1. A. S. CHOWDHURY, J.-It would appear from the memo randum of appeal that it is directed against an order dated 8th June 1967, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, Abdulla, J. In Matter No. 23 of 1963 in the Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. Nurul Islam who appears for the appellant however, submits that this appeal is in effect directed against the order made on the 5th July 1966.
2. The appeal arises in the following circumstances. The Pioneer Bank is in liquidation and the State Bank of Pakistan has been appointed Official Liquidator of the said Bank.
3. The appellant Suruj Mia is one of the dobtors of the said Bank and it is alleged that he owes a sum of Rs. 16,449.50 to the Bank. The Liquidator, the State Bank of Pakistan, took the view that a sum of Rs. 3,500.00 in lump as offered by the debtor should be accepted and a compromise petition should be filed in the Executing Court in Money Execution Case No. 1 of 1964 pending in the 2nd Court of the Subordinate Judge, Comilla.
4. It will appear from the petition for direction filed by the State Bank of Pakistan that the prayer for approving the compromise was on the ground that the debtor is an old man of 73 and financially ruined and that some of his relations have agreed to advance him the said amount of Rs. 3,500 to save him from ruination. It is also stated therein that the Bank finds it difficult to realise the amount by execution proceeding ; for the properties already auction-purchased by the Bank b; longed to others as would appear from some of the registered deeds produced in an earlier Execution Case No. 4 of 1960 by the debtor. In these circumstances the liquidator thought that if the matter was not amicably compromised, the only course open to "it would be to continue litigation in the Civil Court for years together without material gain." This prayer was rejected by the learned Judge taking Company Matters on 5-7-66.
5. Mr. Nurul Islam learned Advocate for the appellant submits that the order is not sustainable for, the learned Judge has rejected the prayer of the Official Liquidator without reason and that his client is in jeopardy of losing his liberty for the Official Liquidator has been directed to put him into civil prison. This contention of Mr. Nurul Islam, we shall presently indicate, is the outcome of misunderstanding of the order and the result of unfounded apprehension.
6. Mr. Rahul Islam's contention is however, that the appal i5 plot maintainable, We would at this stage quote with advantage the impugned order dated 6-7-66 in extenso "With regard to report filed to day which has reference to prayer No. G of the summons for direction filed on 3-3-1966, the Official Liquidator's prayer is rejected. He is directed to proceed with the execution case and to put the debtor in Civil Imprisonment for realisation of the decretal dues. He must take steps immediately."
7. It seems that the learned Judge's order has been thoroughly mis--understood by Mr. Nurul Islam.
8. He ought to have appreciated that the Official Liquidator cannot put his client into prison, nor did Abdulla, J., mean it. The Execution Court cannot put Mr. Nurul Islam's client into prison, unless the matter is brought within the circumstances laid down in section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
9. This order, therefore, is to be read as a direction on the liquidator for making prayer to the Executing Court for such a course being adopted, we would emphasise only if circumstances specified in section 51 of the Code arises. The only result of the impugned order as found by us is that the prayer of the liquidator to compromise with the debtor has been rejected and it has been directed to proceed with the Execution Case. An order of this nature is an administrative order.
10. The question as to whether an appeal lies against an order made by a Single Judge sitting in the Original Side of this Court came to be considered in the case of Dacca Jute Mills Ltd. And others v.
11. Satish Chandra Banik and others (19 D L R 735). In that case it has been held that the Companies Act provides a complete code of procedure governing appeal and it has precluded appeals from judgments and orders made under the Act, except those that are made under sections 38, 153(7) and 202 of the Act. It is rightly pointed out by Mr. Ruhul Islam that orders are not actually made under section 202 of the Act, but the various orders under Chapter V of the Act relating to winding up matters are contem--plated in section 202 of the Act. An appeal would lie against such an order. This view finds support in the case of Sansar Chand and others v. Punjab Industrial Bank Ltd., Lahore (AIR 1929 Lah. 707). A Full Bench of that Court consisting of Broadway, Zafar A.I and Jai Lal, JJ., held that the Language of section 202 is wide enough to cover appeals against all orders made in the matter of the winding up of a company, provided such an order finally t decides a dispute between the parties or deprives the appellant of a substantial and important right and is not a mere formal or interlocutory order.
12. A petition of a routine nature such as the one before us cannot be held to have given rise to a dispute between the parties, nor are we inclined to hold that the impugned order has deprived the appellant of a substantial or important right, for it cannot be held that he had a right to compromise.
13. The view expressed above to the effect that no appeal would lie against any administrative order passed by a Judge sitting in Original Side of this Court finds support in the case of Shankarlall Poddar v. Gobinda Prosad Lath and others (AIR 1959 Cal. 324). In that case al Division Bench of that Court consisting of K. C. Das Gupta, C. J. And R. S. Bachawat J. Observed: "There can be no doubt that if the order made is administra--tive in nature an appeal would not lie under the provisions of section 202 of the Companies Act."
14. Mr. Nurul Islam, points out that his client has deposited Rs. 3,500 in pursuance of the proposed compromise and therefore the learned Judge ought to have directed the Liquidator to file an application to the Executing Court for recording the terms of compromise. We are not impressed with this argument as well. The amount was deposited with an Officer of the Bank subject to the approval of the proposal for compromise by the learned Company Judge ; it would logically follow that when the proposal for compromise has been turned down the Liquidator will have no right to retain the amount which has been deposited by the debtor in good faith.
15. Mr. Nurul Islam then argues that the observation of Abdulla, J. May have adverse affect on the mind of the Sub--ordinate Court. It should be remembered in this case the direction is not on any Subordinate Court by a Judge of a High Court but the direction is by the Company Judge to the official Liquidator, an Officer of this Court and that it is plainly the duty of the Executing Court concerned to pass such order as may be warranted by circumstances. He has to apply law to the facts and circumstances of the case and exercise his discretion. We have already made it sufficiently clear that the observation of the learned Judge will not influence in any manner the decision of the Executing Court.
16. For the reasons stated above, we are of opinion that this appeal is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.