' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---Instant appeal, filed by the appellant-Bank, proceeds against order dated 2-1-2002, whereby the learned Judge Banking Court, acting as Executing Court, consigned appellant's execution petition to record on the ground that it was completed.
2. Pursuant to passing a decree for a sum of Rs,7,44,068 with costs, against the respondent, by the then Banking Tribunal (since defunct), vide judgment and decree dated 21-7-1996, the appellant- Bank filed the execution petition. During the execution proceedings, the respondent paid/ deposited different amounts in liquidation of the aforenoted decree and finally the learned Banking Court, after finding that the decree has been satisfied, "filed" the execution petition, "as having been completed" vide impugned order dated 2-1-2002, hence the present appeal.
2-A. This is a represented case. The name of the learned counsel for the respondent has been published in today's cause list, however, none has entered appearance to represent the respondent, thus, he is proceeded ex parte.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the learned Executing Court in its over anxiety disposed of the execution petition, despite the fact that a sum of Rs,1,31,978 is still outstanding against the respondent. He has added that the impugned order is not a speaking order, therefore, liable to be set aside.
4. We have heard the learned counsel and examined the available record. Minute perusal of order sheet of the Executing Court manifests that the respondent, during the execution proceedings, deposited different amounts, which find mention in various orders, passed by the learned Banking Court, which observed from time to time that such and such amount is payable by the respondent.
On 1-7-1999, the learned Banking Court mentioned in its order that as the respondent has deposited a sum of Rs,1,00,000, therefore, remaining amount comes to Rs,2,80,000. Similarly, in orders dated 14-9-1999, 11-10-1999, 4-1-2000, 14-3-2000 and 8-8-2000, it was noticed by the Banking Court that the outstanding amount, against the respondent, is Rs,2,20,000, Rs,1,70,000, Rs,70,000, Rs,55,000 and Rs,40, 000, respectively. It appears appropriate to reproduce the said orders, which reads as follows:-{{URDU TEXT}} ' It would not be out of place to mention here that the respondent deposited the residue amount of Rs,40,000, which itself find mention in the impugned order.
5. The narrative of aforenoted orders is sufficient to show that the total decretal amount was paid by the respondent. Undoubtedly, the aforenoted orders were passed in the presence of the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the decree-holder attended each and every date of hearing and was, thus, aware about the development of the execution proceedings. Although the said orders were passed in the presence of the learned counsel for the decree-holder, as noted above, yet the appellant-Bank neither challenged those orders at an appropriate stage nor raised any such objection before the learned Banking Court. It may be noted that the appellant-Bank even did not file any application, before the learned Banking Court, seeking rectification of the said orders and agitating that the amounts, stated to be outstanding against the respondent in different orders, are incorrect. The appellant-Bank, through its learned counsel, participated in the proceedings and, thus, was aware about the different orders including the aforenoted orders, passed by the learned Banking Court. The aforenoted orders are indicative of the fact that the respondent deposited different amounts, in satisfaction of the decree, which were accepted by the appellant-Bank, inasmuch as the same were duly acknowledged by it. In view of the conduct of the appellant-Bank, now it cannot be legitimately argued that some amount is outstanding against the respondent. It would not be out of place to mention here that the appellant did not challenge the aforenoted orders, passed by the learned Banking Court in the present appeal. We have examined the memorandum of appeal and do not find that the A appellant-Bank has assailed those orders as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal, as required under section 105, C.P.C. It flows therefrom that the appellant acknowledged those orders as correct, acquiesced over the matter and that was the reason why the said orders were not challenged before the higher forum at the relevant point of time and not even in the present appeal. Principle of estoppel operates very harshly against the appellant.
6. In the above perspective, we have examined the impugned order and find that it is apt to the facts and circumstances of the case and does not suffer from any legal infirmity, thus, no interference is called for by this Court.
7. Upshot of the above discussion is that the present appeal is devoid of merits, hence stands dismissed v I h no order as to costs.