This is an application filed under Section 151, C.P.C. read with Section 5 Civil Courts Amendment Ordinance, 2002. Through this application the Defendant No. 1 has sought directions for transfer of the present suit for trial to Civil Court on the ground that the plaintiff has overvalued the suit as its correct value is less than three million rupees.
2. In the present suit the plaintiff has sought reliefs of declaration accounts and dissolution of a partnership firm being run in the name and style of Najmi's Footwear in a shop in Bohri Bazar Saddar, Karachi. The valuation of various reliefs are given by the plaintiff in paragraph 8 of the plaint which is reproduced hereunder: "8. That for the purposes of Court-fees and jurisdiction the suit is valued at Rs. 1,500,000.00 for declaration, for accounts at Rs. 1,000,000.00 for dissolution at Rs. 500,000.00 and for the relief of Receivership at Rs. 50,000.00. The Plaintiffs have paid maximum Court Fees of Rs. 15,000.00 thereon."
3. It is contended by Defendant No. l's counsel that the aggregate value of the suit in paragraph 8 of the plaint has been shown at Rs. 3,050,000 which include Rs. 50,000 as value for the relief of Receivership. He submitted that the relief of Receivership being of interim nature, the same could not be made basis for valuation of the suit. It was therefore contended that when the valuation of.
Rs. 50,000 for the relief of Receivership is ignored, the residual value of the suit become Rs.
3,000,000 only, making it triable before Civil Court under Section 5 of the Civil Courts (Amendment)
Ordinance No. XXX (Sindh) of 2002. He also contended that the plaintiffs have also overvalued the reliefs of declaration.
4. It is a settled principle that jurisdiction of Courts cannot be ousted by undue overvaluation of claims made in a suit as it amounts to fraud upon the law. The Courts should not allow a plaintiff to evade the law relating to I the matters of jurisdiction. Where it is found that plaintiff has deliberately exaggerated his claim in order to bring his suit in a Court which otherwise would not have jurisdiction, the plaint should be returned for presentation before Court of appropriate jurisdiction.
5. In the present suit reliefs for declaration and accounts of a partnership concern has been sought. I will therefore first examine the relevant provisions of the Court Fees Act in order to see whether the plaintiffs have committed any legal error in the valuation of the suit. The relevant provisions are sub-sections (iv)(c) and (t) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act which read a follows: "Section 7 of the Court Fees Act
6. Computation of fees payable in certain suits for money.--The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suit next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:-- (i)..........................................
(ii)..........................................
(iii)..........................................
(iv)In suits .....................................................
(a)................................................
(b)................................................
(c)For a declaratory decree and consequential relief.-- To obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed, .
(d)................................................
(e)................................................
(f) for accounts: for accounts: according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal; in all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the reliefs sought.
6. Reading all sub-sections of section 7 it becomes apparent that in contrast to other sub- sections, sub-section (iv) of Section 7 has given discretion to the plaintiff to value his suit as he deems appropriate. The words used in the concluding part, of sub-section, (iv) of Section 7 which are underlined by me are according to the amount at which the relief is valued-in the plaint" and "the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the reliefs sought". The object of entrusting the plaintiff with such an absolute discretion in cases covered by sub-section (iv) of Section 7 appears to be that it was difficult for the lawmakers to provide basis for valuing the suit covered by the said sub-section with any precision. Thus, once the plaintiff puts his own valuation to a suit. covered 'under sub-section (iv) of Section 7, the jurisdiction of the Court where suit is to be tried is determined. In such cases the defendants do not have the option to' seek interference of the Court for re-determination of the value in order to seek change in the forum before which suit is to be tried as the Court cannot question plaintiffs valuation, however, arbitrary it may be.
7. It is also a settled principle that where a plaintiff puts value for the purposes of declaration and also for the purpose of other reliefs, it is their cumulative value of all the reliefs which determines the jurisdiction of the Court before which the suit is to be filed. Section 17 of the Court Fees Act reads as follows: Section 17 of Court Fees Act
17. Multifarious suits.--Where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act.
Nothing in the former part of this Section shall be deemed to affect the power conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 9.
8. Aggregate value of only such reliefs are to be taken into account which are distinct in nature.
Where one relief is not distinct from other and appears to be only superfluous or not arising out of the suit, the same cannot be joined together to determine value for the purposes of jurisdiction. In the present case none of the reliefs sought by the plaintiff can be regarded as superfluous or not arising .in the suit except for the relief of Receivership which though arising in the suit, is purely of interim nature. Only such reliefs, decision on which result in final resolution of a controversy, are to be valued for the purposes of valuation of a suit and not the reliefs which are purely of interim nature and are sought till the disposal of the final controversy in suit. Therefore, such relief cannot be made basis for the purposes of valuing a suit. Thus only such reliefs, which are distinct from the other and are of final in nature are to be combined together for the purposes of valuation of a suit.
The value of R.s. 50,000 attributed for the relief of Receivership in the present case is therefore unwarranted and has to be ignored from the aggregate valuation of the suit.
9. It was also contented by the defendants' Advocate that the value for the relief of declarations with regard to dissolution of partnership and alleged forged documents is not warranted by law as such specific reliefs do not find mention in Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. He therefore contends that value of such declarations be also reduced from the aggregate valuation. This argument is utterly misconceived. Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act only speaks about seeking relief of declaration and of consequential relief. It does not speak of the nature of declaration or of the consequential relief, which a plaintiff has to seek in p a suit. The nature of such reliefs entirely depends upon the grievance, which the plaintiff brings to the Court and is discernible from the contents of the plaint. Therefore, all such reliefs, which flow from the contents of the plaint are legally permissible and can be sought by a plaintiff. No restrictions can be imposed on the nature of declarations, which a plaintiffs can seek as long as they are lawful and arise from the contents of the plaint. In this regard reference can be had to the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, which read as follows: Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act
42. Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right. Bar to such declaration.--Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and, the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief.
10. From the bare reading of Section 42 of Specific Relief Act it becomes evident that a plaintiff is entitled to ask for any relief to which he is entitled under the law which relates to his claim either to any legal character or to a right in a property. Therefore, in order to seek declaration or consequential relief it is not necessary that such reliefs must find mention in Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act or for that matter in any other provision of the Court Fees Act. The plaintiffs are therefore justified in seeking declaratory reliefs with regard to dissolution of the firm or for declaration with regard to their claim of forgery of documents.
11.From the above discussion it has become quite apparent that apart from the value attributed to the relief of Receivership all other reliefs have been rightly valued. This brings the value of the suit to exactly three million rupees. However, there is another aspect of the case. Apart from the present suit, there are three other suits, which have been consolidated with the present case. These are.
Suit No. 1477 of 1999, Suit No. 1696 of 1999 and Suit No. 548 of 2000. The present suit was consolidated with Suit No. 1477 of 1999 and Suit No. 1696 of 1999 vide consent order dated 15-5-2000 passed in Suit No. 1696 of 1999 and Suit No. 548 was later connected with the three suits vide order dated 6-11-2000. In all the four suits common issues are to be framed and common evidence is to be led in terms of consent order dated 15-5-2000 in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting judgments. Furthermore, Suit No. 1477 of 1999 was filed with regard to partition and possession of the shop in which partnership business i.e. Najami's Shoes was being run and the same has been valued at Rs. 6,500,000. In view of the consolidation of Suit No. 1477 of 1999, the joint value of the subject-matter of controversy travels much beyond three million rupees. Therefore there would be no justification to dispatch this case to lower Court for trial. It would also defeat the very purpose for which all the four suits were consolidated, with the consent of the parties.
12.In addition to the above, another overriding factor which warrants dismissal of the present application is that this Court possesses concurrent jurisdiction alongwith the Civil Courts as was held by the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case reported in PLD 1981 Karachi 210. In the said reported judgment there is elaborate discussion on the con-currency of jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, this Court has the power to try the present suit irrespective of its valuation.
13. In view of the above discussion, this Court can proceed with the trial of the present case and therefore C.M.A. No. 1257 of 2004 is dismissed with no order as to costs.