 16th of August 1977. The licence was then auctioned on the 24th of August 1977, for a sum of Rs. 8,76,000 as against the fee of Rs. 50,000 which was being paid by the petitioner under the agreement dated the 15th of July 1972.
3. Aggrieved by these actions of the Municipal Authorities the petitioner invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, contending that the Administrator, Municipal Committee, had not applied his independent mind in deciding the question of the cancellation of his licence, but had taken a decision under the influence of the Martial Law Authorities. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge on the ground that the decision not to renew the licence had been taken by the authorities before the imposition of Martial Law, and that the Martial Law authorities appeared to have been instrumental only in getting the status quo order vacated. The learned Judge further observed that, in fact, no licence had been issued to the petitioner for the year in question, namely, 1977-78, therefore, there was no question of the licence having been cancelled. Finally, the learned Judge held that the question whether under the agreement executed between the parties the petitioner had a right to have the licence renewed every year interminable or he had any right to be compensated in case of refusal of the authorities to renew the same, was a matter for the civil Court to decide, and that the petitioner had already filed a suit in the civil Court for this purpose.
4. The learned Judge, therefore, did not think it a proper matter for being dealt with under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. He nevertheless observed that the Administrator of the Municipal Committee should not have brought in mention of Martial Law for the purpose of ousting the jurisdiction of the civil Court, as, in fact, it was not an action of the Martial Law authorities.
5. Leave to appeal is sought on the ground that the licence had been granted to the petitioner under section 64 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, which makes provision for the establishment of a private cattle market, and the same provision has been continued in the shape of section 66 of the Punjab Local Government, Act, 1975, and that under these provisions of law the Municipal Committee was under a legal obligation to grant the licence once the prescribed conditions were satisfied by the petitioner. Mr. A. R. Shaikh submits that the petitioner had been regularly depositing the licence fee as contemplated by the agreement already referred to, and accord--ingly there was no legal ground for refusing to renew the licence for the period 1977-78.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the refusal was mala fide and it stands vitiated by the fact that the petitioner was not given a hearing before the renewal was refused. In support of his contention that the petitioner had a legal right to get his licence renewed, the learned counsel has referred us to observations appearing on page 197 of Judicial Review "by S. A.
7. De Smith", as well as the cases reported as Messrs East and West Steamship Company v. Pakistan and others (PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 41), Small Town Committee, Ram Nager v. Firm Muhammad Sadiq- Barkat A.I and others (PLD 1960 SC 394), Messrs Faridsons Ltd, Karachi and another v. Government of Pakistan and another (PLD 1961 SC 537), Sardar Muhammad and 4 others v. Municipal Committee Jhelum City (PLD 190 SC 497), Messrs Shameem Textile Mills, Lahore v. The Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1972 Lah. 572) and Government of Pakistan and another v. Zamir Ahmad Khan (PLD 1975 SC 667).
8. Mr. Jarry Ullah Khan, appearing for the Municipal Committee, Jhelum, submits that the points now raised on behalf of the petitioner were not agitated in the High Court, nor even in the plaint filed in civil Court, and that a new case is now sought to be made out, which sought not to be permitted in the present proceedings. He contends that the claim of the petitioner being based on a contract, the proper forum for him to agitate his grievance is the civil Court, and not the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. He points out that the petitioner had, in fact, filed a civil suit on the 18th of August 1977, and the filed the writ petition only after his application for an interim injunction had been rejected by the civil Court on the 27th of August 1977. Mr. Jarry Ullah next submits that the petitioner had succeeded in obtaining the licence for a very low annual fee of Rs. 50,000 in 1972 on account of his political influence, and the Municipal authorities had rightly decided to auction the licence, and they had initiated action in this behalf in January 1977, followed by a formal notice to the petitioner in April, 1977 and ultimately the licence was auctioned for an amount of Rs. 8,76,000 for the year in dispute as against Rs. 50,000 payable by the petitioner. Mr. Jarry Ullah further contends that in any case the period in dispute, namely, the financial year 1977-78 has already expired, and, therefore, no direction can now be made for the issuance of the licence with retrospective effect, and the only remedy available to the petitioner is to sue for damages or compensation, if so advised. Lastly.
9. Mr. Jarry Ullah refers us to Muhammad Yaqoob v. Health Officer,Municipal Committee, Hyderabad and another (1973 SCMR 184), for the proposition that no one has any vested right to the issuance of a licence which is in the discretion of the licencor.
10. After hearing the learned counsel for parties at some length, we are of the view that it is not necessary, for the disposal of the present petition, to examine the contention put forward by Mr. A.
11. R. Shaikh as to the legal right vesting in the petitioner to get the licence renewed for financial year 1977-78, as admittedly the period indispute has already expired, and in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction the High Court, or the Supreme Court acting in appeal, could not issue a direction that the licence be renewed within retrospective effect. In the circumstances the only remedy for the petitioner is to ask for damages/compensation if he considers that the renewal has been illegally refused. It would not be proper for us to embark upon any discussion of this question as it would then amount to pre-empting the jurisdiction/ function of the civil Court to which the matter may be taken by the petitioner. We also find that in the High Court as well as in the civil Court the petitioner had based his cases of action on the agreement dated the 15th of July 1972, although the agreement was undoubtedly executed by the Municipal Committee in terms of the relevant statutory provisions authorising it to establish a private cattle market.