This revision petition has been filed against an order of Mian Habib-urRahman, Additional District Judge, Lahore, dated 12th November 1979.
2. The plaintiff-respondent was an Inspector in the District Evacuee Trust Committee, Multan. On 17th January 1969, his services were terminated for misconduct. He, therefore, filed a civil suit to challenge this order.
3. The suit was contested by the petitioners on various grounds. The learned trial Court framed the following issues : "(1) Whether the impugned order is illegal ? O. P. P.
(2) Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action ? O. P. D.
(3) Whether this suit is not maintainable in its present form ? O. P, D.
(4) Whether this suit is time barred ? O. P. D.
(5) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the present suit ? O. P. D.
(6) Relief."
4. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the appointment o the plaintiff -respondent was on temporary basis and his services could be terminated at any time without assigning any reason, but the learned trial Court did not agree with this and found Issue No. 1 against the petitioners on the ground that it was not a case of simple termination of services since the removal of the respondent was directed on ground of hill misconduct, and such an order could not be passed without following the procedure provided by the Rules. The learned trial Court, however, dismissed the suit on a finding on Issues Nos. 3 and 5 against the plaintiff-respondent. It held that the remedy of the plaintiff lay before the higher Authorities or he could file a writ petition in the High Court, but be could not file a civil suit.
5. In appeal the learned Additional District Judge found Issues Nos. 3 and 5 to have been incorrectly decided in the circumstances of the case. He, therefore, decreed the suit.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the petitioners being only a statutory corporation the relationship between it and its employees were governed by the law of mater and servant and consequently no suit for declaration could be filed to challenge the order of termination of service. The only remedy of the petitioners was to file a suit for damages.
7. The learned counsel relied upon Pakistan Refugee and Rehabilitation Corporation v. Syed Karamat Hussain (PLD 1966 Lah. 442) in which it was held that servants of Refugee and Rehabilitation Corporation have no conditional protection or safeguard like civil servants and as such they are governed only by the law of master and servant. No civil suit for declaration by an employee of the Corporation is, therefore, competent.
8. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that this principle would not apply to a case where removal of an employee of a Corporation is ordered in violation of provisions of statutory rules.
9. 1 agree with the argument of the learned counsel that the civil suit was competent since the rules of service governing the petitioners are statutory rules. The case is distinguishable from those cases where it w held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the dispute between statutory corporation and its employees are governed by the law of master and servant and in case of such dispute the only remedy for the employees is to file suits for damages even though the employees have been removed or dismissed from service without being granted an opportunity of being heard. The cases to this effect are Lahore Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Saif Ullah Shah (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 210), Pakistan v. Naseem Ahmad (PLD 1961 SC 445) Messrs Malik & Haq and another v. Muhammad Shams-ul-Islam (PLD 1961 SC 531) and Chairman, East Pakistan Development Corporation v. Rustam Ali (PLD 1966 SC 848).
10. But this principle does not apply to a case where the relations between employer and the employees are governed by the statutory rules. This is clear from the observation in the Lahore Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Saif Ullah Shah in which reliance was'' placed upon a resolution passed by the Managing Committee to the effect that the Civil Services Rules would apply to the Bank's employees. It was held that this could not help the employees since the resolution was not passed in oh, form of a rule. The portion underlined" by me established that in the view of their Lordships of the Supreme Court a different view would have been taken if Saifullah Shah's employment had been governed by statutory rules. In the case of Messrs Malik & Hag and another v. Muhammad Shams-ul-Islam the principle of master and servant was applied in the absence of any statutory provision. In Ijaz Ahmad Siddiqui v. Municipal Committee (1) a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan entered a caveat that "we should not be understood as saying that a Municipality or another corporate body is absolutely immune from the writ jurisdiction in the matter of grant of redress to an aggrieved employee even if the impugned order suffers from an inherent vice and is for that reason ab initio." Similar view was taken in District Board Lahore v. Agha Muhammad Khan (PLD 1957 LAH 780) Abdul Ghafoor v. The Thai Development Authority Jauharabad (PLD 1958 LAH 169), Deputy Managing Director, National Bank of Pakistan v. Ataul Haq (PLD 19655 Kart 104), Manni v Karachi Cantonment Board (PLD 1969 Kart 304) M. S. Faruki v. Province vi West Pakistan (PLD 1970 LAH 195), Secretary, East Pakistan industrial Development Corporation v.
Md. Serajul ffaqquc (1970 SCMR 398), Province of East Pakistan v. Mumtajud Din Ahmad (PLD 1971 Dacca 235), Fayyaz Hussain v. Administration Lahore Municipal Corporation (PLD 1972 LAH 31) and Abdul Razzaq v WAPDA (PLD 1973 LAH 188). In view . Of this 'consistent view, I agree that the civil suit was not incompetent.
10. This question was agitated in some other cases filed against the employees by the Board. In Zulfiqar Khan v. Chairman Evacuee Trust Board Writ Petition No. 1.709/5 of 1969 decided on 1st October 1974, it was held that the employees of the Evacuee Trust Board were governed by the Efficiency and Discipline Rules of the Central Government and where an order of termination of service was preceded by a charge-sheet and an explanation which was found unsatisfactory, the charge-sheet played an important part and the order of termination of service war by way of penalty and not in accordance with the tennis of the employment of the employee. It could not be sustained unless the procedure laid down, by the Rules was followed. Same view had been taken earlier in Writ Petition No. 1542/S of 1972 Muhammad Ramzan v. The Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board and another decided on 13th May 1974, Writ Petition No. 217 of 1972 Maqbool Ahmad and others v. Inayat Hussain and others decided on 22nd May 1974, and Writ Petition No. 152/S of 1972 Nur Elahi v. The Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board and another decided on the same date. Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal Nos. 645 and 646 of 1974 were filed by the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board against the two latter cases which were dismissed. It was urged -before their Lordships of the Supreme Court that Evacuee Trust Property Board had not framed any Rules prescribing the procedure for the removal or dismissal of the Board's employees, and secondly the issuance of show- cause notices gave sufficient opportunity- to the respondents.
Under paragraph No. 43 of the Scheme framed under section 16-A(1) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and under section. 14(2) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, the Evacuee Trust Board was authorised to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Scheme. Paragraph 16 of the Scheme provided that no employee of the Board shall be dismissed or otherwise punished except in accordance with rules framed by the Board and approved by the Central Government. The Evacuee Trust Board passed the following resolution in the 60th meeting of the Board held in May 1969, by which it was resolved that-- "Agreed. Central Government Rules would apply to the Board's employees for all intents and purposes."
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled the argument of the learned counsel for the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Board on the basis of this resolution and held that it amounted to the making of Rules by the Board.
11. It is clear that the employees of the Board were governed by the Efficiency and Discipline Rules.
The order of termination of service of the respondent was based on a finding of misconduct which leaves a stigma on the respondent. In these circumstances, I agree that this was a case of B penalty in which the procedure laid down by paragraph No. 16 should have been applied. The impugned order of the Board was not sustainable and the suit was rightly decreed. I find no ground to interfere.
12. The petition is dismissed with costs.
S. Q.